The self-conscious artist and the politics of art: from institutional critique to underground cinema by Kosmaoglou, Sophia
 1 
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS ARTIST AND THE POLITICS OF ART: FROM 
INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE TO UNDERGROUND CINEMA 
 
Sophia Kosmaoglou, June 2012 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 










I hereby formally declare that the work presented in this thesis 




I would like to thank all those who have contributed to this thesis, there are more than 
I can mention.  
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr John Chilver for his patient support and incisive 
criticism. I extend my gratitude to my former supervisors Professor Nick De Ville and 
Dr Janet Hand who over many years provided consistent support and advice.  
Many thanks to Lia Yoka for her encouragement. Her excellent writing and passion for 
scholarly research were the inspiration for this endeavour.  
Many thanks to all the Exploders, current and former. I especially want to thank Matt 
Lloyd, David Viey, Angel Daden, Morgan Paton, Amada Egbe, Ben Slotover and 
Caroline Kennedy for their support. My grateful thanks to Peter Thomas and Duncan 
Reekie for their advice and support. Their research and critical writing was a constant 
inspiration for my own.  
I gratefully acknowledge the support of IKY the Greek Institute of State Scholarships. 
Without their support, this thesis would not have been possible. 
Many thanks to my mother Reveka, my sister Maria and my brother Kristos, who 
contributed an enormous amount of energy to this project. 
I extend my gratitude to my friends for lending their ear to my rants, for their support 
and patience. My deepest thanks to Brian Steel for his continuous support and keen 
enthusiasm for my work. 
This PhD thesis is dedicated to Mike Riley and Damian Abbott. 
 4 
ABSTRACT 
The current debates about political art or aesthetic politics do not take the politics of 
art into account. How can artists address social politics when the politics of art remain 
opaque? Artists situated critically within the museum self-consciously acknowledge the 
institutional frame and their own complicity with it. Artists’ compromised role within the 
institution of art obscures their radically opposed values. Institutions are conservative 
hierarchies that aim to augment and consolidate their authority. How can works of art 
be liberating when the institutional conditions within which they are exhibited are 
exclusive, compromised and exploitive? Despite their purported neutrality, art 
institutions instrumentalise art politically and ideologically. Institutional mediation 
defines the work of art in the terms of its own ideology, controlling the legitimate 
discourse on value and meaning in art. In a society where everything is 
instrumentalised and heteronomously defined, autonomous art performs a social 
critique. Yet how is it possible to make autonomous works of art when they are 
instantly recuperated by commercial and ideological interests? At a certain point, my 
own art practice could no longer sustain these contradictions. This thesis researches 
the possibilities for a sustainable and uncompromised art practice. If art is the critical 
alternative to society then it must function critically and alternatively. Artistic ambition 
is not just a matter of aesthetic objectives or professional anxiety; it is particularly a 
matter of the values that artists affirm through their practice. Art can define its own 
terms of production and the burden of responsibility falls on artists. The Exploding 
Cinema Collective has survived independently for twenty years, testifying to this 
principle. Autonomy is a valuable tool in the critique of heteronomy, but artists must 
assert it. The concept of the autonomy of art must be replaced with the concept of the 
autonomy of the artist. 
 
KEYWORDS: art, art institution, autonomy, institution, contemporary art, critique, 
Exploding Cinema, institutional critique, ideology, politics, political, aesthetic, agency, 
museum, use-value, underground cinema.
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INTRODUCTION 
The period between the 1940s and 1970s saw a radical expansion of art into public 
space; it took the form of protest, confrontation and provocation. This was an 
international phenomenon and ranged from groups like Cobra, the Lettrists and the 
Situationist International in Paris to the Art Workers’ Coalition in New York; the Gutai 
Art Association, Butoh and Angura theaters in Japan; COUM Transmissions, Artists’ 
Placement Group and the Film-makers’ Co-op in London. There was Fluxus, the 
Viennese Actionists, Gustav Metzger’s auto-destructive art, Gordon Matta-Clark’s 
building cuts and Richard Long, Michael Heizer and Robert Smithson’s forays into the 
landscape.  
What are the factors that have contributed to the current state of affairs, where artists 
seek approval and support from the very authorities they purportedly seek to 
challenge? Where art is ubiquitous but neatly institutionalised, safe and predictable. Art 
fairs supplement their commercial function with critical components in the form of 
panel discussions and entertainment value with the recuperation of performance art as 
spectacle.1 The art world appears to be constantly transformed by the appearance of 
new artists, new trends and new spaces. However, the conventions of the art world 
and the major centres of power remain consistently the same. Andrea Fraser points 
out that affirmations of the positive changes that have taken place within the art world 
since the 1970s do not account for the persistent underlying distributions of power 
within the art world that are legitimated by these positive changes (Fraser, 2005, p. 
104).  
…the enormous expansion of museum audiences, celebrated under the 
banner of populism, has proceeded hand in hand with the continuous 
rise of entrance fees, excluding more and more lower-income visitors, 
and the creation of new forms of elite participation with increasingly 
differentiated hierarchies of membership, viewings, and galas (Fraser, 
2005, p. 104)  
Paradoxically, it is critical, confrontational or experimental art exhibited in alternative, 
independent and artist-run spaces, which sustain the radical profile of contemporary 
art and the mainstream market. Even though the later thrives on the sale of 
established and secure investments. Since the beginning of the art-market bubble in 
                                            
1 For example, Art Parcours the new “special exhibition project” at Art Basel, with a line-up of 
“high-caliber pieces, selected by Jens Hoffmann”, a performance spectacle throughout the city 
designed as a side-show for the market <www.artbasel.com/parcours>. 
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the 1980s, art is in “crisis”. The conceptual artists’ dematerialised critique was 
especially vulnerable to recuperation and the spectacular subversive complicity of the 
postmodernists proved particularly suited to commodification. Regardless of its 
oppositional premises, critical work is easily recuperated by the very structures under 
critique. Jean Baudrillard argues that subversive tactics are meaningless because 
“transgression and subversion never get ‘on the air’ without being subtly negated as 
they are: transformed into models, neutralised into signs, they are eviscerated of their 
meaning” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 173). This paradoxical outcome is attributed to the 
equivocation and ironic distance of postmodernism. Jurgen Habermas argues that 
despite its subversive premises, postmodernism reinforces the values of bourgeois art 
and capitalism:  
More or less in the entire Western world a climate has developed that 
furthers capitalist modernization processes as well as trends critical of 
cultural modernism. The disillusionment with the very failures of those 
programs that called for the negation of art and philosophy has come to 
serve as a pretense for conservative positions. (Habermas, 1983, pp. 
13-14) 
Benjamin Buchloh similarly argues that artists’ appropriation of marketing and 
consumer techniques effectively comes across as an affirmation of capitalism, because 
“even the mere thought and the slightest gesture of opposition appear dwarfed and 
ludicrous in the face of the totalitarian control and domination by spectacle” (Buchloh, 
2000, pp. xxi-xxii). The corporate appropriation of art and the collusion between art 
and business has been thematised in public discussions and artists’ critiques alike. 
Despite these developments, the art world seems to continue ever more productively 
with business as usual.   
Interest and ambition 
What does the artist want besides subsistence? Is the artist’s final goal 
money? If not, what is it? Love? Fame (i.e. temporary notoriety)? 
Immortality? (Art Workers’ Coalition, 1969) 
What motivates artists? Is this equivalent to asking “what is art?” Artistic ambition is 
usually framed as a professional anxiety. Competitiveness and competitions are 
inconsistent phenomena in a field that promotes the singularity of its products, but 
professional agendas drive artistic practice, they also however establish the 
fundamental values that are affirmed through art practice. In his essay Money, 
Disembodied Art, and the Turing Test for Aesthetics (1997), Julian Stallabrass surveys 
contemporary art: “a vista at once chaotic and strangely uniform” with a feeling that 
art is currently in a great deal of trouble:  
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…high culture appears to have pulled up at a dead end, though 
somehow artists still carry on making things […] culture is stripped of 
the narrative of modernism, of the promise of a happy ending, and 
when even the liberatory promise of postmodernism has declined into 
market-niche relativism, it is hard to know how, where or indeed why to 
proceed. (Stallabrass, 1997, p. 70) 
For Stallabrass, one of the valid responses to this situation is “an ethical philistinism” in 
the form of “a principled refusal of culture” (Stallabrass, 1997, p. 69). The art world is 
at once a fascinating scene of rich diversity and a tightly structured, predictable and 
impenetrable procession of exhibitions, distinctions and prices. Since 2008, 
Beaconsfield Gallery and City & Guilds Art School in London have organised a series of 
discussions titled Art & Compromise in order to address the various forms of 
compromise that enter into art practice, as well as the “criteria that might be used to 
condemn or commend these effects”, the following blurb provides a background to the 
aims of this series:  
The 20th century concept of the artist as a politically alienated idealist 
has undergone significant shifts in recent years. Is there any form of 
moral obligation still within art’s purpose? What price integrity? Can the 
negotiations of compromise be catalysts for creative invention? 
(Beaconsfield, 2011).  
This conception of the artist as a “politically alienated idealist” is completely outdated, 
eclipsed by the increased professionalisation of art practice. The questions facing 
artists today do not revolve around the ambiguous demand of a “moral obligation”, 
which is incompatible with the clearly political character of the autonomy of art. 
Whereas art continues to be defined by the concept of autonomy, the “political” turn in 
art,2 suggests that we are moving into a more social conception of art. Socially-
engaged practices nevertheless take place within a field circumscribed by the 
autonomy of art. Current debates about political art or aesthetic politics do not take 
the politics of art into account. How can artists address social politics when the politics 
of the art field remain opaque? Taking professional, aesthetic, institutional, social and 
political factors into account, this thesis provides a philosophical and practical 
investigation of the possibilities for critical autonomy in art practice. 
It is increasingly untenable for artists to produce art in apparent ignorance of the art 
institution’s constraining grip. Every attempt to address this problem takes the form of 
                                            
2 The political turn is evident in the current engagement with the political relevance of art in 
exhibition themes, art journals and in art practices described as political art, situational 
aesthetics, relational aesthetics, socially engaged and collaborative art practices. 
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rhetorical critique that remains dependent on the context of the institution. 
Institutional critique has shown the limits of self-reflexivity and self-critique. This 
paradox is especially pronounced within neo-liberal economies, as art institutions 
become increasingly possessive of art, its representation and the discourse that 
surrounds it. 
Hopeful artists who appeal for entry at the gate of the art world have an idealised view 
of what such inclusion actually involves and brings with it: superficial and 
instrumentalised relationships, degrading negotiations with dealers and curators, 
resentment from other artists. The main problem however, is that the work of art itself 
is always secondary to the more important issues at stake in the professional art world: 
sales, exposure, competition, publicity and networking. This state of affairs redefines 
the notion of “ambition” for artists, prioritising professional anxiety above the formal, 
political or aesthetic intentions of the practice. This situation makes artists feel both 
impotent and confused because the artwork is unable to transcend the institutional 
context and assert its own conditions of possibility. It is almost impossible to express 
one’s disagreement or to challenge this state of affairs from within the institution. The 
institutional context surpasses any effort by the work of art to self-consciously 
acknowledge or challenge the conventions of the art world effectively without being 
subsumed once again into the category of “art”.  
There is a recent surge to produce art that intervenes in the real space of everyday 
experience. Dematerialised and ephemeral event-like works of art proliferate in 
museums, galleries and virtual spaces. Art institutions however convert this concept of 
“free” space into one more reified commodity. The 2010 open call for proposals titled 
Nomadic devices loom around the museum for two projects in public spaces of Mataró 
and Vic in Spain,3 was conceived as a research project “on the construction of mobile 
devices as elements of an expanded concept of the Museum or going as far as being 
an alternative to it” (Idensitat, 2011). The project aimed to reflect on: 
…those projects which, circulating in the public space, challenge the 
conventional notion of the Museum and reformulate instead the 
functions of the exhibition display as a nomadic platform nurturing 
direct and self-managed participation, development of social research 
and dissemination of educational experiences. (Idensitat, 2011)  
                                            
3 Curated by Marti Peran and realized together with Idensitat <www.idensitat.net>, Can Xalant 
Centre de Creacio i Pensament Contemporani de Mataro <www.canxalant.org>, ACVic Centre 
d’Arts Contemporànies <www.acvic.org>.  
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The organisers draw on Marcel Duchamp’s Boîte-en-valise (1941) and Roger Filliou’s 
Galerie Légitime in his hat (1962), admitting that the notion of “travelling art” has 
“been the object of a recent co-optation by the conventional Museum”. They 
emphasise the “invasive phenomenon” and the “proliferation of attempts to expand the 
perimeter of the traditional Museum with portable structures” in order to reinforce the 
“expansion of the museum’s narrative models”,4 and promote these “looming nomadic 
devices” as an understanding of “the exhibition cell as a space for reception and 
creation of plural and critical narratives against the hegemonic model” (Idensitat, 
2011). The project is conceived as a series of events or “parkings” and hinges on the 
CX-R, an adapted caravan designed by Argentine architects a77 and Pau Faus in 2009 
(Can Xalant, 2011):  
Its portability allows the center to expand into the public arena, 
establish collaborations with its environment, and expand its scope of 
action and repercussion. (Idensitat, 2011)  
The project betrays the influence of Michael Asher’s Installation Münster (Caravan), 
first exhibited in 1977 at Skulptur Projekte Münster. Asher’s concept has been 
institutionally appropriated and recalibrated as one more aesthetic practice, an 
identifiable, reproducible and regularised strategy. 
De-mystification 
For Seth Siegelaub, a key word in the early days of conceptual art was “de-
mystification”:  
…we thought that we could demystify the role of the museum, the role 
of the collector, and the production of the artwork; for example, how 
the size of a gallery affects the production of art, etc. In that sense, we 
tried to demystify the hidden structures of the art world. (O’Neill, 2007, 
p. 10) 
Sieglaub claims that one aspect of this ambition was to reveal that public art displays 
are the outcome of private decision-making with significant effects on the consumption 
and production of art, because “the ‘consumers’ are also the ‘producers’” (Obrist, 2008, 
pp. 129-130).  
…unofficial agreements are rarely exposed even though they often 
underwrite official cultural politics […] it is not art’s supposed intrinsic 
qualities alone that lead to its institutional recognition, but an interplay 
                                            
4 The Serpentine Gallery temporary pavilions (2000-2010), the Temporary Guggenheim 
Museum in Tokyo (2001) and the Chanel Contemporary Art Container by Zaha Hadid (2008). 
 12 
of promotional, social, and institutional activities (Graw, 2006, pp. 145-
146) 
It is considered inappropriate to discuss the interests, social relations and private 
discussions that lie behind the activities of art institutions and they are excluded from 
the public discussions that art institutions regularly host. Stewart Martin concurs that 
the relationship of art “to its formation within capitalist societies is routinely 
methodologically excluded as an extra-philosophical concern, to be left to economics, 
sociology or history” (Martin, 2007, p. 15).  
How does this climate of concealment nourish the ambitions of artists today? Between 
the extreme reactions of protest, withdrawal and complicity, what are the ambitions for 
artists working today? How do art institutions limit, encourage, or frame those 
ambitions? And how do institutions figure within the broader social and economic 
framework of which they are a part and on which they depend? 
Hans Haacke worked as a guard and museum guide at Documenta 2 in 1959. Behind 
the scenes he witnessed an enormous operation with all sorts of interests in play. 
Walter Grasskamp relates how this early experience led Haacke to an understanding of 
museums as defining contexts: observing the “machinations backstage” Haacke 
witnessed the “enormous effort required to isolate a work of art from the everyday 
world and shift it into the context of an art exhibition from which it draws much of its 
aura” (Grasskamp, 2004, p. 30).  Haacke relates that he witnessed the “stage 
management” of art: the intervention of the dealers, the conversations between 
organisers, collectors and the press, the manipulation of art and artists as commodities 
and their “celebrity rating among collectors”. He realised that the selection (and 
exclusion) of artists in prestigious exhibitions is crucial for the “ranking of artists and 
art movements”, which has a bearing on what is reported in the press and the 
legitimising discourses which in turn determines the reception of the work (Haacke, 
2009). Observing the “machinations backstage” Haacke observed a contrast between 
the work and the everyday life of the viewers. Inevitably, this led Haacke to “a 
recognition of the artificiality of art, and what constitutes an artwork”, being a student 
at the time this “sparked doubts about the dynamics of his chosen profession” 
(Grasskamp, 2004, p. 30). Haacke points out that to ignore this “inevitable aspect of 
exhibitions would yield a flawed comprehension of the dynamics of the art world” 
(Haacke, 2009), which is presented as a space of freedom which promotes non-
instrumental ideals.  
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There continues to be a crucial need for de-mystification of art production because the 
concealment, distortion and misrepresentation of the functions and structures of the 
art institution impedes the understanding of the conditions of art production and the 
producers’ place within them. Only with an understanding of these conditions can 
artists make crucial realistic and effective decisions regarding their careers and art 
practice. 
The various prescriptive statements hurled into public discussion about the art world 
point out the “crisis” of art and compulsively provide answers to the question “what is 
to be done?”. These normative speculations are unrealistic because they ignore some 
of the fundamental principles that motivate the actions and collective behaviour of 
individuals in the field, they also disregard the principles within which institutions are 
constituted and function and they assume that all individuals within the field have a 
common agenda.  
Most current practices are promoted as “critical” in one way or another and dissent has 
become the orthodoxy as artists reproduce critical discourses while they participate in 
the very structures they denounce: 
Recurrent expressions of reflexive speculation about the nature of 
curating, the artwork and the institution by those who constitute it 
become ritual observances, not radical contestation […] the self-
reflexive preoccupation with the identity and status of artist, curator 
and institution plays on the symbolic negation of these positions, but 
paradoxically can only do so only by sustaining them in practice. The 
dramatisation of the self-reflexive defers endlessly any critical debate on 
the actual, cultural potential and quality of definable artwork, and the 
authority and power of curatorial practice over the public space in which 
that potential is evaluated, justified and given legitimacy. 
(Charlesworth, 2006, p. 4) 
It is necessary to look closely at these practices and their associated discourses, to 
read their claims and stated ambitions against their achievements, to consider their 
contexts, the social relationships and their sources of funding, to articulate and 
“demystify” the apparatus that generates the contemporary art field.  
What are the expectations, ideals, ethics, strategies, stated aims, interests, 
investments and motivations of artists and other players in the field? Close attention to 
these motivational factors reveals the difference between critical practices and 
practices that are rooted in rhetorical and performative acts of critique, which betray a 
professionalized and conservative art world. 
The ‘professionalization’ of the art world is an understated euphemism 
for the ‘businessification’ of the art world, which has been gradually 
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developing since the early 1970s. This process is nothing less than the 
expansion of the dominant values of capitalism into the domain of art 
production as art has shifted from a ‘small-scale’, ‘cottage’ handicraft to 
become an important sector of the cultural industry, alongside pop 
music, fashion, television, film and their related ‘star’ values. 
(Siegelaub, 2009) 
Art history and international contemporary art 
So-called “international contemporary art” is a circumscribed, specialised and self-
consuming field of production (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 70) which is predicated on the set 
of financial and ideological hierarchies established in the western art capitals during the 
twentieth century. Contemporary art practice emerges from the historical discourses of 
western art and aesthetics, which have defined the legitimating discursive field, 
appearing naturalised, current and universal. Nevertheless, the art world has made 
every effort to shed its origins5 and take up the mantle of “criticality” (De Duve) yet 
still retains what Walter Benjamin called its “aura”.6  
According to Daniel Buren, contemporary art has inherited nineteenth-century art, “its 
system, its mechanism and its function”. This is clearly apparent in the acceptance of 
the “exhibition framework as self-evident” (Buren, 1973, p. 68). But it is also apparent 
in the enduring concept of the art object which shares its provenance with the 
museum artefact, forcibly displaced from its native context and isolated in a glass case 
it was rendered useless, it became an object for contemplation, aestheticised and 
admired for its ‘beauty’. 
The contemporary art world is not distributed equilaterally across a global network. 
Curatorial decisions across the globe can be traced back to the western centres of 
financial and curatorial power (museums, journals, galleries). The current climate of 
cultural production is a profitable and exclusive professional sector, which promotes its 
entrepreneurial activities on the fetishization of the tradition of western art. 
Nevertheless, the public relations face of “international contemporary art” purports to 
represent the entirety of practicing artists. These discourses according to Liam Gillick 
however “no longer include those [artists] who work hard to evade its reach” (Gillick, 
2010). 
                                            
5 While art schools increasingly replace art history with courses in critical theory, Art History 
departments are rechristened “Visual Cultures” to shed their western-centred associations while 
essentially retaining the same discourses steeped in western philosophy and aesthetics.  
6 Frieze Masters is a recent effort to reconnect contemporary and art history in the context of 
the art market <http://friezemasters.com/>.  
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The anxious desire to define “contemporaneity” has spurred a number of journals, 
panel discussions and academic courses.7 The main consensus is that we can no longer 
generalise about art (Foster, 2009). For Liam Gillick “contemporary art” is the name of 
a “stylistic epoch”, it has become historicised as “a subject for academic work” (Gillick, 
2010). It is clear that “contemporary art” refers to a particular type of practice with 
dedicated venues and an exclusive market, evident in the particular criteria for 
inclusion in contemporary art fairs. Contemporary art has until recently generally 
referred to  
…a specific accommodation of a loose set of open-minded economic 
and political values that are mutable, global, and general—sufficing as 
an all-encompassing description of “that which is being made now—
wherever.” (Gillick, 2010) 
Contemporary art institutions and biennials currently appear to constitute a dispersed 
and truly global field without boundaries. In an interview with the art critic Michel 
Claura, Seth Siegelaub claims that conceptual art was unique because it emerged 
simultaneously all over the world and it did not have a geographic centre. Prior to 
conceptual art, art movements emerged from local contexts in Paris, Zurich and New 
York: “it was impossible to be an important artist unless you lived in the ‘right’ city” 
(Claura and Siegelaub, 1999/1973, p. 287). Claura however argues that “the ideology 
that underlies western art seems today to subtend the art world in a much more 
consistent and simultaneously anterior manner” (Claura and Siegelaub, 1999/1973, p. 
287). In fact, the contemporary art scene—as it comes across in museums, biennials 
and art fairs—is centralised and proliferates around the practices of curators with 
practically unlimited expertise. In his introduction to Institutional Critique and After 
(2006), John Welchman maintains that the traditional museum has become 
transformed into an enormous distribution centre: 
During the last decade of biennial mania and super-commuting curators 
who package and reassemble a core of international artists in concert 
with a homegrown quotient at a myriad roving locations (Istanbul, 
Yokohama, Cairo…), the contemporary aspect of the “museum” has 
been effectively re-calibrated as a global delivery system. (Welchman, 
2006, p. 14) 
Charles Esche argues that despite the reflexive discourses on the global effects of 
biennial culture, the contemporary art world continues to be centralised, evidence that 
the periphery must consistently appeal to the centre for legitimacy as “key institutions 
                                            
7 See Foster, 2009 and Aranda, Kuan Wood and Vidokle, 2009 and 2010. 
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of contemporary culture officially to sanction the ‘periphery’ in order to subsume it into 
the canon of innovative visual art (Esche and Bonami, 2005, p. 105). On the one hand, 
the difference between centre and periphery is maintained in terms of the unequal 
balance of power and authority. On the other, the global institutionalisation of art has 
standardised art production, eradicating the difference between centre and periphery. 
Although many artists develop their practice in the periphery of the art world,  
…their energy is validated and consumed by the centre and therefore 
the relationship between rim and hub remains in place. This is, of 
course, how globalisation generally operates – sometimes to the 
economic benefit of the patronised but rarely in the interests of 
maintaining their autonomy and sustainability. (Esche and Bonami, 
2005, p. 105)  
In fact, the contemporary art world thrives in plural localised networks, art schools and 
galleries provide nodal points for these networks, revealing the local character of art 
production, but also in many cases its institutionally predetermined character. The 
influence of “international contemporary art” breaks up the crucial dialogue between 
artists: rather than investing in local networks, artists address an “international” art 
audience, an illusory sphere of influence accessible only via institutions. This gives 
credibility to the “international” scene. In many cases, these plural networks remain 
disconnected in order to maintain their authority. More decades than miles separate 
London’s west end Cork Street from Vyner Street in the east. Equally, the diverse 
profiles of galleries currently on Vyner Street demonstrate that a “curatorial culture of 
self-reflexivity and critical interrogation can coexist more or less comfortably alongside 
persistent orthodox forms of presentation” (Charlesworth, 2006, p. 4). JJ Charlesworth 
argues that this ultimately characterises a profoundly contradictory cultural epoch 
…where claims to universal and general value are treated with 
suspicion, but in which the institutions that previously staked their 
authority on such outmoded things as elite culture nevertheless 
continue to operate, but emptied of their previous raison d’être 
(Charlesworth, 2006, p. 3) 
Hence, although institutions continue to operate and make value judgements in a 
climate of “business as usual”, they do so despite the lack of shared values and criteria 
through which institutional power is mediated and legitimated (Charlesworth, 2006, p. 
3):  
This pluralising cohabitation can be the only outcome of a cultural 
debate that has long ceased to argue over any certain definition of the 
function of art’s institution. (Charlesworth, 2006, p. 4) 
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The art world is both locally and discursively produced, even though it is presented as 
international, global, universal and shared through the media, the journals and the 
publicity departments of institutions.  
The problems currently faced by artists who are resistant to reigning ideologies of 
profit and consumption have been presaged by artists and writers since the turn of the 
twentieth century. These concerns have come predominantly from the left, and from 
writers and artists who are concerned with the subservience of art to the forces of 
production. By the 1980s, it was clear that the corporate infiltration of every sector of 
society had accelerated rapidly. Some writers expressed their despair whilst others 
rejoiced cynically in the apparent freedom—or the pluralism—that neo-liberalism 
provided. In his Glossary to Relational Aesthetics (2002), Nicolas Bourriaud suggests 
that we: 
…not without irony, borrow Hegel’s formula whereby ‘art, for us, is a 
thing of the past’ and turn it into a figure of style: let us remain open to 
what is happening in the present, which invariably exceeds, a priori, our 
capacities of understanding. (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 108) 
To turn Hegel’s end-of-art thesis into a “figure of style” whilst continuing to practice 
“art” undisturbed amounts to a rhetorical strategy and cynical opportunism. We 
“remain open to what is happening” but we participate in, produce and reproduce it at 
the same time. This is why it is important that our capacity for comprehending this 
state of affairs is not hindered by strategic obfuscation.
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CHAPTER ONE: “INSTITUTIONALISED CRITIQUE”8 
The narrative of avant-garde art is a series of shifts in a controversy that revolves 
around whether artists should practice critique by withdrawing into artistic autonomy, 
or to abandon the autonomy of art and practice political art. Jacques Ranciere locates 
the conflict between political and non-political art in the clash between the politics 
internal to its own existence, in other words its autonomy:  
Critical art has to negotiate between the tension which pushes art 
towards ‘life’ as well as that which, conversely, sets aesthetic 
sensorality apart from other forms of sensory experience. (Ranciere, 
2009, p. 46)  
Both political art and autonomous art however, are accommodated within the 
institution of art. But there is a third way to view autonomy, and it involves the politics 
of art.  
According to Donlad Egbert, this enduring dilemma for avant-garde artists emerged 
from the ideas of utopian writer Comte Henri de Saint-Simon and his conception of the 
artist’s leading role in society (Egbert, 1967, p. 346). The term avant garde is directly 
derived from the language of revolutionary politics. It was one of Saint-Simon’s 
collaborators, Olinde Rodrigues, who coined the term avant-garde in the essay The 
artist, the scientist and the industrialist written in 1825 (Calinescu, 1987, pp. 101-102). 
In a dialogue between an artist, an industrialist and a scientist, Rodrigues appeals 
through the character of the artist: 
Let us untie. To achieve our one single goal, a separate task will fall to 
each of us. We, the artists, will serve as the avant-garde: for amongst 
all the arms at our disposal, the power of the Arts is the swiftest and 
most expeditious. When we wish to spread new ideas amongst men, we 
use, in turn, the lyre, ode or song, story or novel; we inscribe those 
ideas on marble or canvas, and we popularise them in poetry and in 
song. We also make use of the stage, and it is there above all that our 
influence is most electric and triumphant. We aim for the heart and 
imagination, and hence our effect is the most vivid and the most 
decisive. If today our role seems limited or of secondary importance, it 
is for a simple reason: the Arts at present lack those elements most 
essential to their success—a common impulse and a general scheme. 
(Saint-Simon, 1999/1825, p. 190) 
                                            
8 Sheikh, 2006. 
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Artists were to be judged not only by the immediate ‘usefulness’ or exchange value of 
their work but by their contribution to the transformation of social relations.  
 
The Situationist International and writers such as Henri Lefebvre and Michel Ragon 
advocated the fusion of art, life and politics, and radically contested the existence of 
art as a separate category. Other movements of the twentieth century have taken a 
playful attitude, often ending up preserving a special position for art (DeRoo, 2006, p. 
45). 
In the 1960s, minimalist artists broadened the critique of artistic autonomy to consider 
the spatial conditions of the art object. Although the minimalists rejected the 
transcendent formalism of Michael Fried and Clement Greenberg, formalism re-entered 
minimalist art with “the assumption that the places of perception are politically and 
socially neutral” (Deutsche, 1986, p. 22). The work of Dan Flavin and Donald Judd For 
example, retains its formal autonomy (Beveridge and Burn, 1975, pp. 131 ff). 
Minimalism insists on the materiality and specificity of its objects and the work’s 
relationship to its “expanded field” (Krauss, 1983/1979). 
A critique of the institution of art was a constituent part of many conceptual art 
practices of the late 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1960s, artists in New York began to 
question the status of art in society. In 1969, an early and politicised form of 
institutional critique emerged in New York when the Art Workers’ Coalition (AWC) was 
founded. This was a loosely structured group of artists and critics who joined in protest 
against the practices the art establishment. They campaigned for inclusive exhibition 
policies and a political stand against the Vietnam War. Conceptual art was  still a 
marginal practice in an art world defined by Clement Greenberg’s modernism and 
conceptual artists presented themselves as an “internal challenge” to the commodity 
status of art (Bolt Rasmussen, 2009, p. 43).  
Clement Greenberg regarded art as the only sphere in which it was possible to 
articulate freedom from and resistance to pervasive capitalism. Art was to consolidate 
its autonomy and refrain from any direct political engagement. Marxist intellectuals of 
the “Old Left” privileged high culture and autonomous art as the “last defensible 
enclaves of political activity and dissent” (Frascina, 1999, p. 109). This position was 
untenable for conceptual artists who were concerned with contemporary aesthetic, 
social and political issues. Following in the wake of student protests, artists set out to 
critique the museum for its hegemonic role and its failure to denounce the war in 
Vietnam (Bolt Rasmussen, 2009, p. 44).  
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For the emerging generation of artists, social and political crises exacerbated the 
contradictions between modern art and its reliance on the market for production and 
distribution. Artists sought to question the connection between art and ideological 
structures. Happenings, Pop art, earth art, performance art, minimal and conceptual 
art often developed into demonstrations and politically explicit art. In 1970, and at a 
time when the relationship between art and politics intensified (Frascina, 1999, p. 
112), Hans Haacke exhibited MOMA-Poll in the exhibition Information at the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York. Visitors were asked to vote yes or no to the question:  
Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President 
Nixon’s Indochina Policy be a reason for you not voting for him in 
November? (Ault, 2002, p. 93) 
David Rockefeller was a trustee of the Museum at the time, and although he did not 
call for the removal of the work, he did question whether the work in the exhibition 
had any “artistic content whatsoever”. According to Frascina, the institution’s internal 
correspondence “positioned the interests, identities, art practices and critiques of the 
protestors as ‘other’ but in need of ameliorating through the process of public 
relations” (Frascina, 1999, pp. 112-113). 
In April of 1969, the AWC held a public hearing at the School of Visual Arts in New 
York, which was attended by several hundred artists and art workers. A total of 61 
artists and critics spoke against museum policies, including Carl Andre, Hans Haacke, 
Robert Barry, Lucy Lippard, Joseph Kosuth, Sol LeWitt, Michael Snow, Gregory 
Battcock and Barnett Newman (Art Workers’ Coalition, 1969). Carl Andre and Robert 
Barry urged the movement to abandon the art world and develop an alternative sphere 
in which artists would have more control over their own work. But the artists were not 
willing to go that far, according to Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen, “It was one thing to criticize 
museums with their shows and acquisitions, another to abandon the institution of art”. 
These artists were concerned with political issues, but they were not willing to abandon 
the institution on which they depended for their own legitimacy. Thus, the “museum 
remained the main focus” for their protests (Bolt Rasmussen, 2009, p. 45), and they 
were concerned to extract better working conditions within it. This did not prevent the 
ensuing accusations that the AWC was involved in the “politicization of art” (Lippard, 
1970, p. 173). As a spokesperson for the movement, Lucy Lippard defended the AWC 
as a political movement not an artistic one; it did not take a position on the aesthetic 
content of the artist’s work: 
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…the AWC has never offered any opinions on the content or form of 
art, which we consider the concern of individual artists alone (Lippard, 
1970, p. 173) 
Although the artists of the AWC wished to take up a position in response to social and 
political issues, the question was how to do this without compromising their aesthetic 
and critical autonomy (Bolt Rasmussen, 2009, p. 46). Hans Haacke traces the 
emergence of institutional critique to this period (Haacke, 2007).  
Conceptual artists began to address the art institution from social and political 
perspectives, exploring “appropriate means of intervention in institutional spaces and 
discourses” (Deutsche, 1986, p. 22). They interrogated the historical context of the 
work of art, its conditions of reception and its institutional status. Artists such as Hans 
Haacke, Michael Asher, Martha Rosler, Daniel Buren, Marcel Broodthaers, Chris Burden 
and Lawrence Weiner, were amongst those who began to “address ‘art’ as a broad-
based social institution whose interrelated sites included museums, studios, journals 
and newspapers, art-historical practice within the universities, and the marketplace”. 
Using a variety of innovative media, these artists made evident the “dynamic and 
complex impact that social, economic, and physical conditions have on the creation of 
meaning and value” (Zelevansky, 2006, p. 173). 
The diversity of art practices which can be assembled under the banner of institutional 
critique cannot be identified on the basis of common media or modalities of practice. 
How does one reconcile Daniel Buren’s stripped posters with Hans Haacke’s political 
work, exemplified by his museum visitor polls, Lawrence Weiner’s architectural 
interventions, Michael Asher’s site-specific installations and Robert Smithson’s 
earthworks?  
In Subversive Signs (1986), Hal Foster points out that the diverse practices of these 
artists9 nevertheless have in common the fact that their investigations focus on the 
institutional frame, revealing the ways in which “the production and reception of art 
are institutionally predetermined, recuperated, used” in their critical texts and site-
specific work (Foster, 1986, p. 101). Foster observes that these artists utilise spaces, 
representations and languages both as targets and as weapons, which amounts to a 
postmodern shift in the practice of art from production to the manipulation of signs. 
Foster admits that this shift was not new but he argues that it 
                                            
9 Including amongst others, Martha Rosler, Sherrie Levine, Dara Birnbaum, Barbara Kruger, 
Louise Lawler, Allan McCollum and Jenny Holzer (Foster, 1986, p. 99). 
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…remains strategic if only because even today few are able to accept 
the status of art as a social sign entangled with other signs in systems 
productive of value, power and prestige. (Foster, 1986, p. 100) 
Conceptual artists thus began to acknowledge and made efforts to reveal and frustrate 
the institutional structures which frame the display and determine the production if art. 
In 1973, Lucy Lippard wrote a sobering evaluation of these efforts:  
Conceptual art has not, however, as yet broken down the real barriers 
between the art context and those external disciplines—social, scientific, 
and academic—from which it draws sustenance. (Lippard, 1973, p. 263) 
She expressed her despair that the “ghetto mentality predominant in the narrow and 
incestuous art world” may never be able to break free from its “resentful reliance on a 
very small group of dealers, curators, critics, editors, and collectors who are all too 
frequently and often unknowingly bound by invisible apron strings to the ‘real world’s’ 
power structure” (Lippard, 1973, p. 264) 
It was only after this apparent failure, and not until the early 1980s, that practices of 
institutional critique were gathered into a coherent movement. The chief advocate was 
Benjamin Buchloh, who beginning with his essay Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation 
and Montage in Contemporary Art (1982), established the parameters of the term and 
the main protagonists, including Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, Michael Asher, and Marcel 
Broodthaers. Writing in 1990, Buchloh identifies in Lawrence Weiner’s Declaration of 
Intent (1969), “a critique that operates at the level of the aesthetic institution”, which 
he describes as 
…a recognition that materials and procedures, surfaces and textures, 
locations and placement are not only sculptural or painterly matter to 
be dealt with in terms of a phenomenology of visual and cognitive 
experience or in terms of a structural analysis of the sign […] but that 
they are always already inscribed within the conventions of language 
and thereby within institutional power and ideological and economic 
investment. (Buchloh, 1990, pp. 136-137) 
Whilst this recognition was latent in the work of American artists such as Lawrence 
Weiner and Robert Barry, it was manifesting rapidly in the work of European artists of 
the same generation, especially in the work of Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren and 
Hans Haacke.  
In fact an institutional critique became the central focus of all three 
artists’ assaults on the false neutrality of vision that provides the 
underlying rationale for those institutions. (Buchloh, 1990, pp. 136-137) 
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Theoretical discourse burgeoned around institutional critique when a second 
generation of post-conceptual artists emerged, including Louise Lawler, Allan 
McCollum, Sherrie Levine and Fred Wilson. These artists contributed to the 
retrospective constitution of institutional critique (Fraser, 2007).10 In the early 1990’s 
the term institutional critique was reappropriated by a third generation of artists 
“whose work can be read as a series of different attempts to continue and revise some 
of the premises of Institutional Critique” (Graw, 2006, p. 138). This third generation of 
artists includes Fareed Armaly, Mark Dion, Andrea Fraser, Renée Green, Clegg & 
Guttmann and Tom Burr (Kaiser, 2007). 
Although institutional critique may seem to be a dispersed and globalised practice, on 
closer inspection it turns out to be a local phenomenon, which, beginning in the early 
1980s, was rapidly theorised and subsequently became institutionalised. The core 
artists identified with all three generations of the genre have consistently co-exhibited, 
while artists and theorists sympathetic with the aims of institutional critique generated 
a substantial theoretical output. Andrea Fraser is herself a major proponent of 
institutional critique, she has written extensively on the subject, retrospectively 
mobilizing the work of conceptual artists as antecedents. Fraser acknowledges the 
influence of Craig Owens, Benjamin Buchloh, Douglas Crimp, Yvonne Rainer, Hans 
Haacke and Martha Rosler with whom she studied at the New York Whitney 
Independent Studies Program in the 1980s, where the consolidation of institutional 
critique is said to have taken place.11 Her fellow students included Mark Dion, Renée 
Green, Gregg Bordowitz, Joshua Decter and Miwon Kwon (Fraser, 2007 and 2005, p. 
101). Through Buchloh, Fraser also met Louise Lawler, Allan McCollum and Sherrie 
Levine who often worked together on collaborative projects.12  
According to Philipp Kaiser, what galvanised the “loose grouping of artists” which 
included Christian Philipp Müller, Fareed Armaly, Mark Dion, Andrea Fraser, Renée 
Green, Clegg & Guttmann and Tom Burr, was the  
…inglorious collapse of the art market […] shortly before the outbreak 
of the first Gulf War. Almost all those present at their hour of birth 
                                            
10 Fraser acknowledges that none of the artists considered founders of institutional critique have 
laid claim to the term (Fraser, 2005, p. 101).  
11 Renee Green maintains that the term “institutional critique” was promoted by the Whitney 
Independent Studies Program (Graw, 2006, p. 138).  
12 Lawler and McCollum collaborated on an installation titled For Presentation and Display: Ideal 
Settings, 1984. Diane Brown Gallery, New York, whilst Lawler and Levine collaborated on A 
Picture is No Substitute for Anything, Wedge #2 (1982). 
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agreed that it was because of the recession—then especially palpable in 
New York—that these hitherto marginalized, critical-theoretical artists 
were suddenly being accorded public space. (Kaiser, 2007) 
This loose grouping of artists “connected along an axis from New York to Cologne” 
(Lind, 2010, p. 196), would exhibit together regularly in Europe in the 1990s under the 
name of Kontext Kunst (Context Art).13 At this point in time, the periodical Texte zur 
Kunst and the curator Peter Weibel both “had a keen interest in proclaiming the much 
yearned-for new avant-garde”. In 1990, art critic Isabelle Graw and Stefan Germer 
launched Texte zur Kunst, which was “devoted exclusively to conceptualist, 
contextualist, and political art criticism”. By 1993, “there were so many exhibitions of 
contextual art taking place that there was talk of a paradigm shift” (Kaiser, 2007).14  
Peter Weibel popularised the term Kontext Kunst as the name of a new international 
art movement with the exhibition Kontext Kunst: The Art of the 90s held at the Neue 
Galerie as part of the 1993 Graz Steirischer Herbst. The substantial catalogue served as 
a “compendium of universal validity, as the group’s manifesto” (Kaiser, 2007). The 
catalogue features an anthology of 22 substantial essays discussing from diverse 
perspectives the artistic issues and social and political themes that distinguish “Context 
Art” from related forms of conceptual and installation art. Indeed, Weibel’s heraldic 
prose is a parody of Situationist proclamations and a precursor to Nicholas Bourriaud’s 
championing of the artist as social reformer: 
It is no longer purely about critiquing the art system, but about 
critiquing reality and analyzing and creating social processes. In the 
‘90s, non-art contexts are being increasingly drawn into the art 
discourse. Artists are becoming autonomous agents of social processes, 
partisans of the real. The interaction between artists and social 
situations, between art and non-art contexts has led to a new art form, 
where both are folded together: Context art. The aim of this social 
construction of art is to take part in the social construction of reality. 
(Weibel in Gordon Nesbitt, 2011, p. 32) 
                                            
13 These artists included Mark Dion, Andrea Fraser, Clegg & Guttmann, Renée Green, Gerwald 
Rockenschaub, Thomas Locher and Christian Philipp Müller (Lind, 2010, p. 196). 
14 As exhibition commissioner in 1993, Peter Weibel invited the Austrian artist Gerwald 
Rockenschaub to team up with Andrea Fraser and Christian Philipp Müller, to design a trans-
national pavilion as the Austrian contribution to the Venice Biennale. In the same year Stephan 
Schmidt-Wulffen and Barbara Steiner curated Backstage at the Hamburger Kunstverein and 
curator Yves Aupetitallot invited artists to engage with the site of Le Corbuisier’s apartment 
building Unité d’Habitation in Firminy, for his Project Unité. 
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Weibel promoted Context Art as an exemplary departure from the self-referentiality of 
institutional critiques and a return to the critical practice of the 1960s and 1970s.15 By 
emphasising its site-specificity, Weibel saw it as an expansion of institutional critique to 
a critique of society and social process in general. Maria Lind describes Context Art as 
a German version of relational aesthetics, with their common interest in site-specificity, 
process, interdisciplinarity and research. Though the former were “more historically 
oriented” (Lind, 2010, p. 196) and “more programmatically political and academic” 
(Lind, 2004). According to Kaiser, Weibel subsumed diverse practices into an 
apparently coherent movement by promoting the discourse around Context Art. For 
Kaiser, this was nothing less than an “ideological co-opting of what was then a new 
artistic phenomenon […] whose genealogical origins were emphasized by James Meyer 
much later”16 in an essay titled The Fate of the Avant-Garde.17 By the mid-1990s, 
Stefan Germer pointed out that merging these contextual practices eventually 
emphasised that they were fragmented right from the start (Germer in Kaiser, 2007). 
Critique and its vicissitudes 
For theorist Peter Bürger and artist Hans Haacke, the concept of critique depends on 
an ideal of critical distance. The younger generations of artists practicing institutional 
critique however, are informed by an awareness that the assumption of critical 
distance has always been a fiction, and their work proposes “a renegotiated notion of 
critique based on the admission that ‘ritical distance’ is compromised a priori” (Graw, 
2006, p. 147). Andrea Fraser in fact goes further to maintain that there is no outside to 
the institution (Fraser, 2005, pp. 282-283), effectively eliminating this distance. 
Has institutional critique been institutionalized? Institutional critique has 
always been institutionalized. It could only have emerged within and, 
like all art, can only function within the institution of art. The insistence 
                                            
15 This nevertheless included established artists such as Fareed Armaly, Tom Burr, Clegg & 
Guttmann, Meg Cranston, Mark Dion, Andrea Fraser, Louise Lawler, Thomas Locher, Dorit 
Margreiter, Christian Philipp Müller, Hirsch Perlman, Adrian Piper, Mathias Poledna, Stephen 
Prina, Julia Scher, Rudolf Stingel, Lincoln Tobier and Christopher Williams. 
16 In a move similar to Nicholas Bourriaud’s appropriation of another set of diverse practices in 
the mid-1990s, Kaiser states that the Kontext Kunst exhibition catalogue was “symptomatic of 
Weibel’s tendency to claim this new art as ‘his’ discovery, if not ‘his’ invention—something of 
which Germer was publicly very critical” (Kaiser, 2007). Maria Lind concurs that the term 
Kontext Kunst was “highly contested by particularly the Cologne-based leftist art scene” (Lind, 
2004). Relevant discussions on the work of these artists had been published in the journal 
Texte zur Kunst, before the Kontext Kunst exhibition, while “a number of those involved felt 
that Weibel and some of the other curators had hijacked their project” (Lind, 2010, p. 196, note 
31). See Germer, 1995. 
17 Meyer, 2000. 
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of institutional critique on the inescapability of institutional 
determination may, in fact, be what distinguishes it most precisely from 
other legacies of the historical avant-garde. It may be unique among 
those legacies in its recognition of the failure of avant-garde 
movements and the consequences of that failure; that is, not the 
destruction of the institution of art, but its explosion beyond the 
traditional boundaries of specifically artistic objects and aesthetic 
criteria. (Fraser, 2005, p. 104) 
Institutional critique reveals the antinomies of artistic autonomy, raising critical 
questions about the institution of art and the role of the artist within it. However, this 
is often achieved inadvertently; works of art that stage paradoxical subversions within 
the insitution come across as ambiguous rhetorical strategies, which prompt questions 
about the work’s critical efficacy, if not confusion about its intentions. As viewers, we 
are forced into a position of passive complicity, because our only response can be an 
ironic smirk in acknowledgement of this unmasking. Wlliam Powhida’s unflattering 
drawings of the art world are an example of this kind of work. His drawing, How the 
New Museum Committed Suicide with Banality was commissioned by the Brooklyn Rail 
for its November 2009 front cover. The title of the work is from a blog of the same 
name by James Wagner (Wagner, 2009). The work, subtitled Or How to Use a Non-
profit Museum to Elevate Your Social Status and Raise Market Values is a caricature 
denouncing the cronyism involved in the controversial New Museum exhibition of work 
from the collection of Dakis Joannou, who is also a trustee of the museum. The 
exhibition was curated by Jeff Koons, close friend of Joannou, who owns the single 
largest collection of Koons’ work. Wagner complains that “aside from the self-serving 
aspect, it looks a lot like insider-trading” and Linda Yablonsky writes in the Art 
Newspaper that this exhibition “raises a potential conflict-of-interest” (Yablonsky, 
2009): 
New Museum director Lisa Phillips says the debate over such issues is 
one good reason to pursue the show. “We want to push the 
conversation forward,” she says, adding that the museum is assuming 
all costs associated with the Joannou exhibition… (Yablonsky, 2009) 
Powhida’s drawing is in an edition of 20 prints. Dakis Joannou, bought one of these for 
$1,500 (Neyfakh, 2010).  Jeffrey Deitch, long-time collaborator of Dakis Joannou and 
Jeff Koons: 
…smiled at Mr. Powhida’s critique. “The irony is that by exposing art 
celebrity culture, he’s becoming a celebrity himself,” he said of Mr. 
Powhida. “So hats off to him” (Cave, 2009) 
Artist Lisa Beck maintains that the caricature is a tribute rather than a critique:
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I don’t think that the power structure has exactly trembled… In fact, I 
know that some of the figures he makes fun of take delight in being 
included in his work. It’s like being the subject of a roast at Caesar’s—a 
tribute, or mark of their importance. (Beck in Neyfakh, 2010) 
Powhida responded to the criticism that work generated in an article published on the 
Art 21 blog by explaining that both the museum’s and his own dependence on 
patronage is the only defence against political censorship: 
We share the same paradoxical over-dependence on a limited number 
of wealthy individuals to maintain our independence from political and 
ideological interference. Assuming public funding, even from the NEA, 
can bring unwanted political scrutiny of the moral content of the art. 
This is a paradox the art world faces in its efforts to make art 
accessible, while remaining free from the kind of traumatic, political 
interference caused by the politician Jesse Helms, who famously tried to 
cut funding from photographer Robert Mapplethorpe in the 1980s. 
(Powhida, 2010) 
Raising the spectres of censorship, “governmental regulation and political interference” 
and reiterating a number of clichés about art and the art world, Powhida paints a black 
and white picture featuring the heroic artist as social critic and representative of 
minorities: 
Artists are an educated class of cultural producers who routinely 
challenge “moral authority” and share a tolerance for minority 
perspectives. That this vision is supported by a wealthy elite is also 
paradoxical, but there aren’t many alternatives at this point in our late-
capitalist democracy. (Powhida, 2010) 
Isabelle Graw is sceptical of the support that institutions extend towards artists’ 
critique, because it can “become a reified practice that feeds capitalism’s all-consuming 
appetite” (Graw, 2006, p. 148): 
…the more seemingly self-evident critical functions that can be attached 
to a work of art, the better its promotional value. There are works that 
facilitate such critical labelling—think only of Santiago Sierra’s current 
popularity. (Graw, 2006, p. 141) 
For the same reasons, Craig Owens maintains that practices which attempted to 
“subvert this nexus from within, addressing the invisible mechanisms which define art 
in our society” failed in their ultimate goal to “counteract those forces which work to 
alienate artists from their production” (Owens, 1992, p. 260) and were absorbed into 
the culture industry: 
…ephemeral and site-specific works had been effectively reinserted into 
the circuits of commercial distribution and exchange via photography; 
and artists who attempted to maneuver within institutional precincts 
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seemed ultimately to confirm the (liberal-democratic myth of the) 
elasticity of those institutions—their ability to tolerate even their own 
most hostile opposition. (Owens, 1992, p. 260) 
For Andrea Fraser institutional critique is defined by a particular methodology, which 
she describes as a “critically reflexive site-specificity” (Fraser, 2006, p. 305). 
Institutional critique is thereby distinguished from site-specific practices that deal with 
“physical, formal, and architectural” sites:  
Institutional Critique engages sites above all as social sites, structured 
sets of relations that are fundamentally social relations […] a site is a 
social field of relations. (Fraser, 2006, p. 306) 
Fraser’s condition of “reflexivity” indicates that, amongst the various relations that 
define a site, there are both “our relations to that site and the social conditions of 
those relations” (Fraser, 2006, p. 306). Fraser considers institutional critique to be a 
“political practice” with “transformative intentions […] aimed, first of all, at forms of 
domination at work in its immediate field of activity”. She argues that the relations 
which constitute the artistic field interact with relations in other fields. Institutional 
critique scrutinises these relations in terms of their problematic “encroachment and 
instrumentalisation (e.g., corporate sponsorship), but also in terms of homologies of 
structure and interest (e.g., the corporatization of museums, galleries, and even 
studios)” (Fraser, 2006, p. 306). Therefore institutional critique is critical in the sense 
that “it does not aim to affirm, expand, or reinforce a site or our relationship to it, but 
to problematize and change it”. Fraser maintains that institutional critique transforms 
…not only the substantive, visible manifestations of those relations, but 
their structure, particularly what is hierarchical in that structure and the 
forms of power and domination, symbolic and material violence, 
produced by those hierarchies (Fraser, 2006, p. 306).  
In fact, institutions are resistant to change. Museums change incrementally to 
accommodate shifts in art practice, museum attendance, new technologies and new 
funding conditions, but they do not change in response to artists’ provocations or 
appeals. Although institutional critique has problematised the museum in academic 
contexts, it has also effectively affirmed the museum’s authority; it has augmented its 
power by reinforcing the museum’s claim to “cutting edge” practice, controversy and 
criticality. This has contributed to the museum’s expansion and thereby entrenched its 
hierarchical structure.  
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Nevertheless, for Fraser the only way to accomplish such change is “by intervening in 
the enactment of that relation”. This condition also addresses the “ambivalence” 
identified with institutional critique:  
…because to intervene in relations in their enactment also always 
means as you yourself participate in their enactment, however self-
consciously (Fraser, 2006, p. 307) 
Gerald Rauning denounces this self-consciousness as “self-obsessed self-critique”, he 
casts doubts on its critical efficacy by pointing out that it “substantializes one’s own 
involvement in the institution and crowds out the horizon of change” (Raunig, 2009, p. 
173). JJ Charlesworth concurs, adding that self-critique within the institution can only 
have a symbolic function, which in turn is dependent on the institution: 
…the self-reflexive preoccupation with the identity and status of artist, 
curator and institution plays on the symbolic negation of these 
positions, but paradoxically can only do so only by sustaining them in 
practice. (Charlesworth, 2006, p. 4)  
What is the “institution of art”? 
There is a sense, when speaking of resistance to the co-optation of art or the 
subversion of repressive institutions and the commodification of art, that one is fighting 
an invisible enemy. Who or what are we referring to when we speak of the 
“institution”? 
Institutions are centres of social intensity that provide legitimation, but institutions are 
also characterised by particular discourses, or ways of thinking and speaking. 
Institutions are hierarchically ordered, social structures which are resistant to change 
because they tend towards stability. Institutions are therefore both ideological and 
conservative. Institutions are social apparatuses, which become especially problematic 
when they are mistaken for the goal rather than the means.  
The “institution of art” acquires several meanings throughout the twentieth century 
and it is often difficult to extract the one from other. The term can stand for any one 
or a combination of the following definitions:  
(1) The first is the limited topological sense of the institution of art as the site of its 
presentation, such as the museum or gallery. This notion of the institution is 
encountered in Daniel Buren’s writing. For Buren “institution” is synonymous with 
“museum” and the function of the museum is to frame, isolate, define, validate and 
naturalise works of art (Buren, 1973). Andrea Fraser defines this narrow sense of the 
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museum in terms of “bureaucratic organisations that contain and present and preserve 
and consecrate artworks” (Fraser, 2007).  
However, according to Isabelle Graw, this limited notion of the institution facilitates a 
“fixation on the art apparatus”, whereas in fact the institution has “lost much of its 
former authority” (Graw, 2006, p. 146): 
Fixation on the art apparatus seems strangely nostalgic today, 
especially in relation to the new definitional power of the art market, 
which has taken over from the museum as the chief administrator of 
value through a network of often invisible global transactions in the 
primary and secondary markets. (Graw, 2006, p. 146) 
(2) Hence, the second definition of the institution includes the broader network of 
social institutions that accommodate the production, display and reception of art, such 
as museums, galleries, journals, biennials, foundations, art schools, studios, funding 
bodies and the art market.  
…but we can also think of institution in the much broader sense, […] as 
a social tradition, a set of customs and practices that are established 
within a particular culture or society (Fraser, 2007). 
(3) Thus, the third and broadest concept of the institution of art refers to the historical 
and contemporary discourses on art, which enable us to recognise and speak about 
art. According to Arthur Danto:  
To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry—an 
atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an 
artworld (Danto, 1964, p. 580) 
Danto defines the art institution as a value system and the tradition of art in the west 
as an ideological system. According to Peter Bürger, “works of art are not received as 
single entities, but within institutional frameworks and conditions that largely 
determine the function of the works”. Bürger defines the institution of art as the 
“framing conditions” which regulate the “commerce with works of this kind in a given 
society or in certain strata or classes of a society” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 12). 
The concept ‘art as an institution’ […] refers to the productive and 
distributive apparatus and also to the ideas about art that prevail at a 
given time and that determine the reception of works. (Bürger, 
2007/1974, p. 22) 
In her article, From the Critique of Institutions to an Institution of Critique (2005), 
Andrea Fraser outlines an expanded concept of the art institution: 
From 1969 on, a conception of the “institution of art” begins to emerge 
that includes not just the museum, nor even only the sites of 
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production, distribution, and reception of art, but the entire field of art 
as a social universe. In the works of artists associated with institutional 
critique, it came to encompass all the sites in which art is shown—from 
museums and galleries to corporate offices and collectors’ homes, and 
even public space when art is installed there. It also includes the sites 
of the production of art, studio as well as office, and the sites of the 
production of art discourse: art magazines, catalogues, art columns in 
the popular press, symposia, and lectures. And it also includes the sites 
of the production of the producers of art and art discourse: studio-art, 
art-history and, now, curatorial-studies programs. And finally, as Rosler 
put it in the title of her seminal 1979 essay, it also includes all the 
“lookers, buyers, dealers and makers” themselves. (Fraser, 2005, p. 
103) 
The institution of art is defined broadly by Fraser to include everything, even the 
public. This definition of the institution, however is too broad and therefore becomes 
meaningless. It fails to draw any distinctions between art practice, selection, 
mediation, representation, display, distribution, exchange and professional or public 
reception. The art institution is not inclusive and we do not all have the same measure 
of responsibility in it. It is therefore problematic to equate the wider field of art as a 
social institution—including the public—with institutions and institutional practices 
themselves. Hence, a more precise definition of the institution is necessary in order to 
discuss the institution of art without mystifying it.18 
We can consider the art institution in the terms of another definition by Fraser as a 
“network of social and economic relations” (Fraser, 2005, p. 103). Fraser locates this 
conception of the institution in the work of Hans Haacke, especially his installations 
Condensation Cube, (1963-65), and MOMA-Poll (1970) where:  
…the gallery and museum figure less as objects of critique themselves 
than as containers in which the largely abstract and invisible forces and 
relations that traverse particular social spaces can be made visible. 
(Fraser, 2005, p. 103) 
The institution of art can be differentiated longitudinally along the different roles 
played out in the institution (artist, museum curator, dealer, critic and audience) and 
latitudinally, across the various networks and types of institutions, large and small, 
                                            
18 Arthur Danto (Danto, 1964) and George Dickie (Dickie, 1974) have contributed to an 
“institutional theory of art” and the “artworld”, which however useful, remain generalised 
definitions of the “art institution” that fail to take factors such as the relationship of art to 
capitalism, the commodity and popular culture into account. John Searle (Searle, 2006) 
provides a definition of institutions based on the primary institution of language, discussed in 
chapter three. Pierre Bourdieu has written extensively on the institution of art from a 
sociological perspective, discussed in chapters one to three of this thesis. 
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traditional and contemporary. The relative importance of a museum or gallery depends 
on its role within the field. For example, new galleries do not have the same influence 
as established galleries. Established galleries have demonstrated their credibility on the 
market and accrued a substantial amount of cultural capital over the years from their 
collaborations with artists, curators, museums, critics and other galleries. Artists who 
have established their value on the art market will effectively increase the cultural 
capital of a new gallery by exhibiting there. In fact, an ambitious young gallery will 
often pay a large amount of money in advance to an established gallery in exchange 
for the solo exhibition of an established artist. In this way, galleries effectively function 
as pimps. This is what Fraser demonstrates with her video Untitled (2003). For this 
video, Friedrich Petzel Gallery arranged a sexual encounter between Fraser and an 
unnamed collector. If it was somewhat embarrassing to watch Fraser and the collector 
have awkward sex on a hotel bed, it was interesting to observe the puzzlement of the 
visitors who regarded this uneventful and bland 60 minute video on a small monitor in 
the middle of the exhibition Pop Life, Art in a Material World at Tate Modern (2009). 
Using a conventional single-shot still bird’s eye-view of the hotel room without audio, 
the video allegorises the relationship between artist, dealer and collector. Fraser 
describes her intentions in an interview with Delia Bajo and Brainard Carey of Praxis:  
…the question I’m interested in posing is whether art is prostitution—in 
a metaphorical sense, of course (Bajo and Carey, 2004) 
However, instead of elucidating this relationship, the work is a further mystification of 
the terms of its own production: a limited edition with stringent conditions attached to 
its sale, the first of which is sold to the collector for an undisclosed sum (Tate Modern 
et al., 2009). The contractual agreement is an important element of this work because 
the “conditions of production of “Untitled,” the relations of exchange, are obviously 
central to it” (Bajo and Carey, 2004). Far from demystifying the exchange between 
artist and collector via the dealer, the video functions as a vulgar figure of speech, an 
ironic trope or flippant vignette, which obfuscates its admission of complicity.  
What remains hidden in Fraser’s Untitled video, is the fact that the dealer is not merely 
a pimp and galleries are not just commercial spaces. Together with other players in the 
“network of social and economic relations” that constitute the field of art, galleries 
perform the vital function of legitimising artworks and artists. Pierre Bourdieu describes 
the ritual of institutional legitimation fittingly as a form of “consecration” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 38). Degree specific consecration is the artistic prestige, or the degree of 
recognition “accorded by those who recognize no other criterion of legitimacy than 
recognition by those whom they recognize” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 38). There are degrees 
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of cultural consecrations as well as varieties, one can consecrate an art object, an 
artist, a gallery or an entire movement.19  
Consecration is a ritual of initiation and it can only be performed by individuals or 
institutions that are themselves consecrated and therefore authorised to bestow this 
recognition upon newcomers. Bourdieu argues that reputations in the art world are 
made, not by individuals or institutions, no matter how influential they are, but by the 
entire field of production (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 78). Consecration is a performative ritual, 
founded on a system of belief sustained by the entire field. Bourdieu notes that the 
consecrated artist or writer is in turn authorised “to win assent when he or she 
consecrates an author or a work—with a preface, a favourable review, a prize, etc.” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). This ritual also maintains cohesion in the field as a whole 
where the stakes include the struggle for the authority to grant this legitimisation: 
…the field of cultural production is the site of struggles in which what is 
at stake is the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer 
and therefore to delimit the population of those entitled to take part in 
the struggle to define the writer. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42)  
In other words, at stake within these struggles is “the monopoly of the power to 
consecrate producers or products” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). In fact, Bourdieu argues 
that it is the “incessant, innumerable struggles to establish the value of this or that 
particular work” that generate the belief that underlies the value of works of art in 
general, which in turn provide the basis of the value of each particular work (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 79). 
It follows therefore that Fraser’s video Untitled, is merely chipping at the tip of the 
iceberg because a work of art is a commodity as well as a symbolic object, and as such 
it operates in two relatively independent economies:  
…these struggles never clearly set the ‘commercial’ against the ‘non-
commercial’, ‘disinterestedness’ against ‘cynicism’, they almost always 
involve recognition of the ultimate values of ‘disinterestedness’ through 
the denunciation of the mercenary compromises or calculating 
manoeuvres of the adversary, so that disavowal of the ‘economy’ is 
placed at the very heart of the field, as the principle governing its 
functioning and transformation. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 79)  
                                            
19 The exhibitions When Attitudes Become Form, Kunsthalle Bern, 1969, curated by Harald 
Szeemann and Information, Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1970, curated by Kynaston 
McShine were instrumental in establishing conceptual art as a movement. 
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This disavowal of the economy in the art world is institutionalised in the figure of the 
dealer, who mediates between money and the artist. The artist should never be seen 
to accept money directly. In fact this is the most enshrined, albeit tacit rule in the 
relationship between artists and galleries. As Bourdieu points out, dealers form a 
“protective screen” between artists and the market, but they also link artists to the 
market (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 79). The dealer however does not merely represent the 
commercial exchange of art, the dealer is authorised to:  
…proclaim the value of the author he defends […] and above all ‘invests 
his prestige’ in the author’s cause, acting as a ‘symbolic banker’ who 
offers as security all the symbolic capital he has accumulated. 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 77)  
It is the dealer’s investment that introduces the artist into the “cycle of consecration” 
by demonstrating his “disinterested, unreasoning passion for a work of art” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 77). Bourdieu describes the practices of art businesses as “practical negations, 
[which] can only work by pretending not to be doing what they are doing”, because in 
the art world, to succumb to commercial ambitions is to “sell-out”. Bourdieu observes 
that art dealers are reduced either to disinterestedness or self-interest, which conceals 
their essential duality or duplicity. The art market can only function “by virtue of a 
constant, collective repression of narrowly ‘economic’ interest” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 74). 
The pursuit of economic profit is therefore carried out in conjunction with the 
accumulation of symbolic capital, both of which depend on the disavowal of the 
commercial interests and profits derived from disinterestedness. Hence, the pursuit of 
prestige or recognition is the only economically viable and legitimate form of credit in 
the art world:  
For the author, the critic, the art dealer, the publisher or the theatre 
manager, the only legitimate accumulation consists in making a name 
for oneself (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 75)  
Fraser casts Friedrich Petzel Gallery in the role of the pimp, herself in the role of the 
prostitute and the collector is the customer, who pays to satisfy his desire for 
possession. However, a surplus of value is also generated in this transaction, in the 
form of cultural capital. 
In The Field of Cultural Production (1993), Pierre Bourdieu distinguishes between two 
principles at work within the field of art. On the one hand, the specificity of art is 
defined by the “autonomous principle” whereby art “fulfils its own logic as a field” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39). Bourdieu describes the autonomy of artistic production as the 
equivalent of a guild for professional artists  
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…who are less inclined to recognize rules other than the specifically 
intellectual or artistic traditions handed down by their predecessors, 
which serve as a point of departure or rupture. They are also 
increasingly in a position to liberate their products from all external 
constraints, whether the moral censure and aesthetic programmes of a 
proselytizing church or the academic controls and directives of political 
power, inclined to regard art as an instrument of propaganda. 
(Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 112-113)  
The dominant “heteronomous principle of hierarchization” in the field of art is official 
success and would dominate the field unchallenged if the field lost its autonomy and 
became subject to ordinary laws prevailing in the economic and political field 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 38). In these terms, it becomes apparent that the field of power—
which dominates both art and society—functions like a barrier between the field of art 
and the forces of society. 
The institution of art is thus divided within itself, but this dividing line is drawn in the 
sand. Institutions or individuals with the authority to legitimise or “consecrate” art do 
not always explicitly censor or exclude artists, instead they set up the conditions 
whereby artists self-censor themselves willingly. As Susan Buck-Morss points out, 
critique is not unwelcome in the hallowed halls of museums, as long as it is carried out 
as art (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 68). The museum thus brackets art’s critical potential 
while it lays claim to the critical appeal of the work of art. 
Bourdieu argues that a work of art cannot be recognised and valued as such until it is 
“socially instituted as a work of art” by figures who are themselves consecrated with 
institutional competence and authority. But even then, the qualities of a particular 
artist or work of art do not suffice to render this judgement (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 229). 
Because “the ‘subject’ of the production of the art-work—of its value but also of its 
meaning—is […] the entire set of agents engaged in the field”, this includes artists, 
critics, dealers, collectors and curators: 
…in short, all who have ties with art, who live for art and, to varying 
degrees, from it, and who confront each other in struggles where the 
imposition of not only a world view but also a vision of the artworld is at 
stake, and who, through these struggles, participate in the production 
of the value of the artist and of art. (Bourdieu 1993, p. 261)  
The production of the value (and meaning) of the singular work of art is therefore 
concomitant with the production of the value of art. The art institution is thus more 
than just a “network of social and economic relations”, the art institution is a self-
governing ideological value system. It has the potential to be constantly renewed by 
the diverse practices that it represents. This potential however, is stunted and 
 36 
redirected by the most heteronomous and most powerful agents, who set the 
standards of inclusion and achievement within the field. The institution of art can thus 
be defined narrowly to include only those institutions or individuals that have the 
authority to legitimise art as such.  
Fraser argues that once we have conceived the institution of art as a social field “the 
question of what is inside and what is outside becomes much more complex”, adding 
that institutional critique consistently engages with those boundaries (Fraser, 2005, p. 
103). On the one hand, this is true as far as the audience also internalises the 
projections of the institution of art, the audience however does not share the 
responsibility of artists, curators and institutions in constructing and promoting 
practices and representations of art. Fraser admits that: 
There is, of course, an “outside” of the institution, but it has no fixed, 
substantive characteristics. It is only what, at any given moment, does 
not exist as an object of artistic discourses and practices. (Fraser, 2005, 
pp. 281-282) 
There is therefore an outside to the art institution, it is whatever is ignored, 
marginalised, excluded and appropriated. The interminable questions that revolve 
around the question of the distinction between art and non-art—which would also 
provide the definition of art—demonstrate that there is an outside to the institution. 
Like ideology, the institution is not apparent when one is on the inside, because one 
cannot see that one is inside. The art world is not inclusive of all artists and practices. 
There is an outside position to speak from because the inside is not inclusive. Isabelle 
Graw argues emphatically that “it is simply not the case that ‘there is no outside’ or 
that even the most outrageous proposition will inevitably be absorbed by institutions”. 
She argues that in order to construct an institution  
…a constitutive outside is not only needed, but inevitable. Some things 
will always be left out, often deliberately: structurally speaking, every 
centre produces its periphery. (Graw, 2006, p. 143) 
The public is on the outside too, because “consecration” is performed by experts and 
because this process is intentionally mystified. In reality, the public has the power to 
confer the status of art onto an object by popular consensus. The popularity of Tate 
Modern, however is not a demonstration of this sort of consensus, instead one would 
have to trace its popularity to cultural and economic policies and the media.  
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The centralised power structure of the art institution alienates both artists and the 
public, evidence the critical attitude of the public as well as that of artists, critics and 
even collectors.20 At the same time, excluded artists uphold the fetishised value of the 
art world even more ardently than those consecrated by it, precisely because they are 
on the outside, looking in and seeking inclusion.  
Today we speak of the “expanded museum”; beginning with the independent curator, 
the museum gradually became externalised, increasingly reaching out to public spaces 
and social networks. As Fraser points out, art practices which aspire to “escape” the 
institution, actually take it with them: 
It is artists—as much as museums or the market—who, in their very 
efforts to escape the institution of art, have driven its expansion. With 
each attempt to evade the limits of institutional determination, to 
embrace an outside, to redefine art or reintegrate it into everyday life, 
to reach “everyday” people and work in the “real” world, we expand our 
frame and bring more of the world into it. But we never escape it. 
(Fraser, 2005, p. 104) 
The art institution as a discursive formation  
The white wall’s apparent neutrality is an illusion. It stands for a 
community with common ideas and assumptions. (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 
42) 
The ubiquitous question “Yes, but it is art?” is usually a provocation for a debate about 
what art is, in apparent ignorance of the fact that if works of art serve any purpose at 
all, it is to keep posing this question anew. Andrea Fraser argues that art is defined as 
such “when it exists for discourses and practices that recognize it as art, value and 
evaluate it as art, and consume it as art” (Fraser, 2005, p. 103). The purpose of the art 
institution is to define art and it does so via an ensemble of discursive functions. These 
usually include exhibitions and art reviews, catalogues and monographs, panel 
discussions and conferences, art school critiques, textbooks and journals. Our concept 
of art is therefore essentially a social convention, which Fraser identifies as the 
institution of art: 
The institution of art is not something external to any work of art but 
the irreducible condition of its existence as art. No matter how public in 
placement, immaterial, transitory, relational, everyday, or even invisible, 
what is announced and perceived as art is always already 
institutionalized, simply because it exists within the perception of 
participants in the field of art as art, a perception not necessarily 
                                            
20 See Saatchi, 2011. 
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aesthetic but fundamentally social in its determination. (Fraser, 2005, p. 
103) 
It follows that, if the institution of art is socially determined, then it is also “internalized 
and embodied in people”: 
It is internalized in the competencies, conceptual models, and modes of 
perception that allow us to produce, write about, and understand art, or 
simply to recognize art as art, whether as artists, critics, curators, art 
historians, dealers, collectors, or museum visitors. (Fraser, 2005, p. 
103) 
The significance of this, as Fraser argues, is that “above all” the institution of art 
“exists in the interests, aspirations, and criteria of value that orient our actions and 
define our sense of worth” (Fraser, 2005, p. 103). The institution of art is therefore 
entwined with our own investments and ambitions, and maybe more importantly, it is 
entwined with our identities and values. According to Pierre Bourdieu, art is an 
institution in the sense that the “work of art is an object which exists as such only by 
virtue of the (collective) belief which knows and acknowledges it as a work of art” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 35). Hence, the notion of artists “becoming” institutionalised is a 
fallacy. Prevailing artistic, aesthetic, art-historical or critical discourses do not merely 
enable us to recognise art; they constrain what we recognise as art in two ways. In the 
first case, the production of discourse is a condition for the production of art, by 
insinuating, contextualising, interpreting or legitimising it (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 35). And 
secondly, the institution limits and controls the production of discourse by 
administering its possibilities and over who are authorised to produce this discourse:  
All critics declare not only their judgement of the work but also their 
claim to the right to talk about it and judge it. In short, they take part 
in a struggle for the monopoly of legitimate discourse about the work of 
art, and consequently in the production of the value of the work of art. 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36) 
The role of the critic, the curator or the scholar who translates practice into discourse, 
is objectively more influential in the production of discourse on art than the work of the 
artist because discourse has material effects. Michel Foucault argues that discourses 
are not merely “signifying elements referring to contents or representations”, 
discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” 
(Foucault, 1989, p. 54). Foucault is concerned with the material effects of discursive 
structures that maintain dominance and status quo in any field:  
…in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of 
procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope 
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with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality. 
(Foucault, 1986/1971, p. 149) 
The materiality that Foucault refers to amounts to the actual effects of discourse. 
Amongst these effects is the power to influence the art and institutions of the future. 
Foucault argues that although we can discern in the plurality of discourses and the 
“infinite resources” available for their production, this potential is available at a price, 
because disciplines and discourse are essentially “principles of constraint” (Foucault, 
1986/1971, p. 155):  
They become embodied forms of knowing and they are just as 
systematic and structured and every bit as constraining as the more 
obvious structures of control, perhaps more so, because they are taken 
for granted and embodied. (Foucault, 1986/1971, p. 155)  
In other words, individuals speak through pre-existing narratives but they are just as 
much “spoken by” these naturalised and embodied discourses. The curator, according 
to Paul O’Neill is “an important agent within the global cultural industry” (O’Neill, 2007, 
p. 16). In fact, for Boris Groys the curator embodies institutional authority: “a curator 
does not need to be part of any fixed institution: he or she is already an institution by 
definition” (Groys, 2009). The rising power of the curator, according to O’Neill has less 
to do with the power structures of the art world and more to do with “inherited cultural 
significance (and capital)”. He argues that in order to be considered an element of the 
institutional superstructure, “curating had to be articulated as part of art discourse” 
(O’Neill, 2007, p. 19). O’Neill characterises the discursive as an “ambivalent way of 
saying something vis-à-vis doing” (O’Neill, 2007, p. 20) and argues that curating 
produces the required level of esteem for the entry of art works into the 
superstructure: 
Practice alone does not produce and support such esteem, rather 
distinct moments of practice translate into a hierarchical ‘common 
discourse’ of curating as it is understood through its discursive 
formations. While internationalism is now at the core of practice with 
the biennial industry, its accompanying curatorial discourse functions to 
maintain the superstructure of the art world on a much wider scale than 
ever before. (O’Neill, 2007, pp. 20-21)  
Benjamin Buchloh foregrounds the role of the curator as one essentially of converting 
discourse into practice, contextualising and decontextualising practices and artists 
successively. Buchloh regards this “procedure of abstraction and centralisation” as an 
“inescapable consequence”—but it is also an inescapable condition—of the work’s entry 
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into the “superstructure apparatus” (Buchloh in O’Neill, 2007, p. 19).21 Therefore, a 
circular relationship transpires in the field of culture, where practice is translated into 
discourse, which in turn produces “more equivalent practice, which enables the 
maintenance of the existing superstructure” (O’Neill, 2007, p. 19). 
[Exhibitions are] contemporary forms of rhetoric, complex expressions 
of persuasion, whose strategies aim to produce a prescribed set of 
values and social relations for their audiences. As such exhibitions are 
subjective political tools, as well as being modern ritual settings (O’Neill, 
2007, p. 16)  
In his classic series of essays Inside the White Cube (1976), Brian O’Doherty argues 
that, at its most serious, “the artist/audience relation can be seen as the testing of the 
social order by radical propositions” (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 41). However, and for the 
most part, discourse serves to reinforce and sustain the status quo, by facilitating the 
“successful absorption of these propositions by the support system—galleries, 
museums, collectors, even magazines and house critics—evolved to barter success for 
ideological anaesthesia” (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 41). 
Aesthetic judgement is the belief system that sustains the institutional selection, 
dissemination and promotion of artists, practices and discourses. The professional field 
of art is legitimised by this subjective and unverifiable but naturalised concept of value, 
which is disseminated throughout the art world and periodically updates the legitimate 
values and aspirations of art. In his essay When Form Has Become Attitude - And 
Beyond (2005/1994), Thierry de Duve traces the historical paradigm shifts in the 
modalities of art-making in terms of their institutional definition, particularly in art 
education. The academic tradition of the eighteenth century emphasised “talent” within 
the paradigm of mimesis. Art in this period is classified in terms of what de Duve calls 
“metier”, defined as the canon or tradition of art with its specialised rules and skills (De 
Duve, 2005/1994, pp. 19, 22, 23). Modernism and the avant-garde initiated a shift 
towards the emphasis of creativity: art within modernism is classified according to 
“medium” and thus the paradigm became invention (De Duve, 2005/1994, pp. 20, 22, 
23). Both of these models are obsolete (De Duve, 2005/1994, p. 22)22 and have been 
replaced with the latest shift, which occurred in the 1970s: 
                                            
21 Buchloh, Benjamin (1989). Since Realism there was... (On the current conditions of 
factographic art). In L’Exposition Imaginaire: The Art of Exhibiting in the Eighties. (‘s-
Gravenhage, SDU uitgeverij: Rijksdienst Beeldende Kunst, pp. 96–121. 
22 Though as de Duve points out they are still active in varying degrees (De Duve, 2005, p. 25). 
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…the most progressive art and art teaching of the Seventies thought 
that art had to be willed, whether it aligned itself with some political 
programme bathed in revolutionary rhetorics, or whether it saw itself as 
the relentless critique of the dominant ideology. […] Thus another 
concept took the place of creativity, that of “attitude”. A concept that is 
a blank, actually: a sort of zero degree of psychology, a neutral point 
amidst ideological choices, a volition without content. (De Duve, 
2005/1994, p. 26) 
De Duve argues that in the 1970s, the two former models “the academic model, talent-
metier-imitation, and […] the Bauhaus model, creativity-medium-invention” were 
replaced by “a new triad of notions: attitude-practice-deconstruction” (De Duve, 
2005/1994, p. 26). 
Contemporary practice is converted into historical (arte)fact through discourse, which 
is traditionally the purpose of the museum and the discipline of art history. However, 
the circulation of art depends on the circulation of discourse. In the contemporary orgy 
of international exhibitions and events, an overview of current practice is impossible. 
Discourse thus becomes indispensable in the popularisation of artists, art works and 
trends in journals, publications, conferences, panel discussions and art schools. 
According to Fraser, the institutional critique of the museum as an apparatus is equally 
a critique of artistic practice (Fraser, 2005, p. 102), the critique of the institution of art 
is thus not aimed just at museums, but constitutes an attack on the internalisation of 
the orthodoxies within the community of the art world as a discursive institution 
(Fraser, 2005, p. 103). Fraser suggests that the internalisation of these orthodoxies is 
problematic, because they predetermine our perceptions and actions. And because 
they are implicit, these ideologies are very difficult to oppose and reinvent. A critique 
of these orthodoxies however would require us, as artists, to define “our sense of 
worth” (Fraser, 2005, p. 103) for ourselves, and to shed the orthodoxies that 
determine the art world and its functions to replace them with discourses that 
represent our own values. But these orthodoxies are impossible to extract from the 
way we think about art and our identities as arts. 
If institutional critique is a critique of the internalisation of ideology, then instead of 
problematising institutional sites such as the museum or art fair, while subscribing to 
their value-systems, it might be more appropriate to either problematise institutions 
that are formative in our shared discourses on art, such art education, or to redefine 
their discourses affirmatively. 
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Critique within the institution 
In his 1966 essay Structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences, 
Jacques Derrida maintains that the epistemological presumptions of western 
metaphysics constitute the “structure” of philosophical discourse and infect ordinary 
language. Derrida questions these discourses by revealing their reliance on an origin or 
centre: 
The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance, and organise 
the structure—one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganised 
structure—but above all to make sure that the organising principle of 
the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. 
By orienting and organising the coherence of the system, the centre of 
a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. 
(Derrida, 2005/1966, p. 352) 
The centre permits the play of elements because it provides them with a context. 
Nevertheless, and for the same reason, “the centre also closes off the play which it 
opens up and makes possible” (Derrida, 2005/1966, p. 352). This is essentially the 
problem of any discursive formation, i.e. an institution. Daniel Buren describes the art 
institution as “the centre in which the action takes place and the single (topographical 
and cultural) viewpoint for the work” (Buren, 1973, p. 68). So for example,23 the 
question: “What is art?” predetermines any possible answers by the assumption that 
“art—the word, the concept, the thing—has a unity and, what is more, an originary 
meaning, an etymon, a truth” (Derrida, 1987/1974, p. 20). Derrida points out that, in 
seeking for this meaning of art, one would be seeking for a singular meaning which 
would “inform from the inside, like a content, while distinguishing itself from the forms 
which it informs” (Derrida, 1987/1974, pp. 21-22). Derrida’s notion of centred structure 
reveals the orienting effect of institutions as centralised structures, whether 
ideologically (on a universal level), or methodologically (on a local level): 
The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based 
on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a 
fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is 
beyond the reach of play. (Derrida, 2005/1966, p. 352)  
Derrida’s theory of the centred structure which limits play describes the central 
organisation of discursive or institutional systems which ultimately strive for stability, 
                                            
23 For another example of centred structure see Hollier, 1998, p. 42, on the scholastic 
subdivision of knowledge into a scheme that can be condensed into a summary. Hollier points 
out that architecture and the text have a common origin in the notion of summation and the 
notion of grasping the whole work in one glance. 
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thus the limit on “play” is also the limit on the amount of change these systems are 
willing to undergo. Derrida insists that even “destructive” discourses find their footing 
within the parameters defined by the centre of discourse because the idea itself of 
“discourse” is dependent on these inherited structures: 
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order 
to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no 
lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single 
destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, 
the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest. (Derrida, 2005/1966, p. 354) 
This is precisely the contradiction of institutional critique: the problem of the prevailing 
ideology of the institutions within which contemporary art is produced and circulated. 
Artists practicing a critique of the art institution are caught within the terms they are 
trying to unsettle. On the one hand, they seek recognition and rewards from the 
institution, on the other, they seek to challenge the very legitimating structures of the 
institution.  
According to Derrida: “The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured 
by the critical rigor with which this relation to […] inherited concepts is thought” 
(Derrida, 2005/1966, p. 356). In other words, in our own practice, we cannot 
circumvent or do away with the persistence of metaphysics—which is what the avant-
garde movements attempted—we can only knowlingly insert ourselves into this 
intertextual mesh. This argument supports Fraser’s thesis of institutional critique as a 
“critically reflexive site-specificity” (Fraser, 2006, p. 305), and suggests that as artists 
we must accept our complicity within ideology.  
Conceptual art and deconstruction appear to follow a parallel trajectory. Benjamin 
Buchloh emphasises the shift into the space of language-based discourse predisposed 
by the linguistic propositions of conceptual art: 
…the proposal inherent in Conceptual Art was to replace the object of 
spatial and perceptual experience by linguistic definition alone (the work 
as analytic proposition), it thus constituted the most consequential 
assault on the status of that object: its visuality, its commodity status, 
and its form of distribution. (Buchloh, 1990, p. 107) 
Derrida maintains that the decline of the concept of the transcendental signified, which 
was codetermined by the decline of grand narratives, has brought about an 
intensification of discourse; extending the play of signification infinitely: 
This was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, 
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everything became discourse—provided we can agree on this word—
that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or 
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of 
differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the interplay of signification infinitely. (Derrida, 2005/1966, 
pp. 353-354) 
This may provide a starting point from which we can begin articulating new ways of 
thinking and acting but it is an unsatisfactory condition in itself and it is not 
sustainable. In the following quotations, it is apparent that Derrida and Buren are 
essentially referring to a similar strategy of cynical complicity or accommodation within 
oppressive and alienating structures: 
The work in progress has the ambition, not of fitting in more or less 
adequately with the game, nor even of contradicting it, but of 
abolishing its rules by playing with them, and playing another game, on 
another or the same ground, as a dissident. (Buren, 1977, p. 73) 
It is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of 
the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources 
necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself. A problem of 
economy and strategy. (Derrida, 2005/1966, pp. 356-357) 
Burden and Derrida both suggest that we have little choice but to cut our own dresses 
from the same old cloth, the difference is just a matter of style. In her historical and 
critical account of the Situationist International The Most Radical Gesture (1992), Sadie 
Plant raises a pertinent question about the difference (or connection) between forms of 
critique and ways of life. Plant argues that one of the paradoxes of the Situationist 
project was that contrary to their categorical condemnation of the spectacle as an 
alienating force, their activism suggested that “pockets of post-revolutionary 
consciousness can somehow arise in the pre-revolutionary present” (Plant, 1992, p. 89-
90).  
When Vaneigem declared: ‘I want to exchange nothing—not for a thing, 
not for the past, not for the future. I want to live intensely, for myself, 
grasping every pleasure’,24 he was not merely giving an account of how 
life should be, but declaring his intention to take it in the here and now 
as a means of achieving a world in which such supreme self-satisfaction 
would be realised. (Plant, 1992, p. 90) 
According to Plant, the critique of the spectacle “as a dehumanising force is in danger 
of falling into self-contradiction if it admits that it is possible to play and enjoy some 
                                            
24 Vaneigem, 1983, p. 86.  
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autonomy and control over one’s own life within capitalist society” (Plant, 1992, p. 90). 
Plant asks whether the Situationist tactics (for example, the sabotage of labour on the 
one hand and alternative worker’s organisations on the other) were: 
…means of coping with capitalism or destroying it? Were the 
situationists more concerned with finding ways for real life to survive 
within the spectacle, or with the contestation of the spectacle itself? 
(Plant, 1992, p. 90) 
The question is relevant to the ultimate aspiration of institutional critique and to critical 
art in general. What is the end of critique? If Buren’s critique is a form of play, the 
Situationist project aimed at nothing less than revolution. Plant argues that the 
Situationists recognised the capacity of capitalism to absorb critique but insisted that 
all activity should uncompromisingly precipitate revolutionary change. The Situationists 
condemned forms of activism towards a habitable present as ineffectual reformism that 
is susceptible to recuperation (Plant, 1992, p. 91). Plant quotes a scathing critique of 
the Situationists by Jean Barrot from his book What is Situationism (1987). According 
to Plant, Barrot expresses his reservations concerning the contradictions of Situationist 
critique as a form of consciousness within and against capitalism, which could only lead 
to repression or reformism (Plant, 1992, p. 90): 
Either one huddles in the crevices of bourgeois society, or one 
ceaselessly opposes it to a different life which is impotent because only 
the revolution can make it a reality. (Barrot in Plant, 1992, p. 90) 
Plant concludes that although there are obvious benefits in making improvements to a 
flawed society one would prefer to abolish, nevertheless “people’s attempts to live in 
the here and now must also undermine the system which condemns them to survival”. 
Plant, cites the Situationists’ role in the May events of 1968 as an example (Plant, 
1992, p. 94). However, the idea of revolution as a radical schism in society, from a 
pre-revolutionary condition of unfreedom and inequality to a post-revolutionary society 
of freedom and equity has historically proved elusive. Society is a web of relationships, 
networks of power and conflicting interests which cannot change from one moment to 
the next without great upheaval and instability. Sedimented structures, conventional 
practices and power relationships do change incrementally over time. We can 
contribute to the type of society we want by making changes on the local level in 
which we operate. If we build small models of the type of society we want, in artist-run 
spaces, collective projects and local communities we will can make improvements in 
the present and these will function more effectively to undermine the status quo than 
any negative critique. 
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The defence of autonomy 
I understand Institutional Critique much more as a defence, this may 
seem contradictory, but as a defence of the institution of art, in the 
broad sense, of the field of art, of art as a social field. A defence of the 
institution of art in society as a site of critique, as a site of dissent and 
critique and contestation, in society and culture. (Fraser, 2007) 
For Andrea Fraser, unlike movements of the historical and neo avant-garde, which 
challenged art institutions and the autonomy of art (Fraser, 2007), institutional critique 
developed as a defence of art and art institutions against exploitation, reification, 
instrumentalisation and commodification. Fraser cites the work of Buren, Asher, 
Broodthaers and Haacke to support her thesis (Fraser, 2006, p. 307). Excluding 
Broodthaers, the other three artists, to varying degrees, sit comfortably within 
institutions of art that provide the centre of meaning and purpose of their work. None 
of these artists has proposed significant alternatives. As a negative critique of museum 
practices, their work is inextricably embroiled in a dialectical relationship with these 
institutions. This is because their identity as artists is also inextricably tied up with the 
art institution and the claim to autonomy. 
According to the idealist concept of the autonomy of art, art is perceived as being 
“distinct from the social, and the museum is defined as a neutral, nonsocial, apolitical 
institution”. The work of art thus appears to be entirely different to other forms of 
social production (Germer, 1988, pp. 64-65). In his article Haacke, Broodthaers, Beuys 
(1988), Stefan Germer argues that more successfully than any form of censorship, the 
institutional neutrality of artistic practice constrains and depoliticises the work of 
artists:  
Only in a generalized and unspecific way is “outside reality” accepted 
into the museum space; the boundary between art and society is thus 
kept intact (Germer, 1988, p. 65) 
The concept of autonomy has been highly contested. Theodor Adorno and Peter 
Bürger believe in the critical value of autonomy because it releases art from the 
imperative of use-value in a society where everything is subjected to functional 
demands. However, the explicit functionalisation of art by museums, corporations and 
governing bodies evacuates this argument.  
The autonomy of art has become indissociable from the institution of art, which is 
essentially composed of institutions that carry out the work of regulating the 
production and dissemination of art (art fairs, journals, galleries, museums). In 
claiming that institutional critique does not want to destroy the art institution but to 
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defend it, Fraser is essentially playing out her investment and belief in the institution. 
According to Pierre Bourdieu, participation in the field of art is consubstantial with a 
certain investment in its values; artists have a collective investment in the values, or 
the illusio of the art world. Illusio is the “belief in the game, interest in the game and 
its stakes” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 227). Artists are profoundly invested in the values and 
meaning of art: 
Being interested means ascribing a meaning to what happens in a given 
social game, accepting that its stakes are important and worthy of 
being pursued. (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 92)  
According to Bourdieu, the “struggles for the monopoly of the definition of the mode of 
legitimate cultural production” necessitate a sustained reproduction of the illusio 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 227). As Buchloh points out, avant-garde practice mobilises it own 
resistance within this struggle: 
…a continually renewed struggle over the definition of cultural meaning, 
the discovery and representation of new audiences, and the 
development of new strategies to counteract and develop resistance 
against the tendency of the ideological apparatuses of the culture 
industry to occupy and control all practices and spaces of 
representation. (Buchloh, 1984, p. 21) 
These observations indicate that there is a considerable conflict of interest involved in 
the practice, display and dissemination of art, which goes beyond what is usually 
discussed in publications and public debates on art. It also reveals what Graw 
describes as the “regulatory role of the art institution, its ambition to reward ‘good’ 
artists” as an integral part of this struggle (Graw, 2006, p. 144). 
For Fraser, Haacke’s work exemplifies the practice of institutional critique. She argues 
that in his critique of the museum, Haacke’s intention is to defend the “autonomy of 
art institutions from instrumentalisation, from exploitation by […] political and 
corporate interests” and equally to defend art institutions:  
…as potential sites of critique, as sites for another set of values, that 
aren’t those political and economic and market values that are driving 
those corporate interests and those interests of trustees and 
governments, as they use art to polish their image. (Fraser, 2007) 
At the same time, however, Haacke’s work continues to provide art institutions with 
the necessary criticality and controversy that has long been associated with art and 
which amounts to its cultural capital and “cutting edge”. Fraser additionally defends 
institutional critique as a liberating practice: “in making that critique”, she argues, “one 
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is also practicing that autonomy, practising that critique. So as to preserve it […] as an 
element of the field of art” (Fraser, 2007).  
In Fraser’s words, institutional critique emerged with the recognition that “all art 
works, no matter how aesthetically autonomous, can be exploited for economic and 
symbolic profit—and often not in spite of but because of their autonomy” (Fraser, 
2006, pp. 306-307). It therefore seems paradoxical that Fraser would defend the 
autonomy of the art institution. According to Buchloh, such a defence is misinformed: 
Anyone taking the implications of the situational esthetics developed in 
the late 60’s and 70’s into account as an irreversible change in the 
cognitive conditions of art production would have to realize that any 
return to an unconditioned autonomy of art production would be mere 
pretence, lacking in historical logic and consequence. (Buchloh, 1982, p. 
48) 
Buchloh’s assertion is predated and influenced by Peter Bürger’s analysis of the 
paradoxical character of artistic autonomy in Theory of the Avant-Garde (2007), 
originally published in 1974. Bürger claims that “the contradictoriness of the category 
‘autonomy’” is a necessary component of the definition of art in bourgeois society 
(Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 35). Bürger defines “autonomy” as “the functional mode of the 
social subsystem ‘art’: its (relative) independence in the face of demands that it be 
socially useful” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 24). Art becomes autonomous when it is 
released from the requirement to fulfil a social function. The category of the 
autonomous work of art, which describes the detachment of art from social practice in 
bourgeois society “carries the taint of ideological distortion” and functions by 
concealing its origin (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 35): 
The relative dissociation of the work of art from the praxis of life in 
bourgeois society thus becomes transformed into the (erroneous) idea 
that the work of art is totally independent of society (Bürger, 
2007/1974, p. 46) 
Bürger points out the vicissitudes of the autonomy of art: on the one hand, when art is 
released from its social function it turns inward, the autonomy status results in the 
self-criticism of art. On the other, autonomy also means art’s ineffectuality: 
…the autonomy status certainly does not preclude the artist’s adoption 
of a political position; what it does limit is the chance of effectiveness. 
(Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 26) 
 49 
Bürger applies the distinction that Karl Marx makes between “system-immanent 
criticism” which functions within a social institution, as the criticism of specific ideas in 
the name of others,25 and “self-criticism”, which “presupposes distance from mutually 
hostile […] ideas” and a mounts to “a fundamentally more radical criticism”. The self-
criticism of art “addresses itself to art as an institution” (Bürger, 2007/1974, pp. 21, 
22): 
…with the historical avant-garde movements, the social subsystem that 
is art enters the stage of self-criticism. Dadaism, the most radical 
movement within the European avant-garde, no longer criticizes schools 
that precede it, but criticizes art as an institution, and the course its 
development took in bourgeois society. (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 22) 
Avant-garde artists did not take issue with museums or particular practices of 
interpretation, circulation, selection or exclusion within the art world; they took issue 
with the entire concept of art and its role in bourgeois society:  
The avant-garde turns against both—the distribution apparatus on 
which the work of art depends, and the status of art in bourgeois 
society as defined by the concept of autonomy (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 
22) 
The concept of autonomy distinguishes art from other social activities and sets it apart 
as an object of aesthetic contemplation. This is why it does not matter what artists do:  
…museums and other institutions of the artworld really do not care 
what [artists] do. The institutions of cultural power are not threatened 
by what the artist creates, so long as it is done within the authorised, 
artworld space. (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 68) 
It therefore becomes apparent that art institutions, which control the distribution and 
validation of art, do not overtly censor the work of artists but act assertively to 
encourage the production of work that conforms to the institutions’ expectations 
(Graw, 2006, p. 142). For Susan Buck-Morss the autonomy of art is a neutralisation of 
critique, “artistic ‘freedom’ exists in proportion to the artists’ irrelevance” (Buck-Morss, 
2003, p. 69):  
Today’s art is “free,” because it obeys no laws of judgement, taste, or 
relevance, submitting only to the decisionism of the artist, who can be 
scandalous, playful, boring, shocking, or whatever – modes of being 
that have no social or cognitive effect. (Buck-Morss, 2003, pp. 69-70) 
                                            
25 For example, Michael Fried’s criticism of minimalist art in the name of Kantian 
disinterestedness and the formal autonomy of art. 
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According to Bürger, the avant-garde attack on the autonomy of art has proved to be 
no more successful. The intention of the avant-garde was the “abolition of autonomous 
art, by which it means that art is to be integrated into the praxis of life” (Bürger, 
2007/1974, p. 54). Avant-garde artists regarded the dissociation of art from life praxis 
as the defining characteristic of art in bourgeois society, what they proposed therefore 
was the “sublation of art—sublation in the Hegelian sense of the term: art was not to 
be simply destroyed, but transferred to the praxis of life where it would be preserved, 
albeit in changed form” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 49). In the meantime, as Bürger points 
out, this sublation has ostensibly taken place, but it was a “false sublation”: 
…the culture industry has brought about the false elimination of the 
distance between art and life. (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 50) 
Bürger however is sceptical about the value of the avant-garde project to sublate art. 
He regards the reintegration art and life as a “profoundly contradictory endeavour” 
(Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 50) and suggests that the distance between art and life may 
provide a uniquely “free space within which alternatives to what exist become 
conceivable” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 54). For Bürger, the autonomy of art is a 
precondition of criticality, because only if art is perceived as privileged enclave set 
apart from “the means-end rationality of daily bourgeois existence”, can it practice a 
critique of this existence (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 10):  
An art no longer distinct from the praxis of life but wholly absorbed in it 
will lose the capacity to criticize it, along with its distance. (Bürger, 
2007/1974, p. 50) 
But for art to provide this space it must function differently. Artists’ experiments with 
mass production and the increasingly surreal prices of the art market are casting 
doubts about the value of art even in the minds of a public that is largely uniformed 
about the function of the art institution in society. 
Critique and the instrumentalisation of art 
Andrea Fraser and Isabelle Graw find the paradoxical conjunction of the terms 
institution and critique problematic. Like the word “institution”, the term “critique” has 
undergone “semantic shifts and practice-oriented reconceptualizations” (Graw, 2006, p. 
147). For Fraser the term appears even less specific, “vacillating between a rather 
timid “exposing”, “reflecting”, or “revealing”, on the one hand, and visions of the 
revolutionary overthrow of the existing museological order on the other” (Fraser, 2005, 
p. 280).  
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Isabelle Graw’s major reservations with the term institutional critique lie in its 
normative assumption that art has an epistemological function. Most works included 
within the canon utilise some form of “critique”, “analysis, “investigation” or “research”, 
while artworks become “interventions” or “propositions” (Graw, 2006, p. 140). Graw 
argues that when institutional critique is defined as investigative, this implies a 
functionalisation of art (Graw, 2006, p. 140): 
The concept of Institutional Critique as applied to art is based on the 
assumption that art is able to do something (Graw, 2006, p. 137) 
Graw acknowledges that the epistemological functionalisation of art presents a 
strategic advantage because it breaks with the dominant idealist and restrictive 
perceptions of art that derives its value exclusively from its intrinsic qualities. She thus 
emphasises art’s “inscriptive legibility”, in other words “the actual relation of art to 
social conditions and the attendant possibility of renegotiating them” (Graw, 2006, p. 
140). On the other hand, this function becomes subverted when it “serves as a license 
to reduce complex artistic propositions to a seemingly unambiguous epistemological 
function or meaning” (Graw, 2006, p. 141). Graw conveys her scepticism regarding the 
attribution of criticality to works of art, “as if it were almost self-evident”: 
…this criticality is usually asserted rather than defined, and assumed 
rather than made operationally specific, the result is often the 
neutralization of the very possibilities for a truly critical art practice—
critical, that is, in the sense of raising objections and causing problems 
in a particular situation. (Graw, 2006, p. 139) 
Institutional critique has increasingly come under fire for its apparent 
institutionalisation. The strategies of institutional critique are often merely rhetorical 
devices which amount to “critique of an institutional nature” (Graw, 2006, p. 141). This 
is especially true of the self-critical character of institutional critique, which is often 
esoteric and unintelligible to the uninitiated, comprehensible only to artists, theorists, 
historians and critics. Due to its sophisticated discourse on art and society, like any 
specialised form of knowledge, it often marginalises or alienates viewers. But if we 
grant that art can carry out this critical function successfully, as is apparent in the work 
of Hans Haacke and Marcel Broodthaers, the question which follows is whether this 
stated “functionalisation” does not reveal another unstated and more insidious 
functionalisation or instrumentalisation of art, which critical art endeavours to resist 
and counteract. In dialogue with Pierre Bourdieu, Hans Haacke states that: 
I believe that Senator Jesse Helms taught artists, and other people who 
care about free expression, an important lesson. He reminded us that 
art productions are more than merchandise and a means to fame, as 
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we thought in the 1980s. They represent symbolic power, power that 
can be put to the service of domination or emancipation, and thus has 
ideological implications with repercussions in our daily lives. (Bourdieu 
and Haacke, 2005, p. 2)  
Since the early 1970s, Hans Haacke’s work has exposed the relationships between art 
institutions and their corporate partners, at the same time revealing that museums 
strategically lay claim to cultural autonomy. Haacke’s installation On Social Grease 
(1975), exhibited at the John Weber Gallery in New York, consists of six plaques 
engraved with quotations on the corporate involvement in the arts. The work is 
explicitly critical of the cultural legitimisation of business through art. One of the 
quotations by David Rockefeller, who was at the time chairman of Chase Manhattan 
Bank and vice-president of the Museum of Modern Art, reads: 
From an economic standpoint, such involvement in the arts can mean 
direct and tangible benefits. It can provide a company with extensive 
publicity and advertising, a brighter public reputation, and an improved 
corporate image. It can build better customer relations, a readier 
acceptance of company products, and a superior appraisal of their 
quality. Promotion of the arts can improve the morale of employees and 
help attract qualified personnel. (Haacke, 1982, p. 141)26 
For Haacke, the relationship between museums and their corporate sponsors 
essentially amounts to an exchange of symbolic capital for financial capital (Bourdieu 
and Haacke, 2005, p. 17). To understand the impact of institutional practices on the 
production of art, we must also consider the impact of economic and political 
conservatism on art institutions. Richard Bolton carries out such an investigation in his 
essay Enlightened Self-Interest: The Avant-Garde in the ‘80’s (1998). According to 
Bolton, 
…art provides the corporation with a way to speak of the public good, 
even as the corporation furthers its self-interest. Art is used to 
normalize the power of the corporate class. To this end, corporations 
have taken over support of the arts from the government. Museums 
and arts organizations depend upon corporations for survival. (Bolton, 
1998, p. 34) 
Outlining the political and cultural shifts that took place between the 80’s and 90’s, 
Bolton observes that developments in art and politics led to “Fame for critical artists, 
accompanied by diminished opportunities for change” as corporations expanded their 
                                            
26 Rockefeller, David (1966). Culture and Corporation’s Support of the Arts. Speech to the 
National Industrial Conference Board, 20 September 1966. 
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control in the rise of conservatism and unregulated, aggressive capitalism (Bolton, 
1998, p. 23). Bolton examines the impact of the art market, corporate patronage, 
marketing strategies and the media on the function and meaning of contemporary art, 
revealing the “adaptability of capitalism as it confronts challenge—with a sense of the 
way that power works through the cultural sphere to control dissent” (Bolton, 1998, p. 
23). Bolton’s premise is that “Inevitably, those with power in a society will strive to 
create a culture that reflects their interests and aims”,27 and he argues that ruling 
elites anticipate and circumvent challenges to this power not through repression but by 
establishing hegemony: 
A crucial part of this legitimacy is gained in the cultural sphere, for 
culture cloaks power with invisibility. Culture provides the ruling class 
with subtle opportunities to enter the public imagination, with ways to 
legitimate the agendas of the ruling class by associating them with the 
“universal” human spirit. (Bolton, 1998, p. 24) 
Simon Susen states that the functionalisation of culture is a crucial strategy in late 
capitalism, where economic domination is increasingly mediated by cultural 
domination. Culture, he argues, is used both as an instrument and as a source of 
power. Because it functions as a legitimising force and as a commodity at the same 
time, culture subtly penetrates every sphere of society more efficiently than totalitarian 
strategies of coercion (Susen, 2011, pp. 194-195).  
Corporations put “culture to work” by using art as a marketing strategy, whilst most 
patronage is handled by marketing departments which practice “strategic philanthropy” 
(Bolton, 1998, p. 30). In these circumstances, the autonomy and the values of the 
individual work of art are either negated entirely or become subsumed and distorted in 
their subservience to capitalist strategy and ideology. Corporate support for the arts 
effectively results in “a public realm brought under corporate control” (Bolton, 1998, p. 
28). For George Weissman, chairman and chief executive of Philip Morris until his 
death in 2009, business interest in the arts is self-interest: 
                                            
27 Whether this is intentional or not is beside the point, art’s buying public naturally appreciates 
works of art that mirror its own values. Bourdieu argues more broadly that culture does not 
abolish economic divisions in society, it substantiates them: “art and cultural consumption are 
predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a social function of legitimating social 
differences” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 7). 
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Let’s be clear about one thing. Our fundamental interest in the arts is 
self-interest. There are immediate and pragmatic benefits to be derived 
as business entities. (Weissman in Bourdieu and Haacke, 2005, p. 8)28 
In the language of corporations, this is known as “enlightened self-interest” (Bolton, 
1998, p. 30). Philip Morris International, “the leading international tobacco company”, 
which owns Marlboro and six other cigarette brands (Philip Morris International 
Management SA Website, 2008) has sponsored the arts since 1965, largely to redeem 
its unpopular image (Bolton, 1998, p. 32). In recent years, corporations have a 
growing interest in building art collections, primarily of work by emerging artists. 
Deutsche Bank claims to  
…promote young artists who with their creative work give society 
orientation, shake things up, or redefine. We aim to internationalize the 
collection even further and to incorporate the developing countries to a 
greater extent. (Deutsche Bank AG website, 2010) 
Noble intentions and grand claims for art, however the boom in the art market 
demonstrated that so-called “emerging artists” provide a high-return investment. 
Corporations also claim to make art more accessible, according to Deutsche Bank:  
Encountering and engaging with art is also possible outside of 
established cultural institutions. Making Deutsche Bank Collection more 
accessible to the interested public is a goal that we have firmly pursued 
for almost 30 years. […] In 1979, we took a key first step in making our 
collection more accessible with “Art at the Workplace.” Since then, 
rotating exhibits from the collection have been on display in many 
offices and conference rooms, and not just in executive suites. Clients 
and visitors can admire works in our Bank buildings. (Deutsche Bank AG 
website, 2010) 
These art collections are, strictly speaking, not accessible to the public unless they are 
business clients with access to particular corporate spaces. Art collections offer 
corporations “great public relations value”, while they simultaneously “further the 
institutionalization of art as a corporate activity” (Bolton, 1998, pp. 32-33). 
The corporation has used its enormous power to rob the arts of their 
role as a space of dissent, as a possible site of uncommodified 
experience. The museum becomes the site of affirmation of the 
corporation’s project. (Bolton, 1998, pp. 33-34) 
                                            
28 Weissman, George (1980). Philip Morris and the Arts. New York: Philip. Morris, Cultural 
Affairs Department. Reprint of speech delivered at the First Annual Symposium, Mayor’s 
Commission on the Arts and Business Committee for the Arts. Denver, 5 September 1980.  
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The cooptation of artists’ dissent is not possible without the artist’s consent. Hans 
Haacke’s installation On Social Grease (1975), which is unequivocal in its criticism of 
corporate involvement in the arts, was originally acquired for the Gilman Paper 
Company Collection. The plaques mimic the monumental severity of corporate insignia 
and, as Travis English claims, they “fit more perfectly within the lobby of a 
multinational corporation’s headquarters than within a gallery or museum” (English, 
2007). In the corporate collection, the plaques can function either way; taken at face 
value, they embody corporate ideology. Read ironically, they promote the company’s 
transparency and socially responsibility. For Chin-Tao Wu, the Gilman Paper Company 
has “actively, and radically, redefined the very meaning of the piece” (Wu, 2002, p. 
267). On Social Grease was resold at Christie’s in 1987, subject to Siegelaub and 
Projansky’s notorious Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement (1971). 
The Agreement stipulates, amongst other clauses covering the loan and exhibition of 
the work, that the artist is due a 15% royalty fee if the work is resold. This has always 
been viewed by the establishment as “good for artists in principle, but bad for business 
in fact” (Smith, 1987). At the time, Roberta Smith claimed that  
The sale might be seen to affirm once more the official acceptance of 
Conceptual art and to suggest, as well, that Mr. Haacke's work can be 
co-opted and commodified as thoroughly as any other successful 
artist's. It might also be seen to imply the reverse: that Mr. Haacke's 
work, which takes the exploitation of culture as one of its subjects, knits 
so well with the thinking behind the contract that it almost becomes 
part of his own esthetic. Mr. Weber maintains that the desire to own a 
Haacke work in the first place “tacitly implies agreement with its socio-
political posture”.  (Smith, 1987) 
The most elementary conclusion that one can draw from the histories and legacies of 
Haacke’s work is that works of art have the potential to become perpetual signifying 
devices. The “relational” structure of Haacke’s work interacts and mutates in different 
contexts, literally testing the social order, “always testing, failing through the rituals of 
success, succeeding through the rituals of failure” (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 41).  
Businesses evidently have an interest in the symbolic value of art, which serves to 
promote and market their political, social and financial agendas. Nevertheless, the 
work of art is rarely attractive to institutions and businesses in its own right; it is 
almost exclusively valued according to its accumulated cultural and symbolic capital. 
The ubiquitous disregard within business and institutional practice for the individual 
work of art poses a fundamental clash of interests between artist and institution.  
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The utopian and idealist character of art is associated with its claim to autonomy. For 
Herbert Marcuse, the autonomy of art amounts to the ineffectuality of art. In his essay 
The Affirmative Character of Culture (2009) originally published in 1968, Herbert 
Marcuse describes the contradictory nature of art; while art creates positive models 
against a reality that it protests, these can only assume a utopian character because 
they are aestheticised and detached from reality. Hence, while art reveals underlying 
truths about reality, these are taken as a matter of fact, subsumed within the 
institution and their critical role is thus either neutralised or serves as a consolation: 
What counts as utopia, phantasy, and rebellion in the world of fact is 
allowed in art. There affirmative culture has displayed the forgotten 
truths over which ‘realism’ triumphs in daily life. The medium of beauty 
decontaminates truth and sets it apart from the present. What occurs in 
art occurs with no obligation. (Marcuse, 2009/1968, p. 84) 
Although art in bourgeois society provides “at least an imagined satisfaction of 
individual needs that are repressed in daily praxis” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 12), this 
experience cannot be integrated into life. This lack of tangible effects does not signal 
the functionlessness of art, instead it “characterizes a specific function of art in 
bourgeois society: the neutralization of critique” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 13).  
…aesthetic experience is the positive side of the process by which the 
social subsystem ‘art’ defines itself as a distinct sphere. Its negative 
side is the artist’s loss of any social function. (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 33) 
The negative aspect of aesthetic experience amounts to what is essentially a blind spot 
concerning the subjugation of art in bourgeois ideology:  
These institutions, which determine the conditions of cultural 
consumption, are the very ones in which artistic production is 
transformed into a tool of ideological control and cultural legitimation. 
(Buchloh, 1990, p. 143) 
The most significant consequence of institutional mediation on art is the overriding 
ideology of the institution, which impinges on the space of the work, rendering all the 
work in the institution homogenous. 
Art in bourgeois society serves many functions; the most subtle of these functions are 
ideological and therefore largely unarticulated. The institutionalisation of art as an 
exclusive field severs art’s connections to the world and conceals the functionalisation 
of art at the service of political and economic interests. The concept of the autonomy 
of art originates in Kant’s description of art as an aesthetic activity that is purposive but 
without purpose. This concept is furthermore consolidated in Adorno’s argument that 
the critical function of art is its functionlessness. At the same time, art is put to use in 
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biennials to attract tourism and community projects to carry out government policies. 
Art is instrumentalised in museums on behalf of corporations and functionalised in art 
fairs and auction houses as a form of investment. In all but reputation, art is a 
formidable industry trading in all forms of culture.  
This contradictoriness or ambivalence of autonomy which Marcuse, Bürger and 
Benjamin highlight, provides a useful perspective on the development of the dialogical 
relationship between artist and audience, the complexities of this relationship, the 
evolution of the goals of artists and the effectiveness and limitations of the strategies 
they have employed. It also points to the conflict between the perceived 
ineffectiveness of art and the functionalisation of art: its compensatory role and its 
recuperation and instrumentalisation by museums and corporations.  
Critique of institutional critique 
The history and achievements of Institutional Critique have to be 
considered as successfully canonized at this point (Graw, 2006, p. 143) 
In her article From the Critique of Institutions, to the Institution of Critique (2005), 
Andrea Fraser defends institutional critique against criticisms that it has become 
‘institutionalised’.29 The critical claims of institutional critique have come increasingly 
under question at a time when artists such as Daniel Buren, “have become art-
historical institutions themselves” (Fraser, 2005, p. 100).  
Fraser has consistently engaged with representations of the figure of the artist through 
her work and in her writing, often undertaking to defend institutional critique against 
the charges of “contradictions and complicities, ambitions and ambivalence” (Fraser, 
2005, p. 101). She contends that in “an art world in which MOMA opens its new 
temporary-exhibition galleries with a corporate collection, and art hedge funds sell 
shares of single paintings” there is a nostalgia for “a time when artists could still 
conceivably take up a critical position against or outside the institution” (Fraser, 2005, 
p. 100). Fraser asks rhetorically:  
How, then, can we imagine, much less accomplish, a critique of art 
institutions when museum and market have grown into an all-
                                            
29 In his New York Times review of Buren’s solo exhibition at the Guggenheim in 2005, Michael 
Kimmelman accuses Buren of “preaching white-box clichés to a converted audience of insiders 
[which] invariably depends on the largesse of institutions like the Guggenheim”. Kimmelman 
extends his critique to the exclusivity of the art world, or what he calls “special access to special 
information: privileged ideas circulated within a closed system, the art world’s traditional 
currency” (Kimmelman, 2005). 
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encompassing apparatus of cultural reification? (Fraser, 2005, pp. 278-
279) 
For Fraser, the critique of institutional critique’s institutionalisation and obsolescence is 
based on a misconception. She argues that the assumption that institutional critique 
opposes “art” to “institution” and the associated assumption that the institution 
“incorporates, co-opts, commodifies, and otherwise misappropriates once-radical—and 
uninstitutionalized—practices” (Fraser, 2005, p. 102), is a fallacy because the site-
specific interventions of Asher, Broodthaers, Buren and Haacke are a way of both 
reflecting on and resisting institutional forms of appropriation. Fraser argues that 
institutional critique does not affirm the contested site of the institutional apparatus 
and our relationship to it, but problematises and transforms the structure of this 
relationship: “particularly what is hierarchical in that structure and the forms of power 
and domination, symbolic and material violence, produced by those hierarchies” 
(Fraser, 2006, p. 306). For Fraser the only way to accomplish this transformation is “by 
intervening in the enactment of that relation” (Fraser, 2006, p. 307). Fraser argues 
that this condition also addresses the “ambivalence” identified with institutional 
critique, “because to intervene in relations in their enactment also always means as 
you yourself participate in their enactment, however self-consciously” (Fraser, 2006, p. 
307). 
What makes this participation self-conscious is our degree of complicity with the 
structures under critique. Andrea Fraser’s work Little Frank and his Carp (2006) at the 
Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is a case in point. The work parodies the market-driven 
ideology and performative self-promotion of the contemporary museum, but the 
critique is ambiguous, what were the conditions of the work’s production, did she 
sneak secretly into the museum? When we find out that the work was in fact 
commissioned by the museum, the ambiguity is ameliorated but the work is even more 
difficult to grasp, what were the conditions of the commission? If the Guggenheim felt 
threatened in any way, would it have commissioned the work in the first place?  
The argument that artists can infiltrate the institution and subvert it from within is 
either naïve or intentionally misleading. Institutionalisation does not happen from one 
moment to the next, it is a process of internalisation and it is exploitative of subjective 
values, desires and personal relationships. Although artists practicing institutional 
critique maintain an ostensibly critical attitude toward the art world in their work, 
institutional critique reproduces established critical models as well as institutional 
conventions. Most artists currently practicing institutional critique function without 
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causing friction within the institution, erecting a professional career along institutionally 
established routes: 
Finally and familiarly, this practice runs the risk of reduction in the 
gallery/museum from an act of subversion to a form of exposition, with 
the work less an attack on the separation of cultural and social practice 
than another example of it and the artist less a deconstructive 
delineator of the institution than its “expert.” (Foster, 1986, p. 103) 
Institutional critique takes place within the value system it claims to challenge, working 
with and upholding the very same values and means that it critiques, the aim of 
institutional critique therefore is to perpetuate the institution.  
Epilogue of institutional critique 
How has the art world changed after institutional critique? How have museums coped 
with the criticism? Institutional critique has generated a great deal of discourse in the 
form of exhibitions, publications and panel discussions. The title of the book 
Institutional Critique and After (2006), edited by John C. Welchman, suggests that it 
has been superseded. The current phase of institutional critique, exemplified by the 
practice of artists such as Carey Young, is a critique on the entire apparatus of the art 
world from an insider’s perspective. As an after-thought to institutional critique, a 
number of artist-run institutions have tried to maintain a relative independence from 
major institutions without however challenging them in any way. Since the 1990s, 
institutional critique sits comfortably within art institutions, and artists are explicitly 
invited by museums to perform this critique. In Art and Contemporary Critical Practice: 
Reinventing Institutional Critique (2009), the editors Gerald Raunig and Gene Ray state 
that the canonisation of institutional critique “proceeds on a terrain that is quite 
orderly, operates by clear rules and borders, and is characterized by a certain amount 
of depoliticization and self-reference” (Raunig and Ray, 2009, p. xv).  
Raunig and Ray demarcate two crucial lines of further inquiry. The first is the “line of 
art production” which in the current phase of institutional critique is a combination 
social critique, institutional critique and self-critique as institutions invite artists to 
contribute to their self-definition, which only reaffirms the institutionalisation of 
institutional critique (Raunig and Ray, 2009, p. xiii). For Simon Sheikh, in response to 
the expansion of institutional critique beyond art to other forms of institutionalisation 
“the institutional framework became somewhat expanded to include the artist’s role 
(the subject performing the critique) as institutionalized” (Sheikh, 2006). Consequently, 
the second area of investigation that Raunig and Ray recommend is the “line of art 
institutions”, which take up critical functions themselves. This development is seen 
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mainly as a defensive manoeuvre against a backdrop of “repressive cultural policies” 
and “neo-liberal populist cultural policies”. Raunig and Ray recommend further inquiry 
into “counter-strategies [and] new forms of the organization of critical art institutions” 
(Raunig and Ray, 2009, p. xiii-xiv). 
Simon Sheikh postulates an “expanded notion” of institutional critique. He argues that 
institutional critique is not a historical movement or genre, but “an analytical tool”: 
…a method of spatial and political criticism and articulation that can be 
applied not only to the artworld, but to disciplinary spaces and 
institutions in general.  (Sheikh, 2006) 
Sheikh argues that this “institutionalized critique” is internalised by the museum, and 
does not merely question the function and role of the institution, it also “becomes a 
mechanism of control within new modes of governmentality”, providing the model for 
“critical art institutions” (Sheikh, 2006). Institutional critique, he claims, is currently 
practiced by institutions with the production of academic discourse and discussion 
panels (Sheikh, 2008). This has come to be known as “new institutionalism” and it 
describes the practices of institutions that emerged in the 1990s including the Van 
Abbe Museum in Eindhoven, the Depot in Vienna and the Kunstraum Luneburg. 
Isabelle Graw argues that this new type of institution adopted principles and strategies 
associated with institutional critique, such as research, documentation, teamwork, 
transparency and communication, all of which are completely “in accord with neo-
liberal values” (Graw, 2006, p. 142): 
…artistic competencies usually associated with Institutional Critique 
(research, teamwork, personal risk-taking, and so on) actually feed, 
sometimes quite perfectly, into what sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello have described as “the new spirit of capitalism. (Graw, 2006, 
p. 139) 
Institutions welcome and accommodate artists’ critique within their diversified 
functions, in fact artists’ critique provides the means whereby institutions adapt to the 
conditions of neoliberalism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE VICISSITUDES OF AUTONOMY 
The concept of the autonomy of art lays claim to the appreciation of art as art. Devoid 
of any practical function, works of art are evaluated aesthetically and independently of 
any instrumental imperatives (social, moral, economic, pedagogic etc.). Autonomy 
characterises the work of art as an aesthetic experience, it therefore also characterises 
works of art and the criteria for the judgement of art. Ultimately, the status of 
autonomy extends to the artist and the institutions of art as well. The concept of the 
autonomy of art is historically constructed and serves to establish and legitimise what 
we call the “institution of art” in western culture.  
Autonomy is an empowering concept for artists but it is also constitutive of the false 
idealism of art and serves to conceal the connection between culture and hegemony. 
Autonomy privileges artworks as self-contained objects of aesthetic contemplation—
with timeless and universal appeal—not as cultural artefacts implicated in complex 
social and historically inscribed relationships.  
Since the early twentieth century, artists have articulated a self-conscious ambivalence 
regarding the autonomy of art. Whilst many artists continued to question and 
challenge popular and essentialist notions of the artist in their practice, artists like 
Josef Beuys sustained these contradictory notions. Beuys often delivered his famous 
slogan “every human being is an artist” (Beuys, 1974, p. 48), to suggest that creativity 
is not the privilege of artists. He nevertheless cultivated a myth around his persona as 
an artist through the messianic symbolism in his work, in references to his miraculous 
survival in World War II, in his characteristic attire and rhetorical posture. 
The autonomy of art is historically defined through five distinct phases and their 
associated meanings: 
(1) The concept of autonomy is initially an ideological category originating in the late 
eighteenth-century aesthetic philosophy of Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Judgment, 
originally published in 1790. Here the concept of autonomy refers primarily to the 
faculties of aesthetic judgement (or taste) as disinterested pleasure or purposiveness 
without purpose. In his essay Kant and the Autonomy of Art (1989), Casey Haskins 
argues that Kant “never speaks of art—as opposed to the faculties of judgement and 
taste—as autonomous” (Haskins, 1989, p. 43). Kant’s autonomy thesis applies to 
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aesthetics in general and not to art in particular.30 Once he has defined the judgement 
of taste, Kant then superimposes these characteristics onto the work of art.  
(2) The concept of autonomy was updated in the nineteenth century with the struggle 
for the independence of art from social institutions and from claims of morality and 
social utility.31 The original concept of autonomy opened up a domain of freedom for 
art, limited only by the “principle of the unity of the work” (Bürger, 1998, p. 177). 
Walter Benjamin defines the artist’s autonomy as the “freedom to write whatever he 
pleases” and the decision “in whose service he is to place his activity” (Benjamin, 
1969/1934, p. 220).  
(3) The artists’ historical emancipation from patronage culminated in Aestheticism and 
the concept of art-for-art’s-sake. Thus in the modern era, the value of purposelessness 
or disinterest is extended to include the critique of society. The concept of autonomy 
henceforth takes on the meaning of self-jurisdiction because art is not accountable to 
external rules or values. Peter Bürger defines autonomy primarily on the basis of the 
separation of the aesthetic sphere from life praxis: 
Under the impression of the irreconcilability of art and modern society, 
this position is now radicalized in such a way that the work of art may 
only express its own impossibility. (Bürger, 1998, p. 177) 
(4) In the mid-twentieth century—and in tandem with the increasing 
professionalisation of art—the concept of autonomy is reasserted and taken to its 
ultimate conclusion in the formalist programmes of Clement Greenberg and Michael 
Fried. The concept of autonomy is thus associated with an anachronistic concept of 
“high art” as a unique object with timeless and universal appeal, the work of a genius.  
It is important at this point to consider Casey Haskins’ reading of Kant in order to 
establish the meaning of the term “aesthetics” in this thesis. Casey Haskins 
distinguishes between two forms of autonomy: a non-instrumental “strict autonomism” 
associated with Greenberg, which maintains that the evaluation of works of art is 
limited to their artistic or aesthetic properties. The other view, which Haskins calls 
“instrumental autonomism”, is associated with the pragmatist and Marxist traditions 
                                            
30 Haskins states that Kant “stops considerably short of holding that art follows laws of its own, 
a doctrine which would come into fashion only with the teachings of Hegelian-influenced art 
historians such as Riegl and Wolfflin” (Haskins, 1989, p. 43, note 3). 
31 In The Rules of Art (1996), Pierre Bourdieu argues that the struggles of Manet, Flaubert and 
Baudelaire against Salon refusals and obscenity trials was an effort to achieve their autonomy 
from institutions such as the Salon, the Academy, the church and the courts. These artists thus 
contributed to the emergence of the autonomous field of artistic production (Bourdieu, 1996).  
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(Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, John Dewey and Monroe Beardsley). This 
viewpoint emphasises the unique capacity of the artwork to do what other kinds of 
objects cannot do in the same way and introduces alternative criteria into this 
judgment. For example, it ascribes criteria of value to works of art that are 
instrumental to knowledge or education and thus provides a more inclusive framework 
for ascribing value to works of art. Haskins points out that Kant affirms an instrumental 
notion of autonomy (Haskins, 1989, p. 43). Kant defines the work of fine art as: 
…a mode of representation which is intrinsically purposive, and which, 
although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of 
the mental powers in the interests of social communication. (Kant, 
2007/1790, §44, p. 135) 
Thus for Kant, the contemplation of artworks does not necessarily appeal only to the 
aesthetic properties of a work of art. The purpose of art is social cohesion through a 
nondiscursive form of communication. The ultimate goal of this social function is to 
refine the senses in order to bring about the ethical reign of reason. 
…taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a faculty that judges of the rendering 
of moral ideas in terms of the senses (through the intervention of a 
certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this rendering also, 
and in the increased receptivity, founded upon it, for the feeling which 
these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that 
pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not 
merely for the private feeling of each individual. This makes it clear that 
the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the 
development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling. (Kant, 
2007/1790, §60, p. 183) 
According to Haskins, aesthetic ideas for Kant correspond in their function to produce 
“systematic discursive thought even though they range […] over a larger universe of 
discourse”. For Haskins this contains the implication that “aesthetic ideas provide us 
with a proto-knowledge, and to this extent [Kant] regards fine art as instrumental 
toward a cognitive end” (Haskins, 1989, p. 48).  
(5) The fifth aspect of autonomy is the autonomy of the art institution. It consists of 
the internal rules of art and the interdependence of the players in the field; art is 
produced in response to other art and to discourses within the field. They come from 
other artists, curators, critics, the public, administrators, dealers, collectors etc. This is 
what Peter Bürger refers to when he says that “it is not in and of themselves that 
works of art have their effect but rather that this effect is decisively determined by the 
institution within which the works function” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 31). In the 
twentieth century, this claim will have critical consequences for artists’ practice and the 
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control of meaning in their work. By the end of the twentieth century, forms of 
institutional critique revealed the pervasiveness of the art institution and the illusory 
character of autonomy. Autonomy remains a valuable though problematic, 
controversial and contested concept. The problem of autonomy confronts artists who 
set out to produce a “political” critique of capitalist ideology from a position of plausible 
neutrality, one that is circumscribed by the privileged and fortified autonomous 
institution of art itself.  
A self-conscious institution 
…artists, the emblems of freedom, are present in the museum 
experience in a ghostly fashion, as traces of creative work, as wish-
images of non-alienated labour, playing an imaginary role (Buck-Morss, 
2003, p. 69) 
The role of art in western society has undergone major shifts since the eighteenth 
century, when art was consolidated as an institution. This transition occurred within 
the conditions established by the concept of autonomy and at roughly the same time 
as the French Revolution, when the bourgeoisie was in the process of asserting its 
power (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 26). 
The insights formulated in Kant’s and Schiller’s32 aesthetic writings 
presuppose the completed evolution of art as a sphere that is detached 
from the praxis of life. We can therefore take it as our point of 
departure that at the end of the eighteenth century at the latest, art as 
an institution is already fully developed.33 (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 26) 
For Bürger, autonomy “defines the functional mode of the social subsystem ‘art’: its 
(relative) independence in the face of demands that it be socially useful” (Bürger, 
2007/1974, p. 24). Once art was released from the requirement to fulfil a social 
function, it turned inward to engage with its own conditions of possibility, culminating 
in the l’art pour l’art movement at the end of the nineteenth century. With the 
historical avant-garde movements in the early twentieth century, “the social subsystem 
that is art enters the stage of self-criticism”, and it is only when art enters the stage of 
self-criticism that “the ‘objective understanding’ of past periods of the development of 
                                            
32 Kant, 2007/1790; Schiller, 2001/1794.  
33 The British Museum in London was founded in 1753 and opened to the public in 1759. The 
Uffizi Gallery in Florence, which had been open to visitors upon request since the sixteenth 
century, was officially opened to the public in 1765. The Belvedere Palace of the Habsburg 
monarchs in Vienna opened in 1781. The Louvre Museum in Paris was the first public museum, 
it opened in 1793 during the French Revolution when the National Assembly decreed that the 
Louvre should be used to display the nation’s treasures. 
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art become possible”. The self-consciousness of art is here the precondition of the 
historical avant-garde and its programmatic efforts to transcend the institution of 
autonomous art and to integrate art into everyday life with the aim of bringing about 
utopian social change. Hence, “Dadaism […] no longer criticizes schools that precede 
it, but criticizes art as an institution, and the course its development took in bourgeois 
society” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 22). According to Benjamin Buchloh, “one of the 
essential features of Modernism [was] its impulse to criticize itself from within, to 
question its institutionalization, its reception, and its audience” (Buchloh, 1982, p. 50).  
Thus, in the modern era, art by definition questions its existence: the work of art asks 
“what am I?” (Hinkle, 1979, p. 28). This radical uncertainty is the only guidance for 
artists. The promiscuity of art, its unpredictable forms and appearances testifies to this 
principle, yet at the same time art is proscribed, defined, limited and circumscribed by 
the institution of art itself. The moment of self-consciousness of art is also the moment 
of the coming into being of the institution of art. At this moment, it also becomes 
possible to differentiate between the work of art and its institutional function and 
designation. A distinction emerges between the singular practices of artists and art as 
a social institution with a legitimising cultural discourse that enables us to recognise 
and talk about works of art: 
Art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose 
of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is (Hegel, 
1835/1975, p. 11) 
In her essay A Global Counter-Culture? (2003), Susan Buck-Morss states that in the 
legitimating discursive field of art history the “very definition of what art is involved 
making critical judgements about the material world” (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 66). The 
question “what is art?” is central to art practice which—rooted in the epistemological 
criterion of aesthetic judgement—contains the “possibility of aesthetic experience as 
critique” (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 67).  
The critical function of autonomous art 
Art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived. […] 
Art is autonomous and it is not; without what is heterogeneous to it, its 
autonomy eludes it. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 6) 
In Aesthetic Theory (2002/1970), Theodor Adorno describes the emergence of the 
autonomous work of art as part of a historical process: western art before the 
Enlightenment served various social functions. Towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, artists could no longer rely on religious and aristocratic patronage so they 
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began to address the market. They were now free to decide what the work would be 
about. Adorno identifies the autonomy of art with its emancipation from patronage and 
its subsequent “appropriation of the commodity character, through which art gained 
the semblance of its being-in-itself” (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 239). The dialectical 
development of autonomy and commodification involved various processes including 
the development of an art market and the founding of museums and art galleries. 
“Bourgeois” art emerged when artists established themselves in Europe’s burgeoning 
capitalist market of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. After the 
revolutions of 1848, the bourgeoisie was no longer the revolutionary class, reacting to 
the ills of modern industrial society, l’art pour l’art withdrew from social engagement: 
…commodification became a prison rather than a liberation for the 
artist. With “art for art’s sake”, art withdrew from political action; in the 
modernist era that followed, progressive art lost its self-confidence and 
turned against the bourgeois culture which produced it. (Hamilton, 
2008, p. 289) 
Bürger concurs that the failure of the 1848 revolution in France created a political 
climate wherein “social engagement became as good as impossible”, and this “crucially 
encouraged the radicalization of the autonomy of art”. However, he adds that at the 
same time, there were other interpretations of the autonomy of art, including the 
formal experiments of Gustav Flaubert, Charles Baudelaire and Stéphane Mallarme, 
and the idea of the “work” which breaks off the semantic relations between the work 
of art and social reality (Bürger, 1998, p. 177). 
In his essay, Adorno and the autonomy of art (2008), Andy Hamilton argues that 
Adorno develops and qualifies Kant’s concept of the autonomy of the aesthetic in 
conjunction with his concept of purposiveness without purpose, and his account of 
genius, through the Hegelian concepts of truth-content, intellectual import and the 
historical conditioning of artworks (Hamilton, 2008, p. 289-290). Whereas for Hegel, 
the relationship between art and society is affirmative, Adorno stresses its critical role 
(Hamilton, 2008, p. 295): 
Progressive art embodies and exists within late bourgeois culture whilst 
denying by its truth-content that very culture; it deconstructs late 
capitalism as a false totality. (Hamilton, 2008, p. 290) 
Adorno argues that while autonomous art is a commodity, it is not simply a function of 
bourgeois ideology because it also serves a critical function (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
194). The central dichotomy and paradoxical ambivalence of Adorno’s aesthetic theory 
lies in the opposition between Kant’s concurrent emphasis on the autonomy of form 
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and the commodity status of art. This problem was also addressed by Marx, who 
emphasised art’s social determination (Hamilton, 2008, p. 290).  
The autonomy of art, “its growing independence from society”, according to Adorno, 
“was a function of the bourgeois consciousness of freedom that was itself bound up 
with the social structure”, because at the time, “the idea of a fundamentally 
oppositional art was inconceivable” (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 225). Adorno provides an 
account of the artwork’s necessary and illusory autonomy as “the social antithesis of 
society”, which is the key to modern art’s social dimension (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 8). 
Adorno’s main claim is that art’s autonomy and its commodity status are in dialectical 
opposition:  
The double character of art—something that severs itself from empirical 
reality and thereby from society’s functional context and yet is at the 
same time part of empirical reality and society’s functional context—is 
directly apparent in the aesthetic phenomena, which are both aesthetic 
and faits sociaux. They require a double observation that is no more to 
be posited as an unalloyed whole than aesthetic autonomy and art can 
be conflated as something strictly social. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 252) 
For Adorno the social function of autonomous art in the era of modernism is social 
critique (Hamilton, 2008, p. 293). Autonomous art is critical in two ways; in the first 
instance, autonomous art is a critique of heteronomy. Art resists heteronomy by 
insisting obstinately on its own values and rules. Art sublimates reality’s governing 
principle of self-preservation. By subsuming its subjects into its “self-identity”, art 
releases things from the homogeneity that is foisted on them: 
Aesthetic identity seeks to aid the nonidentical, which in reality is 
repressed by reality’s compulsion to identity. […] Artworks are 
afterimages of empirical life insofar as they help the latter to what is 
denied them outside their own sphere and thereby free it from that to 
which they are condemned by reified external experience. (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 4) 
Adorno’s argument is that since art no longer fulfils a social function, it can create its 
own logic, unconstrained by external imperatives. It is through its refusal of any social 
function that, according to Adorno, autonomous art acquires a critical function. In a 
society where everything has been instrumentalised and subjected to the principle of 
exchange, autonomous art performs a social critique. In this way, autonomous art is 
more critical than political art. 
What would Adorno say if he witnessed the current instrumentalisation of this very 
function? How would Adorno negotiate the potentially priceless value of art as an 
object without purpose and the cultural capital this status accrues for the institutions 
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and corporations that invest in its value? The defence of the autonomy of art glosses 
over the social and political dimensions of the production of art and the relationship of 
art to social institutions. Adorno’s concept of autonomy proposes to solve this problem 
by conceiving the autonomy of art as a critical practice on its own terms. 
The second critical function of art for Adorno is its functionlessness, whereby it resists 
the logic of capitalism. Expressing his reservations concerning the critical value of 
political art, Adorno reconfigures Kant’s articulation of the aesthetic as purposiveness 
without purpose (Hamilton, 2008, p. 289) to functionalise its lack of social function. 
Although works of art are socially situated, they have no social function. To put it more 
precisely, the function of art, as a critique and resistance of the instrumental logic of 
capitalism, inheres in its functionlessness: 
What is social in art is its immanent movement against society, not its 
manifest opinions. Its historical gesture repels empirical reality, of which 
artworks are nevertheless part in that they are things. Insofar as a 
social function can be predicated for artworks, it is their 
functionlessness. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 227) 
For Adorno, the relationship between art and society is not limited to the “insertion of 
objective elements”, which works of art “borrow” from the empirical world. Art’s 
relationship to society is defined by the “unsolved antagonisms of reality [which] return 
in artworks as immanent problems of form”. Thus, works of art represent society 
without imitating it (Adorno, 2002, pp. 6, 5). Hence, the purpose of autonomous art is 
to serve no obvious purpose as the apparent negation and critique of functionalism.  
Autonomy and heteronomy 
Theodor Adorno considers commodification to be the founding moment of art in 
capitalist society (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 239), therefore commodification in and of 
itself does not necessarily compromise the critical function of the work of art. In his 
Critique of Relational Aesthetics (2007/2006), Stewart Martin points out that for 
Adorno the autonomous work of art is “inherently entwined with its commodity form” 
(Martin, 2007/2006, p. 374).  
…the trademark of consumer goods appropriated by art by means of 
which artworks distinguish themselves from the ever-same inventory in 
obedience to the need for the exploitation of capital, which, if it does 
not expand, if it does not—in its own language—offer something new, is 
eclipsed. The new is the aesthetic seal of expanded reproduction, with 
its promise of undiminished plentitude. […] The absolute artwork 
converges with the absolute commodity. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 21) 
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Adorno conceives autonomous art as a concentrated form of commodity fetishism 
which exposes the inherent contradiction of the commodity because, ultimately, it is 
uses that are exchanged. For Martin this formulation defines the autonomous work of 
art in terms of its “resistance to being subjected to capital”. For Adorno art is thus an 
“immanent critique of commodification” (Martin, 2007/2006, pp. 374-375). It follows 
therefore that the critical potential of art does not hinge on challenging its commodity 
status (Martin, 2007/2006, p. 378), if anything the focus on commodification is merely 
a distraction.  
Stewart Martin argues that for Adorno the critical dimension of autonomous art lies in 
its critique of the illusion that nothing is valuable in itself, independently of its 
exchange value, an illusion intensified within a universally commodified culture (Martin, 
2007/2006, p. 374). This however suggests that all art is critical of commodity 
fetishism, regardless of the intentions of the artist or their effectiveness. Martin argues 
that this is precisely the reason that “autonomous art must incorporate criticism of 
itself into itself if it is not to function ideologically”. Despite Adorno’s claim for the 
essentially critical dimension of autonomy, he does not claim that art is actually 
autonomous from society, as this would be a fetishisation or illusion (Martin, 
2007/2006, p. 375): 
Hence the necessity of autonomous art’s anti-artistic or heteronomous 
dimension, whereby art must criticise its presupposition of received 
conceptions of autonomous art if it is to avoid suggesting that this 
autonomy is literally independent of its social constitution. (Martin, 
2007/2006, p. 375) 
Over and above the internal uncertainty or self-criticism of art (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
2), Adorno indicates that if the autonomous work of art is to function critically in 
society, this self-criticism must be achieved through mediation with a heteronomous 
dimension (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 248). Hence, by exposing its internal contradictions, 
art highlights social contradictions, thus art remains critical despite its complicity. For 
Adorno, the unavoidable tensions within works of modern art express the conflicts 
within the larger social and historical processes from which they arise and to which 
they belong. These tensions enter the artwork through the artist’s struggle with social 
and historically laden materials, and they elicit conflicting interpretations, many of 
which misread either the internal tensions of the work of art or their connection to 
conflicts in society as a whole: 
In artworks, the criterion of success is twofold: whether they succeed in 
integrating thematic strata and details into their immanent law of form 
and in this integration at the same time maintain what resists it and the 
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fissures that occur in the process of integration. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
7) 
Bürger describes Adorno’s concept of the self-criticism of art in the most precise way, 
he sees art as a “vacant arcanum” and the autonomy of art as a “game”, a convention, 
which was radicalised in response to the failure of the 1848 revolutions when “social 
engagement became as good as impossible” (Bürger, 1998, p. 177). Bürger’s critique 
points out that art and autonomy are provisional ideas: 
…the postulate of autonomy in the last third of the eighteenth century 
responds to central problems of incipient bourgeois capitalist society, 
and for this reason retains its validity in the two centuries to come, 
however disputed that validity will come to be. The problems to which 
this new definition of art reacts are called forth by the transition from a 
traditional to a modern society and by the changes in attitudes and 
patterns of life that this conditions. (Bürger, 1998, p. 176) 
Bürger characterises these problems as a loss of meaning coupled with alienation 
amongst individuals who are directed towards increasingly selfish goals. To individuals 
thus divided in themselves and from their environment “autonomous art opens a world 
that lets [them] experience perfection as reality, although only at the cost of the strict 
separation of this from any life praxis” (Bürger, 1998, p. 176). 
The historical avant-garde movements of the early twentieth century were “unanimous 
in their fundamental questioning of the autonomy of art” (Bürger, 1998, p. 177), for 
them, art was no longer merely a question of material production, but of 
revolutionising life. However, the historical avant-garde failed both in their attempt to 
sublate art and in their ambition to revolutionise everyday life. Instead, their anti-art 
has been recuperated as art. This, according to Bürger, affected “less the relation of 
art and life than the self-understanding of art”. Duchamp’s Fountain initiated the 
question of what a work of art is, as a necessary moment of art production. For 
Bürger, artists cannot uphold the autonomy of art without betraying the avant-garde 
project, neither can they reactivate the avant-garde project because it has failed 
(Bürger, 1998, p. 178). This is the dilemma in which artists of the twentieth century 
have been caught, the dilemma theorised but not overcome, Adorno defines this 
dilemma thus: 
If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of 
the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits to 
integration as one harmless domain among others. The social totality 
appears in this aporia, swallowing whole whatever occurs. That works 
renounce communication is a necessary yet by no means sufficient 
condition of their unideological essence. The central criterion is the 
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force of expression, through the tension of which artworks become 
eloquent with wordless gesture. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 237) 
Bürger, who rejects Adorno’s Theory of the Avant Garde in favour of Marcuse’s critique 
of aesthetics,34 suggests that in order to overcome the aporia, artists must attempt to  
…bind the mutually contradictory, that is, to create works, but in such a 
way that these latter be absorbed in an intention that goes beyond 
them [they] must invent a new place for art, which is neither within nor 
outside of art, but on the edge that separates artistic action from other 
forms of social action. (Bürger, 1998, p. 178) 
Strictly speaking, this controversial35 place is already accommodated in the space of 
autonomy, described by Adorno as the “double character of art”: 
…something that severs itself from empirical reality and thereby from 
society’s functional context and yet is at the same time part of empirical 
reality and society’s functional context (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 252) 
For Adorno this paradoxical character of art: 
…is directly apparent in the aesthetic phenomena, which are both 
aesthetic and faits sociaux. They require a double observation that is no 
more to be posited as an unalloyed whole than aesthetic autonomy and 
art can be conflated as something strictly social. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
252) 
Adorno thus identifies Bürger’s concept of “a new place for art, which is neither within 
nor outside of art, but on the edge that separates artistic action from other forms of 
social action” (Bürger, 1998, p. 178) and presents the notion of autonomy as a 
necessary illusion: 
Art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived. […] 
Art is autonomous and it is not; without what is heterogeneous to it, its 
autonomy eludes it. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 6) 
For Bürger this is an “impossible place, which exists nowhere, but rather must in each 
case be created in the moment” (Bürger, 1998, p. 178). Adorno’s thesis of the dialectic 
between autonomy and heteronomy assigns to the status of autonomy a duplicitous 
                                            
34 Bürger’s critique underlines the incompatibility of Adorno’s theory with central Marxist 
postulates, illustrated by Adorno’s disagreement with Benjamin on the subject of political art.  
35 The incessant question posed by philosophers, art historians and critics as “what 
distinguishes art from non-art?” Following Adorno closely, Ranciere argues that in avant garde 
art until the 1960s “the play of exchanges between art and non-art served to generate clashes 
between heterogeneous elements and dialectical oppositions between form and content […] In 
this way, art’s self-critique became involved in the critique of mechanisms of state and market 
domination” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 51). 
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role, whereby art can preserve but also conceal its commodity character. Autonomy is 
a fetish, a socially constructed ruse. It is a position of complicity but the pay off is 
substantial: works of art are critical because they protest against the 
instrumentalisation of everything in capitalist society (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 227). 
Adorno is critical of the homogenising effect of the culture industry, not of popular 
culture as such. Adorno fears the potential devolution of the art institution into the 
cultural industry, a potential outcome that inheres within its autonomy (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 5): 
If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of 
the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits to 
integration as one harmless domain among others. (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 237) 
In both cases, art can potentially revert to entertainment through reification. Adorno is 
sceptical towards the avant-garde ambition to reintegrate art and life, not because of 
the manifest failure of the historical avant-gardes to achieve this goal, but because of 
their inadvertent success.36 Adorno’s contempt for Jugendstil stems from his belief that 
it opened the floodgates to the commodification and reification of art in capitalist 
culture through its attempts to reintegrate art and life and served as a prelude to the 
culture industry (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 239). Today this process takes place with the 
intervention of the legitimising institutions of art, which administer art on behalf of the 
public.  
Adorno’s defence of the subversive potential of autonomous art endures today in the 
conventional narratives about art and the figure of the artist. Art appears as a space of 
freedom and inclusivity. Art appears to be apolitical in a way that allows it to be 
political in its own terms, beyond the dogmatism of political organisations: 
The work that desires nothing, the work without any point of view, 
which conveys no message and has no care either for democracy or for 
anti-democracy, this work is ‘egalitarian’ by dint of its very indifference, 
by which it suspends all preference, all hierarchy. It is subversive, as 
subsequent generations would discover, by dint of its radical separation 
of the sensorium of art from that of everyday aestheticized life. A  
contrast is thereby formed between a type of art that makes politics by 
eliminating itself as art and a type of art that is political on the proviso 
                                            
36 Peter Bürger argues that the sublation of art was achieved but not in the way intended by the 
avant-garde, Huyssen similarly points out that “In a sense never intended by the avantgarde, 
life had indeed become art—in the fascist aestheticization of politics as mass spectacle as well 
as in the fictionalizations of reality dictated by the socialist realism of Zhdanov and by the 
dream world of capitalist realism promoted by Hollywood” (Huyssen, 1983, p. 28). 
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that it retains its purity, avoiding all forms of political intervention. 
(Ranciere, 2009, p. 40)  
Artists thus implicitly assume a political position through negation. By inhabiting an 
alternative lifestyle, they demonstrate that other realities are possible. Representations 
of artists in the media reproduce this bohemian figure of the artist.37 But in fact, 
professional relationships in the art world are ritualised, antagonistic and alienating, 
and artists are essentially producing unique and expensive commodities. The art world 
effectively functions just like any other competitive and commercial sector of society.  
What is the value of artistic autonomy? 
This is not a time for political art, but politics has migrated into 
autonomous art, and nowhere more so than where it seems to be 
politically dead. (Adorno, 2007/1962, p. 194) 
Although autonomy is essentially a normative concept, it nevertheless describes the 
current condition of art accurately: we experience art in dedicated spaces, we regard 
artworks attentively, we value them more than commodities and we expect artists to 
prioritise aesthetic values over those of the market. However, since the turn of the 
century, we increasingly see more social and political content in works of art, artists 
increasingly expand our notions of the work of art, institutions branch out into the 
community and into public spaces with a social agenda and governments increasingly 
encourage and provide funding for community art projects. If the autonomy of art is 
still a valid concept, then how do we explain the current popularity of political art and 
the dematerialisation of art into social practice? How does the “ethical turn” affect the 
autonomous regime of art? 
Art practice is no longer outside, no longer high, no longer avant-garde. Art is a culture 
industry. Autonomy is identified with an outdated formalist idea and rejected. But the 
problem may lie precisely in the fact that we can no longer lay claim to this autonomy. 
                                            
37 Basquiat (1996) directed by Julian Schnabel, reinforces the romantic clichés associated with 
artists: success, publicity, parties, hangers-on, egotism, isolation and paranoia. Great 
Expectations (1998) directed by Alfonso Cuarón, is an adaptation of the novel by Charles 
Dickens and relocates the story in 1990s New York, where Finn (Pip) makes it in the art world. 
The film rehashes all the clichés associated with the heroic artist of post-war America, the 
enormous expressionist quasi-abstract canvasses accommodated in the studio-loft, the solo 
exhibition sold out on the opening night, fawning dealers and collectors. Spaced (Channel 4, 
1999 and 2001) is a British situation comedy written by and featuring Simon Pegg and Jessica 
Hynes, and directed by Edgar Wright. The character of Brian Topp (Mark Heap) is a caricature 
combining many popular and often contradictory characteristics associated with artists; he is a 
conceptual artist but also paints in an abstract style, he is unsuccessful and ambivalent about 
art, he is eccentric, angst-ridden and obsessive, but also shy and romantic. 
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The notion of autonomy persists, but only as a fetish. Autonomy has passed from the 
artist and from the spectator to the institution. What becomes of art in an 
instrumental, global neoliberal economy?38 Can art in this context escape the 
instrumentalisation that converts it into an indifferent commodity? Does the notion of 
artistic autonomy provide a space of freedom, a way of operating within the conditions 
that have impoverished both work and life?  
Can the notion of autonomy—which the avant-garde rejected in a radical critique—
become useful as a critical tool? The avant garde wanted to destroy art. Conceptual 
artists did not really want to destroy art; they wanted to be artists. The Situationist 
International wanted to destroy art, to annul it by reintegrating it with life and to bring 
it to a conclusion as the end point of this reintegration. Artists no longer wish to 
destroy art; on the contrary, artists wholeheartedly wish to be recognised and included 
within the canon of art.  
Terry Eagleton argues that the aesthetic is a “bourgeois concept” but it aught not to be 
automatically condemned as “bourgeois ideology” in favour of “alternative forms of 
cultural politics”. The enlightenment, he argues, has after all provided the conditions 
that enable us to critique it: the “contradictoriness of the aesthetic”—an “amphibious 
concept” with “real historical complexity”—can only be encompassed by a dialectical 
kind of thought (Eagleton, 1990, p. 8). Eagleton points out that on the one hand, from 
a radical political viewpoint, the notion of autonomy within aesthetic discourse is 
disabling: 
…art is thereby conveniently sequestered from all other social practices, 
to become an isolated enclave within which the dominant social order 
can find an idealized refuge from its own actual values of 
competitiveness, exploitation and material possessiveness. It is also, 
rather more subtly, that the idea of autonomy—of a mode of being 
which is entirely self-regulating and self-determining—provides the 
middle class with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires for 
its material operations. (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9) 
By emphasising the subjective character of aesthetic autonomy, the museum does not 
have to justify its operations, curators do not have to justify their selection, and 
museums do not have to justify their exclusions. Strictly speaking, however the 
autonomy of art characterises the artist’s judgement and the autonomy of the 
aesthetic characterises the judgement of the public or the critic, not the judgement of 
                                            
38 Relational aesthetics in this context is both complicit with neo-liberalism and a means of 
revealing the contradictions of neo-liberalism. 
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the bureaucrat or administrator. On the other hand however, and because the concept 
of autonomy “is radically double-edged”, it also emphasises “the self-determining 
nature of human powers and capacities which becomes […] the anthropological 
foundation of a revolutionary opposition to bourgeois utility” (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9): 
The aesthetic is at once […] the very secret prototype of human 
subjectivity in early capitalist society, and a vision of human energies as 
radical ends in themselves which is the implacable enemy of all 
dominative or instrumentalist thought. It signifies a creative turn to the 
sensuous body, as well as an inscribing of that body with a subtly 
oppressive law; it represents on the one hand a liberatory concern with 
concrete particularity, and on the other hand a specious form of 
universalism. If it offers a generous utopian image of reconciliation 
between men and women at present divided from one another, it also 
blocks and mystifies the real political movement towards such historical 
community. (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9) 
The theoretical category of the aesthetic concerns the “most gross and palpable 
dimension of the human”, it thus constitutes “the first stirrings of a primitive 
materialism” (Eagleton, 1990, p. 13). Eagleton supports aesthetics (a “science of 
sensibility”) as “a response to the problem of political absolutism” in the face of which 
the bourgeoisie was ineffectual (Eagleton, 1990, p. 14). 
The flaw in the argument that Adorno and Eagleton put forth, namely that art is not 
necessarily bourgeois ideology, is that the incentives for artists are narrowly bourgeois 
incentives, motivations that appeal to a bourgeois mentality. If the ambition that 
motivates the production of art is bourgeois, then how can art be a liberating force? 
This blind spot in Adorno and Eagleton is probably due to their hesitation to cast off all 
art as bourgeois, and in fear of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
Jacques Ranciere’s timely reconceptualisation of the dialectical relationship between 
heteronomy and autonomy expands on Adorno’s theory of autonomy. Ranciere does 
this primarily through his conception of the dialectics between aesthetics and politics, 
thereby providing an empowering counterpoint to Adorno’s pessimism. He however 
does not go far enough to stress the value of autonomy. Ranciere’s redefinition of the 
autonomy of art intervenes in the debate over the category of modernity and of the 
place of art and aesthetics within that category.  
In The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes (2002), Ranciere reads the fifteenth of 
Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind (2001/1794), as the promise of 
a new regime in art and in life. Following Schiller, Ranciere maintains that the aesthetic 
is a historical regime for the identification of art. The aesthetic regime inaugurates the 
autonomy of art by suppressing the boundaries between art and life and positing free 
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aesthetic play as the promise of the “aesthetic revolution”. The aesthetic is therefore 
also something else; it is a way of life. Play in the form of the aesthetic as a “specific 
sensory experience […] holds the promise of both a new world of Art and a new life for 
individuals and the community” (Ranciere, 2002, p. 133). Ranciere’s aim is to recover 
modernism and aesthetics from their detractors. For the most part, he believes they 
have been misconstrued. He challenges Bourdieu’s thesis that the “aesthetic illusion” 
only serves to mask the reality of class domination, he also challenges Benjamin’s 
notion of the aesthetisation of politics under totalitarian regimes and Adorno’s critique 
of the aestheticisation of every day life by the culture industry as a mechanism of 
capitalism. So we are left with the question: 
How can the notion of ‘aesthetics’ as a specific experience lead at once 
to the idea of a pure world of art and of the self-suppression of art in 
life, to the tradition of avant-garde radicalism and to aestheticization of 
common existence? (Ranciere, 2002, p. 134)  
According to Ranciere, “aesthetic experience” will both ground the autonomy of art and 
make way for a new life. Significantly, the “autonomy staged by the aesthetic regime 
of art” is not that of art, but of the aesthetic as the experience of heterogeneity 
(Ranciere, 2002, p. 135).  
Understanding the ‘politics’ proper to the aesthetic regime of art means 
understanding the way autonomy and heteronomy are originally linked 
in Schiller’s formula. This may be summed up in three points. Firstly, 
the autonomy staged by the aesthetic regime of art is not that of the 
work of art, but of a mode of experience. Secondly, the ‘aesthetic 
experience’ is one of heterogeneity, such that for the subject of that 
experience it is also the dismissal of a certain autonomy. Thirdly, the 
object of that experience is ‘aesthetic’, in so far as it is not—or at least 
not only—art. (Ranciere, 2002, p. 135) 
Ranciere thus arrives at the relationship between autonomy and heterogeneity via 
aesthetic experience. For Adorno, although the autonomy of aesthetic experience was 
established by Kant, this was a progressive step for the autonomy of art which he 
traces to the mid-nineteenth century and to the rise of the bourgeoisie.  
In A Singular Modernity (2002), Fredric Jameson addresses the distinction between art 
and the aesthetic to account for the “operations whereby the notion of autonomy is 
constructed in the first place, the enabling act that is its precondition”. Unlike Ranciere, 
Jameson rejects the proposition that the autonomy of art comes about through the 
separation of art from non-art. Rather, autonomy is achieved by a “radical dissociation 
within the aesthetic itself: by the radical disjunction and separation of literature and art 
from culture” (Jameson, 2002, p. 176):  
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For what is called culture in all its forms is rather an identification of the 
aesthetic with this or that type of daily life. (Jameson, 2002, p. 177) 
Jameson thus also concludes that the aesthetic category is a mode of sensory 
experience, and the object of that experience need not be limited to autonomous art. 
For Adorno, art is as different to nature as nature is different to society, he argues that 
the domination of nature in early modern society brought about a state of affairs 
whereby nature ceased to be an “object of action” and became an object of the 
disinterested gaze: 
Like the experience of art, the aesthetic experience of nature is that of 
images. Nature, as appearing beauty, is not perceived as an object of 
action. The sloughing off of the aims of self-preservation—which is 
emphatic in art—is carried out to the same degree in aesthetic 
experience of nature. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 65) 
The autonomy of the aesthetic that characterises the sensory condition of modernity is 
not the autonomy of art but the “autonomy of the experience” (Ranciere, 2002, p. 
136). Jameson argues that “culture,39 from Schiller and Hegel on (and as late as Eliot), 
is pre-eminently the space of mediation between society or everyday life and art as 
such” (Jameson, 2002, p. 177):  
Culture thus stands as the blurring of the boundaries and the passages 
and movements back and forth from one level or dimension to the 
other (Jameson, 2002, p. 177-178) 
For Ranciere the consequence of the aesthetic revolution is that: 
…everything becomes artistic […] the process of exchange, of crossing 
the border reaches a point where the border becomes completely 
blurred, where nothing, however prosaic, escapes the domain of art. 
(Ranciere, 2002, p. 146) 
Institutional autonomy 
Autonomy is a necessary requirement for art’s claim to the privileged realm of the 
aesthetic (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 23), thus the institution of art too is defined by the 
concept of the autonomy of art. This goes a long way to explain that the concept of 
autonomy survives because the institution of art would be powerless without it. In 
practice therefore, it appears that artists sanction the institution, rather than the other 
way around. The art institution clings to the status of autonomy, which guarantees 
art’s symbolic value. It is this symbolic value which the institution trades for economic 
                                            
39 Jameson’s use of the term “culture” is inclusive of the “aesthetic”. 
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and political forms of value. According to Arthur Danto, once art becomes a commodity 
and is directed towards ideological and financial interests, it is more vital than ever for 
the museum to maintain its status as the autonomous realm of the aesthetic, 
“requiring the ideology of disinterestedness” in order to disguise the fact that the 
museum “has been transformed into a showroom for classy investments” (Danto, 
1998, p. 133): 
The museum’s spiritual authority is essential if the corporation is to 
enjoy any of the economic benefits of its investment in culture. Small 
wonder that museum directors and curators must insist on the purity of 
their institutions! Small wonder the museum must represent itself as the 
shrine of “objects of pure creativity”! It could not serve the end of 
crassness if it were perceived as crass in its own right. (Danto, 1998, 
pp. 134-135) 
The aesthetic is mobilised by museums and corporations for the production and 
dissemination of commodities, it thus becomes one more commodity in the exchange 
process of global capital. When the symbolic value of art is thus compromised, it 
becomes vital for the museum to adhere to its status as the autonomous realm of the 
aesthetic. However, as the work of Hans Haacke reveals, the role of autonomy in the 
institutional monopoly on the definition of art has consequences beyond the barter of 
cultural capital.  
Hans Haacke has provoked the defensive reaction of institutions on numerous 
occasions. For the exhibition PROJEKT ‘74: Kunst bleibt Kunst at the Wallraf-Richardz-
Museum in Cologne, Haacke made Manet-PROJEKT ‘74. He documented the 
chronological history of collectors who had owned Manet’s paining Bunch of Asparagus 
(1880), which was in the museum collection since 1967. Ten panels detailed personal 
information on each owner, including Max Liebermann, who was barred from working 
in 1933 due to his Jewish background. Another owner was Hermann J. Abs, Chairman 
of the purchasing committee of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum and log-term chairman of 
Deutsche Bank who had held an influential position in the economic politics of the 
Third Reich. The work exposed the widespread practice of concealment of the National 
Socialist past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Buchmann, 2007). Predictably, 
Haacke’s piece was banned. The museum director forced the exhibition curators to 
exclude Haacke’s work from the show40 (Grasskamp, 2004, pp. 53-54). 
                                            
40 In protest of the censorship, Daniel Buren hung photocopies of Haacke’s Manet Project in his 
section of the exhibition, these were subsequently removed by the museum. Marcel 
Broodthaers and the gallerist Paul Maenz also expressed their solidarity. This experience 
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According to Travis English, Hans Haacke’s work denies the autonomy of aesthetic 
experience and the cultural autonomy of the museum as a neutral space by denying 
the privilege of aesthetic experience through his appropriation of the “typically non-
aesthetic” (fact sheets, advertising banners and corporate plaques). Once the museum 
is denied its “institutional differentiation” the museum “becomes yet another relational 
space of everyday life” (English, 2007). English draws a distinction between Haacke’s 
appropriation of non-aesthetic objects and the articulation of the readymade tradition 
initiated by Marcel Duchamp and developed by pop and neo-avant-garde artists. 
Duchamp’s Fountain “actually serves to legitimize the aesthetic context of art” because 
once it is allocated a place in the museum, the readymade becomes transformed: 
…it no longer exists in the world of use value, but is now elevated to 
the realm of the aesthetic, where it is imbued with all of the symbolic 
value of any traditional work of art. Art, as Duchamp brought to our 
attention, is not about precious materials, artistic genius, originality, 
etc., but about the context into which it is placed, that of the aesthetic. 
(English, 2007) 
Departing from the assumed separation between cultural and social fields, Duchamp 
demonstrated that it was not the specific quality of an object but only the place and 
form of its presentation that decided its status. Haacke insisted on the continuity 
between cultural and social fields, thereby unmasking the interests of the seemingly 
neutral museum space, and the political use of culture: “While Duchamp used the 
concept of the autonomy of art, Haacke attacked it” (Germer, 1988, p. 65). Thus 
although Duchamp’s readymade emphasised the difference between the rule and the 
move and initiated a new language-game in art practice, the readymade ultimately 
became subsumed into aesthetic discourse as one more artistic medium, losing its 
potential for rupture.41 This is precisely the rupture that Haacke’s work performs, and 
thereby “shows us that the legitimacy of the autonomous aesthetic realm only exists if 
we cling to the illusion that the museum is a space in itself, set aside and apart from 
the spaces of everyday exchange” (English, 2007). These periodic ruptures are 
absorbed within the tradition of art through institutional discourse.  
                                                                                                                                
reinforced Haacke’s “mistrust regarding the alleged independence of cultural institutions and 
contingent guarantees of artistic freedom” (Grasskamp, 2004, pp. 54, 56). 
41 Helen Molesworth concurs that “Far from destroying art, Duchamp’s profound challenge 
ultimately served to create an enormous field of aesthetic possibility. It helped liberate artists 
from conventional modes of working, contributing to a climate that permitted and rewarded an 
increasingly porous idea of art’s possibilities” (Molesworth, 2003, p. 28). 
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Haacke was making systems art and social critique up until his solo exhibition Systems 
(1971, Guggenheim Museum, New York). The exhibition was cancelled after Haacke 
refused to withdraw his work Shapolsky et al Manhattan Real estate Holdings. A Real-
Time Social System. As of May 1, 1971 (1971), which shed an unfavourable light on 
one of the museum trustees. In a notorious incident, the museum cancelled the show 
when Haacke refused to exclude two documentations of Manhattan real estate 
holdings and a poll of the museum’s visitors.42 In a letter to the artist, Thomas Messer, 
the museum’s director, justified the cancellation:  
We have held consistently that under our Charter we are pursuing 
esthetic and educational objectives that are self-sufficient and without 
ulterior motive. On those grounds the trustees have established policies 
that exclude the active engagement toward social and political ends. It 
is well understood, in this connection, that art may have social and 
political consequences, but these, we believe, are furthered by 
indirection and by the generalized, exemplary force that works of art 
may exert upon the environment, not as you propose, by using political 
means to achieve political ends, no matter how desirable these may 
appear to be in themselves. We maintain, in other words, that while art 
cannot be arbitrarily confined, our institutional role is limited. 
Consequently, we function within such limits, leaving to others that 
which we consider outside our professional competence. (Messer, 1971, 
pp. 248-249)  
According to this logic, Haacke is using “political means” with “ulterior motive”, and his 
work is therefore judged inappropriate for inclusion within the museum, which is 
characterised as institutionally limited to pursuing neutral “esthetic and educational 
objectives that are self-sufficient”.43 According to Arthur Danto, Thomas Messer found 
himself in the:  
…desperate and unaccustomed position of formulating a philosophical 
theory to keep out of museum precincts a work that might be taken to 
call into question a corporate presence that, as Haacke was to 
recognize, constitutes the atmosphere of the museum today. (Danto, 
1998, p. 132) 
The claim of the non-instrumental value of autonomy is misleadingly used to disguise 
the political and ideological function of the institution. According to Stefan Germer, 
                                            
42 Thomas Messer, director of the Guggenheim Museum 1961-1987, “also discharged the 
curator, Edward Fry, for persisting in championing an art indexed as unsuitable” (Danto, 1998, 
p. 129). In the same year, Buren’s installation at the Guggenheim International Exhibition was 
removed. In 1974, the museum removed Haacke’s installation Solomon R. Guggenheim Board 
of Trustees, 1974. 
43 For an analysis of the ideological foundations of Messer’s argument see Alberro, 1997. 
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“the museum is defined as a neutral, nonsocial, apolitical institution” and the work of 
art “is expected to confirm this fiction” (Germer, 1988, p. 64). The work is thereby also 
expected to confirm that art is ontologically different to other forms of social 
production. According to Stefan Germer, this conceals another, much more subtle 
function of the institution:  
Far better than any restriction of content, this institutional insistence on 
the specificity of artistic practice neutralizes all political implications of 
an artwork, since it forces the artist to depoliticize his work in his choice 
of means. Only in a generalized and unspecific way is “outside reality” 
accepted into the museum space; the boundary between art and 
society is thus kept intact, while the social determination of the artwork 
remains unreflected and the political character of museum decisions 
unacknowledged. (Germer, 1988, p. 65) 
The museum’s threat of exclusion thus brings about a regime of self-censorship. 
Messer may have sincerely tried to preserve a privileged space for art, because—as we 
are constantly reminded—if art does not occupy a space outside the normal functions 
of society then art is just another node in the process of production and consumption. 
If the ambiguous designation “art” is consigned to a profession within the general 
economy then its products cannot command a special status. However, according to 
English, Haacke’s provocation demonstrates that “the aura of the aesthetic is not only 
illusory, but that it is used strategically by institutions—both the museum and the 
corporation—to maintain their power and to sublimate the reality of their relations” 
(English, 2007). The alliance of art with totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century 
rendered art with overtly political objectives vulnerable to the criticism of externally 
determined purposes and charges of propaganda, which negate the value of art. The 
posture of neutrality that institutions maintain raises them above any such suspicion.  
Autonomy and philosophy 
Art is not, in the first instance, political because of the messages and 
sentiments it conveys concerning the state of the world. Neither is it 
political because of the manner in which it might choose to represent 
society’s structures, or social groups, their conflicts or identities. It is 
political because of the very distance it takes with respect to these 
functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and 
the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space. 
(Ranciere, 2009, p. 23) 
Theodor Adorno and Jacques Ranciere suggest that essentially, it does not really 
matter what artists do, their work is critical by the very fact of its existence. But in an 
administered world, where everything is commodified, subsumed into spectacle and 
valued heteronomously, how does art manage to perform this critical role merely by 
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existing? How does Adorno’s thesis of art’s opposition to society fare today when art 
functions just like every other professional field? 
By interacting with the global economy art subjects itself to external 
value measurements via monetary value, celebrity capital, redefinition 
through criticism, the specifics of purchase, sale, government grants 
and any other manner by which it perpetuates itself. (Zimmerman, 
2012) 
For Ranciere, the work is critical due to the autonomy of aesthetic experience: it is “as 
an autonomous form of experience that art concerns and infringes on the political 
division of the sensible” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 32). Following Adorno, Ranciere maintains 
that art is political not because of its manifest content but because of its aesthetic 
constitution and the distance it takes from society’s functions (Ranciere, 2009, p. 23).44 
…the specificity of art consists in bringing about a reframing of material 
and symbolic space. And it is in this way that art bears upon politics. 
(Ranciere, 2009, p. 24)  
This description however would seem to guarantee that all art is political. Additionally, 
although artworks assume a “distance” from social functions, the art world itself does 
not. The problem of the affirmative character of art and its relationship of complicity 
with what Ranciere calls “consensus” still persists. For Adorno if art is critical it is 
because of the autonomy of the artist’s activity: 
By crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than 
complying with existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” 
it criticizes society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes 
condemn it. There is nothing pure, nothing structured strictly according 
to its own immanent law, that does not implicitly criticize the 
debasement of a situation evolving in the direction of a total exchange 
society in which everything is heteronomously defined. Art’s asociality is 
the determinate negation of a determinate society. (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 226) 
Contemporary art however is entirely integrated within the political and financial power 
structures of “a total exchange society in which everything is heteronomously defined” 
(Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 226). This includes the entire spectrum of art production, 
whether it is relational art, socially-engaged art, biennial art, museum installations, 
commercial art  or critical art, which Ranciere defines as “a type of art that sets out to 
                                            
44 This definition would normally exclude relational aesthetics, which Nicholas Bourriaud defines 
as “a set of artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the 
whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private 
space” (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 113).  
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build awareness of the mechanisms of domination to turn the spectator into a 
conscious agent of world transformation” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 45). Other functions of 
art range from the production of wealth and tourism (the market, regeneration), the 
production of cultural capital (institutions, corporations), fulfilling state social policies 
(socially-engaged art, community projects) and political agendas (activist art, abstract 
art45).  
Art that is institutionalised—whether in the gallery and museum circuit, the market or 
by public funding bodies—is instrumentalised, functionalised in one way or another and 
therefore heteronomously defined, not autonomous. The values of neo-liberalism are 
the values of the institution of art. In order to acquire visibility in the art world an artist 
must make the right career choices, like any other aspiring professional: 
Fewer and fewer professional artists are “outsiders” who acquire their 
artistic education through romantic involvement in “life” and then go on 
to invest that productive power. Generally speaking, the curricula vitae 
of artists increasingly resemble those of highly qualified specialized 
workers. Hence, it is becoming almost impossible to reinforce the 
exceptional status of the art object—which has often been transfigured 
but also irrationalized by reference to the exceptional lives of the artists 
as bohemians, freaks, and other hominess sacri—in this way. 
(Diederichsen, 2008, p. 34) 
These developments suggest that we need to take seriously Danto’s notion of the end 
of art, or more precisely, of the end of a way of thinking about art. Art has not so 
much become neutralised by being cut off from the social conditions that made it 
possible, art is a cultural industry, and even art that seems to serve no practical end, 
does serve to promote the illusion that art is still an autonomous practice. It is the 
institutions of art—which legitimise art—that have taken over this autonomous 
function, both by promoting autonomy as a legitimating concept and by undertaking 
the role of legislator in place of the artist.  
Adorno and Ranciere both fail to mention the role of the institution of art as the 
legitimating apparatus of the art field. For Ranciere, “art” designates “the framing of a 
space of presentation by which the things of art are identified as such” (Ranciere, 
                                            
45 Diederichsen argues that “it was precisely when [artists of the New York school] became 
more individualistic that their work became especially useful to the state” (Diederichsen, 2008, 
p. 35). This demonstrates that abstraction is subject to any accretion of value, e.g. decoration 
(Adorno, 2002, p. 29). It must be asked why the most vocal and influential voice in the defence 
of the autonomy and purity of art subjected it to the most insidious instrumentalisation, and 
whether Greenberg’s thesis was really a misreading of Kant after all. On the promotion of 
abstract expressionism by Greenberg with CIA funds see Saunders, 2000. 
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2009, p. 23). We might assume that this space is an abstract space of discourse, 
although equally it may designate the institution of art. Ranciere continues:  
…what links the practice of art to the question of the common [and 
here we anticipate that the institution must play at least a partial role] 
is the constitution, at once material and symbolic, of a specific space-
time, of a suspension with respect to the ordinary forms of sensory 
experience. (Ranciere, 2009, p. 23) 
Ranciere is not referring to the aesthetic suspension of normal forms of perception 
which is not the exclusive domain of art, but to the suspension of ordinary forms of 
relating to the world OR IS HE? 
This meditative condition of suspension is not accommodated in the real world, but in 
the contemplative space of the museum. Kant understands the aesthetic as “the 
domain of disinterested, distanced contemplation, involving a special attitude, the 
preserve of experts or ‘aesthetes’” (Hamilton, 2008, p. 290). Although it is true that 
one requires at least time and a receptive disposition to enjoy works of art, this does 
not necessarily mean that the experience of a work of art should take place under 
specific conditions, or that the viewer must be in a particular frame of mind to enjoy a 
work of art. As Hamilton argues, “the aesthetic does not involve a special attitude, the 
preserve of experts or “aesthetes”, but is a ubiquitous and democratic phenomenon” 
(Hamilton, 2008, p. 290). Adorno acknowledges the egalitarian character of art and 
then proceeds to prescribe the limits, the function, the aim and the strategies of art. 
Ranciere too says that art is defined by what it is not, but also proceeds to pronounce 
judgements on art in terms of the theoretical categories in which he has placed it. 
Unlike George Dickie’s and Arthur Danto’s pragmatic, institutional theories of art and 
Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological theory of art, aesthetic theory is always declaring 
prescriptive statements on art. Bourdieu and the pragmatists, on the other hand 
provide descriptive statements about the status of art in society. A truly critical 
approach would have the task of investigating whether art is in fact subordinate to 
practical ends, such as the pursuit of knowledge or social status the exchange of 
capital, the fulfilment of social policies, corporate publicity, cultural tourism and profit. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Great Expectations 
The institution of art is articulated through dominant forms of art practice, discourse, 
pedagogy, modes of display, dissemination and reception. The institution of art 
produces artists as well as museums, archives, galleries, markets, journals, art schools 
and audiences. These institutions undergo paradigm shifts in response to the new 
territories explored and established by artists, but they also respond to shifts in the 
production of knowledge and shifts in society as a whole. These institutional paradigm 
shifts are then neatly historicised as shifts of the entire chaotic and asynchronous field 
of art. However, what changes during these revolutions is not so much the work of the 
artists, but the practice of institutions. Anticipating Jacques Ranciere’s “regimes” of art, 
Bürger points out that “periodization in the development of art must be looked for in 
the sphere of art as institution, not in the sphere of the transformation of the content 
of individual works” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 31). For example, art institutions 
recuperate the precedents set by artists in the 1960s and 1970s, some of these were 
singular practices, marginalised and trivialised at the time, others were very particular 
to their location. They were experimental and critical practices, they were purportedly 
dematerialised, critical of the fetishism and commodification of art, critical of the 
institution of art, critical of the primacy of the visual, critical of authorial authority, 
critical of the elitism and exclusivity of art, critical of the spectacle and critical of 
representation. These repudiated practices are subsequently vindicated by assimilation 
into “art’s ontological norm” (Deutsche, 1986, p. 20), historicised into coherent 
movements and captured by the institutions. Art institutions, which lag behind the 
times and avoid controversy because they are inherently conservative, nevertheless 
become identified through association with the practices they have recuperated. 
Institutions furthermore appropriate artistic strategies by making them the subject of 
themed exhibitions, panel discussions, conferences, talks and workshops.  
These institutional shifts have a decisive and broad impact on emerging practices 
because they always represent the current status of art. They define the programme of 
museum and exhibition displays and practices. They define the criteria for entry into 
art schools and the curricula and structure of art schools. Along with government 
policies, they define the criteria for public funding of art production and dissemination. 
They define art as such, retroactively, until the next shift.  
In the intermediate periods, artists have consistently since the end of the nineteenth 
century expressed their disagreement with the dominant institutional practices that 
claim to represent them. Artists’ critiques of the institution have taken the form of non-
 86 
participation, strike, activist demonstration and alternative institutions. More 
significantly, artists have incorporated their critique into their own work with strategies 
of evasion, including resistance to the art object, to theorisation, to authorship, to 
genius and the cult of the celebrity artist etc. And the cycle begins anew. Since the 
avant-garde initiated a critique of the institution, artists have elaborated countless 
forms of institutional critique.  
According to Boris Groys however, “artists working after the emergence of the modern 
museum know (in spite of all their protests and resentments) that they are working 
primarily for museum collections […] These artists know from the outset that they will 
be collected—and they actually want to be collected” (Groys, 2002). A deeply 
entrenched ambivalence thus characterises artists’ regard for institutions of art.  
It certainly seems to be the case that many contemporary artists have a 
lightly diffident but strangely enmeshed relation to art institutions, 
which, in turn, grant them almost unlimited permission for their 
ambivalence. (Welchman, 2006, p. 14) 
Whereas artists continue to stage exhibitions and events in non-art spaces, artists 
without broad visibility in the art world cannot participate in the competitive arena of 
contemporary art. Museums incorporate the studio and together with art journals, they 
set the themes for current art debates. Institutions select, display and promote art; 
they establish practices and perceptions of art. Institutions organise, fund and promote 
exhibitions, competitions, discussions, debates and exchanges between artists, 
intellectuals and the public. Auction houses, biennials and art foundations establish 
systems of value and systems of circulation. Museums and galleries, according to Dave 
Beech, “do not only threaten practices, they also sustain them” (Beech, 2006, p. 10). 
Indeed, what would art be without institutions?  
One can scarcely imagine art without museums, art schools, galleries and myriad other 
institutions that define not only the discursive field of art, but the productive field as 
well. There is scarcely an aspect of artistic practice and identity that does not now 
depend on one or more institutions for its articulation and legitimisation. Pierre 
Bourdieu discerns three levels of institutionalisation: (1) the institutionalisation of the 
aesthetic gaze as a pure gaze, capable of considering the work of art in and for itself; 
(2) the institutionalisation of art as an object of contemplation and (3) the 
institutionalisation of galleries and museums with the role of conserving the work of art 
materially and symbolically (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36). In fact, rather than following 
artistic production, institutions now claim that they are at the forefront of experimental 
and innovative art production. Small alternative spaces and artists’ collectives are 
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institutions as well, their overall short-term impact within the field is however negligible 
unless they establish alliances with dominant institutions. 
In his article Institutionalisation for all (2006), Dave Beech comments on what he calls 
the “largely unspoken and unexplained distaste with institutionalisation”, and observes 
that evidently, “Something vital is ostensibly lost in this process of institutionalisation”. 
Beech refers to Bourdieu’s notion of art’s “inverted economy”, “whereby art is 
esteemed for the distance it takes from the established measures of value: wealth, 
power, popularity, etc.” (Beech, 2006, p. 8), hence: 
Institutionalisation occurs when the social system gets a grip on art, 
threatening art’s autonomy, independence and dissent. (Beech, 2006, 
p. 8) 
How do artists perceive their own position within the institution? What are artists’ 
expectations of art and the art institution? What alternative conditions do they 
envisage for art?  
Institutionalisation 
These institutions, which determine the conditions of cultural 
consumption, are the very ones in which artistic production is 
transformed into a tool of ideological control and cultural legitimation. 
(Buchloh, 1990, p. 143) 
Art institutions present two major problems for artists, in the first case, although 
institutions are “supporting structures” for art, the opportunities they provide for the 
production of art by way of gallery exhibitions, commissions, residencies etc. are 
defining contexts. Secondly, art institutions retroactively recuperate works of art by re-
defining them in art-historical contexts. In the process of institutionalisation, art is 
separated from its particular context (de-contextualised) and subsequently re-
contextualised as art (neutralised). The condition of “art” with its associated ideologies 
and exclusions overrides any particular (and temporary) recuperation. 
Art does not exist in an ideal abstract space but in real spaces, in museums, biennials, 
galleries, art fairs, on the street. Depending on where we encounter the work of art it 
appears to alternate between precious artefact or commodity, between aesthetic 
experience or social relation, between experiment or monument. Prestigious and 
imposing museum and gallery spaces immediately feel like churches or shopping malls, 
they reduce the audience to spectators or consumers of something that is always 
beyond reach. When we speak of spectator passivity and lack of engagement, this is 
because everything is mediated. Finding themselves thus on either side of a mediated 
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and inauthentic relationship, artist and audience feel cheated. The museum or gallery 
space is not just a physical space of display; it is an entire set of practices, conventions 
and aura around the work of art. Artists thematise and resist this defining context in 
their work, only to be subsumed once again within the institution. Within the space of 
the gallery, artists enter into relationships of dependency and rituals of participation 
that are inextricably linked to the sustainability of their practice: these spaces 
effectively define what artists produce. Once inside the institution, artist become 
complicit with it, see eye to eye with its ideology, accept its values and cannot sustain 
an independent critical position without endangering their own precarious position 
within the institution.  
Disappointed with his exclusion from the exhibition When attitudes become form 
(1969), at Kunstahlle Bern, Daniel Buren pasted his posters in the public space outside 
the venue and “was arrested for executing a poster project illegally in the streets” 
(Birnbaum, 2005, p. 53). He subsequently launched a campaign of similar protest 
strategies in public spaces in conjunction with his participation in exhibitions.46 His 
official exhibition participation earned him recognition while the postering served to 
promote his work as radical and cutting edge. With installations such as Travail in situ 
(1971, Wide White Space, Antwerp), Buren brought the two practices together by 
lining up striped posters (which were also invitations to the exhibition) along the wall 
to form a band which extended out of the gallery space. Arguably, Buren’s early 
attempts to destabilize traditional notions of art were motivated by a desire to provoke 
the attention of the art world, because he abandoned this provocation once he was 
incontrovertibly established within the art world. Although Buren remained constant 
with regard to his stated aim to use stripes throughout his career, his use of coloured 
glass in recent works in situ, like Dan Flavin’s47 coloured neon installations, has evolved 
into a form of decorative ambience for museums.48 
                                            
46 Affichage sauvage (1969), Summershow, Seth Siegelaub Gallery, Paris, Affichage sauvage 
(1970), International Biennial, Tokyo, Within and Beyond the Frame (1973), John Weber 
Gallery, New York. 
47 See Dan Flavin’s Untitled (to Piet Mondrian who lacked green) and Untitled (to Piet Mondrian 
through his preferred colors, red, yellow and blue) (both 1986), at the exhibition Making 
Histories Changing Views of the Collection (2011), Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam. 
48 See the exhibition The Eye of the Storm: Works in situ by Daniel Buren (2005), Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Museum, New York and Architecture, contre-architecture: transposition (2010), In 
situ project, Mudam Luxembourg. According to the museum press release, Buren is “subverting, 
not without a certain irony, the invitation to exhibit” at the museum, but he is also 
“emphasizing certain architectural characteristics of the museum” 
<http://www.mudam.lu/en/expositions/details/exposition/daniel-buren/>. 
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The solution must necessarily lie in creating new contexts and to conceive of new ways 
to think of art in social space. Not to salvage existing institutions, which like all 
institutions ultimately seek to stabilise and augment their power. Anton Vidokle who 
champions the concept of artistic sovereignty (Vidokle, 2010), seems to run out of 
imagination beyond the familiar problems of artist-run spaces: 
Artists’ initiatives these days from the start mimic existing institutional 
and commercial structures: incorporate, establish a board of directors, 
sell memberships, produce benefit auctions and market editions, sell 
artworks, etc. To think that this has no effect on their programming or 
the content they generate would be naïve. There is virtually no period 
of experimentation before this type of “normalized” behavior sets in. 
(Obrist, Vidokle and Aranda, 2007, p. 17) 
David Beech concurs: 
It is clear that a number of artist-run spaces are set up 
entrepreneurially to catch the attention of the market and art’s leading 
public institutions. Such spaces may be funded and managed as 
independent concerns, but they are in no way ideologically or culturally 
independent of art’s institutions. (Beech, 2006, p. 10) 
Alexander Alberro says that by the 1980s, many artist-run spaces in New York were 
firmly established “with professional administrators who developed expanded exhibition 
programmes and sought general audiences” (Alberro, 1998, p. 57). JJ Charlesworth 
places a similar shift in London in the 1990s: 
It was the concentration of power in the hands of certain institutions 
that provoked the formation of the ICA (and subsequently the 
Independent Group). A couple of generations later, it was a similar 
concentration of power that drove the explosion of artist-run initiatives 
that characterised the London art world of the 1990s. With the rising 
cost of property in the last decade, that dynamic has largely 
disappeared from the London art scene, shifting from non-commercial 
spaces to commercial spaces… (Charlesworth, 2008) 
Charlesworth argues that the Independent Group, which was central to the formation 
of the ICA claimed “the legitimacy that came from championing an art that related to 
contemporary experience, rather than the institutionalised conventions of a culture 
rooted in the past” (Charlesworth, 2008). Artist-run spaces are currently regarded as 
springboards to the market or as risky subsidiaries of major galleries; they have thus 
steadily discredited their reputation as autonomous spaces.  
JJ Charlesworth argues that art institutions are in large part responsible for producing 
an art scene, rather than merely representing an existing one. Crucially, he suggests 
that institutions have the option to support “different forms of artistic practice and 
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presentation” (Charlesworth, 2008). This of course is much easier said than done, 
institutions are not only motivated to stay ahead and current in the work they present. 
Institutions are themselves actors in a much broader national and international 
competitive field and they need to meet their targets as well as their budgets. Since 
the 1990s a more overtly political form of art made a reappearance on the major 
stages of the art world, from the singular work of artists blanket-branded “relational 
aesthetics” in the 1990s to exhibitions spearheaded by Documenta,49 which drew much 
of the critical fire and were subsequently followed by other institutions in the 2000s.50 
David Beech argues that institutionalisation threatens to identify art with the 
“conservative defence of art as a minority culture of permanent values” and suggests 
that the answer lies in an engagement with “the specifics of the social system that art 
is gripped by in the process of institutionalisation” (Beech, 2006, p. 8). The question 
“how do independent institutions become sedimented and trapped in conventions and 
power struggles” is urgent and warrants research. Beech describes recuperation as “an 
effect of the cultural capital that is conferred on the artwork by the authority of the 
institution that houses and frames it” (Beech, 2006, p. 9) and cites Marcel Duchamp’s 
Fountain (1917), as the typical example of how the institutionalisation of the avant-
garde was effectively a recuperation of the readymade51 as modernist object: 
The urinal may be worthy of aesthetic attention but to frame it in terms 
of an untroubled aesthetic or formal experience is to reassert the 
categories and values of art’s institutions over the subversion of those 
institutions by anti-art and the values of the readymade. It is an act of 
recuperation which converts the avant-garde critique of art into an 
example of acquiescent art. (Beech, 2006, p. 8) 
For Beech, the overemphasis of the avant-garde negation of dominant culture is at the 
expense of the avant-garde’s “principled practices”, such as the “death of the author, 
                                            
49 Documenta X (1997), curated by Catherine David and Documenta XI (2002), curated by 
Okwui Enwezor. 
50 For example the exhibition Uncertain States of America, Serpentine Gallery (2006), curated 
by Daniel Birnbaum and Hans Ulrich Obrist, culminating in the exhibition New Order at the 
White Cube (2011), which accumulated a broad collection of work characterised by the 
predominantly grey and rough patina of “political art” aesthetics behind the black glass of the 
hermetic white cube in London’s Mason’s Yard.  
51 Despite his protests, Duchamp facilitated this recuperation by authorising a total of fifteen 
replicas of the urinal. Three replicas were authorised between 1950 and 1963: the 1950 New 
York Reproduction requested by the Sidney Janis Gallery (Philadelphia Museum of Art), the 
1953 Paris Reproduction was lost and the 1963 Stockholm Reproduction (Moderna Museet). In 
1964, Duchamp authorised a limited edition series of eight urinals and four proofs, fabricated in 
Milan by gallerist Arturo Schwarz (Durantaye and Hollander, 2007). 
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the attack on the primacy of the visual, the dematerialization of the art object” (Beech, 
2006, p. 9). This is however a radical misunderstanding of the avant-garde because 
these “principled practices” are merely means, transitional and contingent strategies 
that have to be continuously reinvented in different contexts. It is precisely these 
practices that are recuperated and recalibrated as aesthetic forms in dominant art 
discourses; Duchamp’s readymade is such an institutionalised practice.  
The resistance to commodification by making art that cannot be sold surely only makes 
sense in the context of a practice that negates instrumentalisation. Although it may be 
a particularly potent aesthetic strategy, what is particular about dematerialisation is its 
origin as a resistant practice. And theoretically, it is a very cunning strategy; by 
removing the possibility of any material profit, the dematerialised work of art serves no 
interests and therefore becomes immune to instrumentalisation. Once dematerialised 
art becomes a consecrated form of art, then it is just a matter of time before a market 
springs up. In her disillusioned Postface to Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art 
Object From 1966 to 1972 (1973), Lucy Lippard laments that:  
Hopes that “conceptual art” would be able to avoid the general 
commercialization, the destructively “progressive” approach of 
modernism were for the most part unfounded. It seemed in 1969 that 
no one, not even a public greedy for novelty, would actually pay 
money, or much of it, for a xerox sheet referring to an event past or 
never directly perceived, a group of photographs documenting an 
ephemeral situation or condition, a project for work never to be 
completed, words spoken but not recorded; it seemed that these artists 
would therefore be forcibly freed from the tyranny of a commodity 
status and market-orientation. Three years later, the major 
conceptualists are selling work for substantial sums here and in Europe; 
they are represented by (and still more unexpected—showing in) the 
world’s most prestigious galleries. (Lippard, 1973, p. 263) 
Very few people find this outcome surprising anymore, we have become accustomed 
to these paradoxes. This is why it matters little if, as Beech argues, the recuperation of 
the avant-garde was not “complete and final” and the institutionalisation of the avant-
garde is not always achieved on the same terms: 
Rather than preserving the pre-established cultural settlement, 
however, the institutionalisation of anti-art has infected art’s institutions 
with a critical discourse on art’s institutions. In fact, over the last 10 to 
15 years art’s institutions have reconfigured themselves largely in terms 
of the categories and values of the Avant Garde, undoing much of the 
curatorial work that had converted the Avant Garde into an aesthetic 
style or spectacular cul-de-sac. (Beech, 2006, p. 8) 
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Beech argues that recuperation must be maintained and safeguarded by the institution 
from “radical reclamation” and argues that despite being “framed as authorised”, 
avant-garde art is available to the public and to the possibility of reversal of 
recuperation by the “social forces that underpin subversive culture” (Beech, 2006, p. 
8). At the same time however, as Bourdieu argues, conservative forces are also 
“ceaselessly renewed”, whether these are institutions, state and business enterprises 
or the media (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 343). Thus construed, critique is essentially a game 
of rhetorical hide-and-seek, incapable of initiating tangible change. Beech however 
argues in favour of the transformative effect of critique: 
Critique, if it is to have a transformative effect, needs to build 
alternative institutions. If critical culture is not to be converted into 
mainstream culture without remainder then it needs to institutionalise 
its alternative values. (Beech, 2006, p. 10) 
Beech is right in arguing that we need to reinforce values that are alternative to the 
current “mainstream”, however, if we are not talking about the transformation of 
“mainstream culture” then what transformation are we talking about? It makes little 
sense to think of this transformation taking place within the fringes of the art world. 
The only way to really change anything is to start with pragmatic short-term goals and 
pursue them with self-sufficient means. For artists this means establishing sustainable 
practices and independent networks. Beech proposes that a “stronger brand of 
independence” than the entrepreneurial art-run space is necessary for a “substantial 
divergence from business-as-usual”:  
The first condition of art’s independence is not art’s isolation but its 
contestation of the cultural field, either by setting up alternative spaces 
or by occupying existing spaces differently. (Beech, 2006, p. 10) 
Beech’s suggestion however is for more institutions, because “alternative spaces, 
artist-run galleries and artist-led art magazines are institutions”: 
Art’s existing institutions can be reused independently if they are 
treated as contested spaces. Independence, resistance and dissent 
have to be manufactured. (Beech, 2006, p. 10) 
Although it is true that independence must be “manufactured”, it is clear that the 
intention to create alternative spaces or to occupy spaces differently has failed. This 
notion of institutionalisation would have to depart from the model of the New York 
group Collaborative Projects (Colab), which was formed in 1977 and incorporated as a 
non-profit organisation in 1978 to access government funding available to arts 
organisations (Ault, 2002, p. 217). Colab obtained government grants and produced 
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and sponsored large thematic exhibitions, films and screenings, X Magazine, Potato 
Wolf a weekly live experimental TV series broadcast on Manhattan Cable. With its own 
sources of funding, Colab was in control of its own exhibitions and cable TV shows, 
and bypassed the bigger, more established alternative spaces. However, if the long-
term aspiration behind these intentions is to claim a stake in the contested territory of 
the mainstream art world then they will always be vulnerable to recuperation and co-
optation.  
In his Frieze article Under the Canary written in 1992, David Batchelor observed the 
rising trend of DIY exhibitions in warehouse spaces. He argued that what began as a 
necessity to make up for the lack of visibility for artists without gallery representation 
turned quickly into a trend. Batchelor admits that it was tempting to describe this trend 
as the beginning of a movement away from the “establishment towards a situation 
where control rests with the practitioner rather than with the dealer or agent”, or even 
a politically motivated “rejection of the dominant commercially-orientated art world” 
(Batchelor, 1992). He concludes however that the majority of artists were thus: 
…clearly colonising space in an attempt to capture the uninterested, the 
dismissive or the myopic inside the very structures that are rejecting 
their work. The found spaces are being used as a springboard from 
which to jump back into the gallery. (Batchelor, 1992) 
As Batchelor points out, it makes a lot of sense that artists will seek “Critical acclaim, 
public appreciation and financial rewards” from their peers and their chosen field 
(Batchelor, 1992). But ultimately, he sees emerging artists as mischievous adolescents 
who desperately negotiate the rites of passage into the art world. These artists 
discover that the best way to gain entry is by invitation once they have demonstrated 
that they can promote themselves independently. Far from wishing to contact a 
different audience, artist-run spaces address an informed audience (Batchelor, 1992). 
Dave Beech concludes his article with the argument that the “taboo on 
institutionalisation” is effectively a refusal to nurture alternative practices by denying 
them the institutionalisation that they “need and deserve in order to thrive” (Beech, 
2006, p. 10): 
We do not need to avoid institutionalisation, we need fuller, wider, and 
more diverse forms of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation for the few 
needs to be replaced by institutionalisation for all. (Beech, 2006, p. 10) 
Beech’s example is the concept of “self-institutionalisation”, introduced by Jakob 
Jakobsen and Henriette Heise in 1998, when they set up Info Centre in East London to 
serve as an “exhibition space, archive and bookshop”. Jakobsen used the term “self-
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institutionalisation” to designate a “series of practical experiments with the 
construction and use of institutions” (Jakobsen, 2006, p. 8). The first manifesto or “info 
sheet” stated that Info Centre was committed to art as an institutionalising practice 
over and above the production of objects with an extended social aim: 
We are committed to an understanding of art practice that is not 
exclusively related to the making of art works, but also includes the 
establishing of institutions for the experience and use of art and 
generally the making of institutions for human life. (Jakobsen, 2006, p. 
8) 
Funded by the Danish Contemporary Art Foundation, Info Centre was intended as a 
temporary institution, and “engaged and serviced a range of communities, discourses 
and networks in London” (Davies, 2001), and it closed down in 1999 (Jakobsen, 2006, 
p. 8).  
The construction of an institution was not intended as a critique but 
instead as a means to take control of both production and distribution. 
It represented an escape from oppositional institutional critique through 
the total refusal of the dominant institutions’ monopoly of power. 
(Jakobsen, 2006, p. 8) 
Anthony Davies describes this strategy as “starburst”, which he defines as setting up “a 
programme for a specified period and then re-routing the networks and discourses to 
other locations” (Davies, 2001). This activity included Infopool meetings in London, 
publications, a website and the Copenhagen Free University (CFU) set up in Jakobsen 
and Heise’s apartment in Copenhagen in 2001 (Jakobsen and Heise, 2007). In their 
statement, WE HAVE WON! (2007), Jakobsen and Heise recount their objectives in 
setting up CFU as a reaction against recent shifts in artists’ self-definition as 
accomplices to power in the prevailing conditions of neo-liberalism. The CFU was 
additionally a reaction against a similar adaptation of education to corporate practice, 
with the associated reification and commodification of knowledge:  
The Copenhagen Free University made it clear that universities do not 
necessarily have to reflect the hegemonic structures of society; 
universities could be organised and based in and around the everyday 
knowledge and material struggles structuring people’s lives. […] 
Knowledge for us is always situated and interwoved with desire. 
(Jakobsen and Heise, 2007) 
More significantly, Jakobsen and Heise point out that the CPU “never wanted to 
become a fixed identity”, the project was a temporary project from the start (Jakobsen 
and Heise, 2007): 
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This is why the Copenhagen Free University closed down at the end of 
2007. Looking back at the six years of existence of the CFU we end our 
activities with a clear conviction and declare: We Have Won! (Jakobsen 
and Heise, 2007) 
Far from emphasising the need to “institutionalise alternatives in order to care for them 
[…] to underwrite alternative practices with the institutions that they need and deserve 
in order to thrive” (Beech, 2006, p. 10) as Beech argues, Jakobsen and Heise’s concept 
of “self-institutionalisation” does not propose the retreat to defensive enclosure that 
the choice of the term implies.52 They argue instead that with their conceptualisation of 
the term is the intention “to take power and play with power but also to abolish power” 
(Jakobsen and Heise, 2007).  
Beech’s conclusion is misleading because institutions invariably end up courting power 
in order to survive. Gerald Raunig emphasises that amongst its various definitions, the 
term “institution” also carries the “sense of constituted power” (Raunig, 2009, p. 8). In 
his essay What is an Institution? (2006), John Searle demonstrates that the purpose of 
institutions is to create power relationships (Searle, 2006, p. 34). Searle defines 
institutions in terms of their specific properties, clearly distinguishing art-making 
practices from institutional practices. 
Searle argues that the defining characteristic of any institution is language itself, the 
“fundamental social institution” (Searle, 2006, p. 36). Searle points out that although 
institutions are dependent on human beliefs, we take them for granted and treat them 
as though they have physical properties. To answer the question “What is an 
institution?”, Searle suggests that we should examine what distinguishes institutional 
facts from other types of facts (Searle, 2006, p. 24). He foregrounds two concepts to 
account for the difference between social facts and institutional facts. In the first 
instance, the “collective assignment of function” describes our social capacity to assign 
a function to things that do not posses that function intrinsically. Secondly, “status 
functions” are a particular form of “assignment of function” (Searle, 2006, p. 30). We 
assign functions to people or objects when they cannot carry out those functions 
entirely by means of their physical properties. Those functions are thereby carried out 
by our collective belief that the objects or persons have “a certain status and with that 
status a function”. To illustrate his argument, Searle uses the example of a wall that 
                                            
52 The term “self-institutionalisation” is confusing because artists’ projects, as Maria Lind points 
out, do not qualify as institutions because they are “too small and volatile” (Lind, 2009. p. 27). 
Artist’s collectives are volatile and more significantly, usually unhierarchical and defined by tacit 
rules and informal procedures. 
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physically blocks the movement of traffic. Even when the wall deteriorates, the 
remaining line of stones is still recognised as a boundary and continues to perform the 
same function, blocking passage to anyone who is not authorised to cross it. This 
occurs as long as everyone continues to accept the status of the line of stones as a 
boundary. This is a status function (Searle, 2006, p. 31). 
Searle argues that this apparently “feeble apparatus” does not “come tumbling down” 
because of its scope: the status function “iterates upward indefinitely” and the entire 
system operates laterally and vertically in an interlocking system of rights and 
obligations. More specifically, when the status function becomes regularised it becomes 
a rule. These rules, expressed as “X counts as Y in context C”, are what constitute 
institutional structures. Unlike ordinary rules, which exist independently of institutions, 
status functions are “constitutive rules” which do not merely regulate but “constitute 
the very behavior they regulate” (Searle, 2006, p. 32). Art thus seems to escape the 
regulating role of the status function because the rules of art do not constitute the 
behaviour they regulate. If this were so, we would not have any expectations of 
innovation in art.  
Searle argues that ultimately the purpose of institutions is to create power 
relationships: “Human institutions are, above all, enabling, because they create power, 
but it is a special kind of power” (Searle, 2006, p. 34). This special kind of power 
governs all institutional structures including “rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, 
permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications”, Searle calls these 
“deontic powers” (Searle, 2006, p. 34): 
Think of anything you would care to mention—private property, 
government, contractual relationships, as well as such informal 
relationships as friendship, family and social clubs. All of these are 
matters of rights, duties, obligations, etc. They are structures of power 
relationships. (Searle, 2006, p. 34)  
These power relations, according to Searle, function in a way that is fundamental to 
the understanding of society, namely that “institutional structures create desire-
independent reasons for action”. Institutions thus essentially provide the recognition of 
duties, obligations and requirements, as well as the motivation to carry them out 
“independent of your inclinations at the moment”. But institutional structures define 
activities that we would not normally associate with obligations, art is such an activity. 
Searle argues that this is a critical issue because the locus of institutional power in 
many cases defines “very powerful human desires”, such as money and political 
power: “By creating institutional reality, we increase human power enormously”. Searle 
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explains that by creating institutions “we increase the human capacity for action” 
(Searle, 2006, p. 35). Institutions thus propel action by motivating it.  
For Searle, the possibility of satisfying our desires within institutional structures 
depends on the recognition of deontic relationships: 
Without the recognition, acknowledgment, and acceptance of the 
deontic relationships, your power is not worth a damn. It is only 
worthwhile to have money or a university degree or to be president of 
the United States if other people recognize your having this status. 
(Searle, 2006, p. 35) 
If we accept Searle’s definition of the structure and function of the institution, the 
practice of art-making does not constitute an institution. Searle argues that “money, 
property, government and marriage” are institutions, whereas “science, education and 
religion” do not fall under the same category. They are not institutions, although there 
are singular institutions as well as institutional facts within these fields (Searle, 2006, 
p. 46):  
‘The National Science Foundation’ names an institution. ‘Science’ does 
not. The rules of scientific method, if there are such, are regulative and 
not constitutive. They are designed to maximize the probability of 
discovering the truth, not to create status functions with deontic powers 
(Searle, 2006, p. 47) 
Art is not an institution because it is not “defined by a set of constitutive rules” (Searle, 
2006, p. 46). A museum however, is defined by such rules, museums have board 
members or trustees, they have to meet qualitative targets and they have internal 
rules, which regulate the various departments and job descriptions. Museum rules are 
also constitutive of the behaviour of visitors and the type of art that they display. 
Between the work of the artist and the function of the museum is the discursive field of 
the “institution of art” which is “defined by a set of constitutive rules” (Searle, 2006, p. 
46): 
Do those rules determine status functions which are in fact collectively 
recognized and accepted? (Searle, 2006, p. 46) 
They are, the entrance criteria for art competitions, MA courses in curating and art-
writing residencies specify these requirements. 
Are those status functions only performable in virtue of the collective 
recognition and acceptance, and not in virtue of the observer 
independent features of the situation alone? (Searle, 2006, p. 46) 
Yes, there is no manifest distinction between the “immaterial labour” of artists, 
curators and art-writers from the labour of scholars, researchers and administrators. 
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The controversial practice of Anton Vidokle is much debated but not contested as such, 
he is considered an artist. 
Do the status functions carry recognized and accepted deontic powers? 
(Searle, 2006, p. 47) 
They do, the art world is constituted by collectively recognised “rights, duties, 
obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and 
certifications” (Searle, 2006, p. 34). The deontic powers of the art institution provide 
the motivation to keep producing and networking incessantly without immediate 
reward, and thus function as “desire-independent reasons for action” (Searle, 2006, p. 
35).  
The art institution thus provides the engine that drives the productivity of the field of 
art. Searle argues that the creation of a field for “desire-based reasons for action” 
becomes contingent on the acknowledgment of “a system of desire-independent 
reasons for action”, and this is true not only for those who compete for power within 
the institution, but for the audience as well (Searle, 2006, p. 35). Thus the increased 
activity of the art field depends on the institutional field, from which it also maintains a 
certain amount of independence in terms of its fundamental structure. The field of art 
practice can be described as the “desire-based reasons for action”, which is not 
governed by constitutive rules. However, the art world is dependent on the art 
institution as a “system of desire-independent reasons for action” governed by 
constitutive rules. Artists straddle both the art field and the art institution and thus 
have to negotiate these differences on their own terms individually. 
Peter Bürger regards the institution of art as virtually synonymous with artistic 
autonomy. He ascribes to “the institutional framework” the role of “releasing art from 
the demand that it fulfil a social function”, (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 25). Searle’s theory 
of the institution however identifies the institution of art unequivocally as a means for 
the functionalisation of art. The necessity for “desire-independent reasons for action” 
in the art field negates the critical and emancipatory potential of art practices as 
unique “desire-based reasons for action”. Additionally, it makes little sense to mobilise 
external reasons to motivate artists to do what they enjoy doing anyway. 
In his article Occasional Documents: Towards Situation (2001), Howard Slater draws 
on the Situationists’ revolutionary hypotheses of “unitary urbanism” and the 
“construction of situations” (Debord, 1995/1957) to argue that  the only way to 
substitute “a revolutionary creativity of the social field” in the place of reified individual 
creativity is to create “autonomous institutions through which new social relations 
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informed by desire and becoming can come into a mutually recognised existence as 
social entities” (Slater, 2001). For Slater the creation of autonomous institutions 
depends on what Cornelius Castoriadis describes as the individual’s “internalisation” of 
social institutions. For Castoriadis, individuals are constituted by internalising social 
institutions; they thus become the “concrete embodiment” of these institutions:  
This internalization, we know, is anything but superficial: modes of 
thought and of action, norms and values, and, ultimately, the very 
identity of the individual as a social being all depend upon it. 
(Castoriadis, 1996, p. 133) 
For Castoriadis, society is a configuration of institutions that conceal the fact that they 
are socially constructed. Slater argues that through their concealment, institutions do 
not only appear reified and apparently transcendent, they in fact institute 
heteronomous social relations. Heteronomy thus becomes internalised “as the 
conditioning factor of identity, as a mode of being inscribed in the social fabric” (Slater, 
2001). For Castoriadis this concealment of the instituted social imaginary works 
together with the rigid structure of institutions to constitute the “rigidity of the socially 
fabricated individual and the repression of the psyche’s radical imagination” 
(Castoriadis, 1996, p. 132). Thus, as Slater points out: 
…not only is a creative living labour alienated from the worker in the 
product, but the creative activity of self-institution, of seeing institutions 
as social organs that can be modified and transformed, is itself similarly 
subject to an alienation. (Slater, 2001) 
Taking together the points that Searle, Castoriadis and Slater make, we can conclude 
that self-institutionalisation does not guarantee that we can escape the rigidity of 
institutions and their inevitable sedimentation into constricting and invisible 
conventions, which not only conceal their nature but also end up becoming defining 
ends in themselves. For Castoriadis a true “politics of autonomy” would have the task 
of enabling “the collectivity to create the institutions that, when internalized by the 
individuals, will not limit but rather enlarge their capacity for becoming autonomous” 
(Castoriadis, 1996, p. 134). The politics of autonomy and the politics of art are thus 
two entirely different things.  
Undecidability, indeterminacy and plurality 
For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” — 
though not for all — this word can be explained in this way: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language. (Wittgenstein, 1968, §43) 
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Where is meaning located? Is the meaning of a work of art located within the object 
itself? Does meaning depend on the artist’s intention?53 Or the context of the 
encounter with art? Is the meaning entirely up to the audience? I will argue that 
meaning is relational; the work of art is always open to contingent and supplemental 
interpretations. Claude Levi-Strauss sees the desire for meaning as a desperate 
attempt to make sense of reality by forging connections between disparate fragments: 
Mythical thought for its part is imprisoned in the events and experiences 
which it never tires of ordering and re-ordering in its search to find 
them a meaning. (Levi-Strauss, 1962, p. 22) 
Edward Said describes this urge to create meaning as a fear of meaninglessness: 
The writer is as much a respondent as he is a describer. Similarly the 
reader is a full participant in the production of meaning, being obliged 
as a mortal thing to act, to produce some sense that even though ugly 
is still better than meaninglessness. (Said, 1984, p. 41)  
The fixing of meaning, ascribing a coherent sense to what has none is a fallacy of 
textual critique, which translates art into language. In art, the meaning is created in 
the interplay between various registers (Said, 1984, p. 40). These registers are 
physical and intellectual, explicit and implicit, in one word: aesthetic. This interplay 
cannot be translated into language without remainder, as much as a text cannot be 
translated from one language into another without losing something vital.  
In Seduction (1990), Jean Baudrillard argues that “total liberty, or total indeterminacy 
are not opposed to meaning. One can produce meaning simply by playing with chance 
or disorder”, (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 138). This is what the surrealists taught us. 
Sometimes, in order to understand something it helps to take it out of its familiar 
context, the meaning of a particular text will generate different meanings when it is 
read in conjunction with other texts. The experience of a work of art is similarly subject 
to the effect of other works of art. Works of art do not “contain” a reducible sense. 
In my first encounter with Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (2004), I read and re-read 
the first chapters trying to locate the definitions of his terms. I gave up and continued 
to read and eventually I understood what his terms meant through the contexts in 
which he uses them. Deleuze puts his terms to use rather than treating them as stable 
                                            
53 Since the “death of the author”, we know that we cannot refer to the artist, besides artists 
are notoriously resistant to explaining the “meaning” of their work. The work of art embodies 
the artists’ intentions and one of the reasons we value art is for its capacity to generate 
potentially infinite interpretations. 
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signs; they thus become subverted or lose their original meanings through their 
function. Not only words and phrases, but entire works of art can be taken out of 
context and acquire new meanings. How could Nietzsche be used against his own 
ideas? Why is Kant still controversial? How does collage work if not by 
decontextualization and juxtaposition? Just as words acquire their meaning through 
their use, so texts and works of art can appear meaningful in one way or another 
within the contingency of circumstances in which we encounter them. Understanding 
depends on prior experience and knowledge, on particular registers and associations 
that are cultural and context-specific. Derrida only becomes comprehensible within the 
context of the texts he deconstructs. Texts, discourses and events are constrained by 
their contexts.  
In Signature Event Context (1982), Jacques Derrida argues that the determination of a 
context is never absolute or certain. In fact, Derrida argues that the notion of context 
harbours “behind a certain confusion, very determined philosophical presuppositions” 
which exceed the conventional notion of context and unsettle its value and meaning 
(Derrida, 1982, p. 310). For Derrida the scope of the text is massively reduced by the 
limits of a context. However, the intention of Derrida’s argument is to sever all ties 
between text and presence, which relegates the text to a textual universe, and thus 
attracts due criticism from Edward Said. In his essay, The World, The Text, and the 
Critic (1984), Said argues that even in their most rarefied form, texts “are always 
enmeshed in circumstance, time, place and society—in short, they are in the world, 
and hence worldly” (Said, 1984, p. 35). This is why circumstantial reality, or what Said 
calls “worldliness” is a feature of all discourse, whether it is spoken or written (Said, 
1984, p. 34). The “worldliness” of the literary text refers to the ways in which literature 
is entrenched in narratives of history and geography and the means whereby readers 
bring their own worldviews to bear on literature. 
Said argues that the thesis of the potentially limitless interpretations of a text—because 
“all reading is misreading”—is derived from the “conception of the text as existing 
within a hermetic, Alexandrian textual universe, which has no connection with 
actuality” (Said, 1984, pp. 39-40). He argues that, on the contrary, “texts impose 
constraints upon their interpretation [because] the closeness of the world’s body to the 
text’s body forces readers to take both into consideration” (Said, 1984, p. 39). 
Furthermore, a function of texts is to situate themselves by “soliciting the world’s 
attention” and they do this by placing “restraints upon what can be done with them 
interpretively” (Said, 1984, p. 40). This is more or less Derrida’s argument. Similarly, 
while Derrida takes issue with John Austin’s emphasis on the spoken performative, 
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Said takes issue with Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between spoken and written discourse, 
and the associated assumption that circumstantial reality is the property of the “speech 
situation”: 
According to Ricoeur, speech and circumstantial reality exist in a state 
of presence, whereas writing and texts exist in a state of suspension—
that is, outside circumstantial reality—until they are “actualized” and 
made present by the reader-critic. (Said, 1984, p. 34) 
For Said, all texts are worldly because they are implicated in particular historical 
contexts. A text is something historically and materially more than a critical occasion, it 
is a social and political monument. 
Texts are a system of forces institutionalized by the reigning culture at 
some human cost to its various components. For texts after all are not 
an ideal cosmos of ideally equal monuments. (Said, 1984, p. 53)  
For Said, the text engages the world in ways that are “numerous and complicated” 
(Said, 1984, p. 35). Every text or aesthetic object has an “idiolect, voice, or more 
firmly, irreducible individuality” (Said, 1984, p. 33), it is an impersonal object which can 
nevertheless “deliver an imprint or a trace of something as lively, immediate and 
transitory as a ‘voice’ […] it bears a personality, for which a common analogy is a 
talking voice addressing someone” (Said, 1984, p. 33). The text therefore is not only a 
voice, which addresses a potential audience, it is also worldly, it is in the world.  
Exhibitions also address an audience. Michael Warner argues in Publics and 
Counterpublics (2002), that the audience is constituted through the address; the mode 
of address imposes a set of assumptions on the public (Warner, 2002, p. 67, 87). The 
process of publication makes a set of assumptions public, they become common 
currency. Although Said and Derrida agree on this, for Said the text is not self-
sufficient, while for Derrida, the text stands for itself and is therefore autonomous. 
Outside of its context, the text is open to interpretation and therefore also becomes 
vulnerable to misuse. This is not a problem of polysemy as Derrida shows, but a 
question of dissemination (Derrida, 1982, p. 310). Considered in terms of the work of 
art, the privileging of the notion of dissemination over polysemia reframes the plurality 
of the work of art and its multiple interpretations, as a dispersal of meaning. We have 
all regarded the same work of art anew in a different exhibition context: are Georg 
Baselitz’s monumental wooden sculptures funny or only when we see them in a 
context such as John Bock’s exhibition Klutterkammer (2004), at the ICA?  
In Constitutive Effects: The Techniques of the Curator (2007), Simon Sheikh argues 
that historically, public exhibitions were amongst the disciplinary and pedagogical 
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techniques used in the creation of the bourgeois subject. Nineteenth-century exhibition 
making “marked not only a display and division of knowledge, power and 
spectatorship, it also marked a production of a public [with] constitutive effects on its 
subjects and objects alike” (Sheikh, 2007, p. 175). Employing a pedagogical approach, 
the museum constituted the viewing subject as a subject of knowledge but also 
represented the subject through the curatorial mode of address. Techniques of 
collection and display represented colonial and national histories of the emerging 
nation states, and thereby also circulated specific values, ideologies and 
power/knowledge relationships through rational argument and persuasion, rather than 
by decree (Sheikh, 2007, pp. 175-176). Involved thus in “an economy of desire as well 
as in relations of power and knowledge”, public exhibitions both inscribed and 
empowered the bourgeois subject. Exhibition practice also set up divisions and 
exclusions because access was predicated on an understanding and acceptance of the 
represented histories and identities. Exhibitions thus also “indicated ways of seeing and 
behaving” (Sheikh, 2007, p. 177):  
And thus the importance of the art opening, the vernissage, as a 
bourgeois ritual of initiation and cultivation: one is not merely the first 
to watch (and, in some cases, buy) but also to be watched: to be visible 
as the cultivated bourgeois subject of reason, in the right place and in 
your place. (Sheikh, 2007, p. 177) 
Giorgio Agamben maintains that culture in traditional societies exists as absolute 
identity between an act of transmission and the thing transmitted, this is what 
constitutes tradition. In modern societies, characterised by the accumulation of culture, 
transmission is recuperated by aesthetics (Agamben, 1999, p. 114). The function of 
transmission as a frame and context serves as the locus of meaning and overrides the 
content of the transmission.  
Inevitably, every artwork is infinitely interpretable, and it can even be argued that it 
will always be misunderstood (Adorno, 2002/1970, pp. 346-347). This is demonstrated 
in the episode of Martin Heidegger’s misunderstanding of Van Gogh’s painting of 
“peasant shoes” (Heidegger, 2000/1937), his correspondence with Meyer Shapiro54 and 
Derrida’s Restitutions (1987/1971). We understand by misunderstanding. We cannot 
decipher the layers of code, so we put ourselves in Van Gogh’s shoes and draw our 
own conclusions. 
                                            
54 Shapiro, Meyer (1968). The Still-Life as Personal Object—A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh. 
In The reach of Mind: Essays in Memory of Kurt Goldstein 1878-1965. New York: Springer. 
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…a text has a specific situation, placing restraints upon the interpreter 
and his interpretation not because the situation is hidden within the text 
as a mystery, but rather because the situation exists at the same level 
of surface particularity as the textual object itself. (Said, 1984, p. 39) 
We might thus argue that essentially, it does not matter how we interpret the work of 
art, its meaning is dependent on a particular encounter. When speaking about works of 
art, we also necessarily speak of things that are not art; even abstract art is about 
something other than art.55 A recent style of criticism begins with an anecdote of 
events that precede the encounter with the work of art. These events provide the critic 
with a way to frame and make sense of the work. The work of art does not generate 
meanings of its own accord, but through a “constitutive interaction” (Said, 1984, p. 
39). Meaning is relational and cannot be deduced from an isolated object. Without a 
binding context, reality is a potentially infinite meaningless network. To engage in a 
debate about the meaning of a particular work of art is not to come to any hard and 
fast conclusions, as the work will keep generating meanings on repeated viewings. The 
endeavour to pin down the meaning of the work of art is at best a literary or linguistic 
exercise.  
Adorno argues that works of art are “objective” because they are produced through a 
dialectics of subjectivity and otherness (Adorno, 2002/1970, pp. 264, 273-275, 344-
345). But Adorno understands the “objectivity” of the work of art in another sense as 
well, he argues that the relationship of art to society is to be found not in reception but 
in the anterior sphere of production, because art is:  
…the product of the division of labor […] human reactions to artworks 
have been mediated to their utmost and do not refer immediately to the 
object; indeed, they are now mediated by society as a whole. (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 228) 
This means that the significance of art in relation to society is given regardless of the 
work’s content. Adorno thus disregards the particular content and the reception of the 
work of art, its particular context and the interpretations and associations the work has 
accrued over time in the constitution of meaning in art:  
                                            
55 Against the view that works of art are self-sufficient artefacts, Hal Foster argues that the 
abstract art of Peter Halley represents capitalism: “it is the abstractive processes of capital that 
erode representation and abstraction alike. And ultimately it may be these processes that are 
the real subject, and latent referent, of this new abstract painting” (Foster, 1986, p. 139). David 
Carrier argues that paintings are “irretrievably bound up with the social structure in which they 
are created […] today’s contemporary abstract paintings refer to the capitalist system in which 
they are commodities” (Carrier, 1988, p. 52).  
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Interest in the social decipherment of art must orient itself to 
production rather than being content with the study and classification of 
effects that for social reasons often totally diverge from the artworks 
and their objective social content. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 228) 
This “objective social content” is the historically inscribed content of the work of art 
and what stands in for the meaning of the work of art; it stands for an “objective” 
reading not of singular works of art, but of art as such. Adorno is making a distinction 
between the reception or interpretation of art and its literal relationship to society. For 
Adorno, the work of art fulfils an objective role within society; this is the significance of 
the work, not its manifest content. The significance of a work of art is to be found in 
the fact that its reception might cause a controversy or none at all. Diedrich 
Diederichsen points out that very little is generated in terms of discourse on the part of 
works of art that no longer need to negotiate their legitimacy, and that the role of art 
is precisely to generate this discourse (Diederichsen, 2008, p. 30). 
Adorno argues that the relationship of art to society, or the fact that art must be 
presented as art (in the institution of art), is the real purpose of art, and it thus 
overrides the artist’s intentions. Susan Buck-Morss too argues that it does not matter 
what artists do:  
…so long as it is done within the authorised, artworld space. (Here the 
analogy with “theory world” would seem to be absolute, as the 
academic freedom of critical theorists coincides with our lack of 
influence in public and political debate). (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 68) 
How do we recognise art?  
Products which are considered “works of art” have been singled out as 
culturally significant objects by those who, at any given time and social 
stratum, wield the power to confer the predicate “work of art” onto 
them; they cannot elevate themselves from the host of man-made 
objects simply on the basis of some inherent qualities. (Haacke, 2006, 
p. 53) 
How do we recognise art? Can we define art? Can a work of art exist only within a 
protected and dedicated space or do we recognise a work of art in a casual 
environment? Does the work rely on its context to be understood as “art” or does it 
have that quality in and of itself? Can the work of art create its own context?  
For Brian O’Doherty, Duchamp’s two “gallery gestures”, 1,200 Bags of Coal (1938)56 
and Mile of String (1942)57 are “not art, perhaps, but artlike”. More than any work of 
                                            
56 International Exhibition of Surrealism, Galerie Beaux-Arts, Paris. 
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art, the gesture “depends for its effect on the context of ideas it changes and joins”. 
The curious status of the gesture, its “meta-life around and about art” (O’Doherty, 
1976, p. 40), prompts O’Doherty to ask to whom does Duchamp address the gestures:  
Are they delivered to the spectator? To history? To art criticism? To 
other artists? To all, of course, but the address is blurred. If pressed to 
send the gestures somewhere, I’d send them to other artists. 
(O’Doherty, 1976, p. 40) 
O’Doherty seems to be on the right track, because as he points out: 
Both Duchamp’s gestures fail to acknowledge the other art around, 
which becomes wallpaper. Yet the artists’ protest (did any of them ever 
say how they felt?) is preempted. For the harassment of their work is 
disguised as harassment of the spectators (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 40) 
Duchamp’s gestures—and his “hostility” (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 41)—were not directed at 
the audience but at the artists because the ideological site of the gallery is the 
intensification of the artist’s commitment to art. Helen Molesworth argues that:  
By challenging the necessity of traditional artistic labor and the value of 
unique objects and by establishing a potential continuum between the 
space and activities of everyday life and the rarified realm of art, 
Duchamp’s readymades constituted the most serious attack on the 
category of Art since the Renaissance. (Molesworth, 2003, p. 28) 
But if the gestures survive as a sustained attack on the institution of art, the 
readymade does not. Duchamp’s gallery gestures continue to perform this critique on 
artists for whom Duchamp is an influential precursor, even while they aestheticise his 
protest. By repeating Duchamp’s “harassment”, by brining it repeatedly, parodically 
into the museum, artists have fetishised it. Andy Warhol plays off the Brillo Boxes 
(1964) against the hermeticism of the exhibition space. The outcome is not a challenge 
to the gallery space, but a fetishisation of the mass produced object. Molesworth 
argues that Duchamp liberated artists from artistic convention:  
Far from destroying art, Duchamp’s profound challenge ultimately 
served to create an enormous field of aesthetic possibility. It helped 
liberate artists from conventional modes of working, contributing to a 
climate that permitted and rewarded an increasingly porous idea of art’s 
possibilities. (Molesworth, 2003, p. 28) 
Benjamin Buchloh views Duchamp’s readymade as “the ultimate subject of a legal 
definition and the result of institutional validation (a discourse of power rather than 
                                                                                                                                
57 First Papers of Surrealism, 551 Madison Avenue, New York. 
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taste)”. Buchloh points out that the freedom conceptual art gained through its 
emancipation from the material art object and its manual production is a deceptive 
freedom. The suspension of all traditional criteria for judging art in the end only 
strengthens the power of the art institutions (Buchloh, 1990, pp. 117).  
This erosion works, then, not just against the hegemony of the visual, 
but against the possibility of any other aspect of the aesthetic 
experience as being autonomous and self-sufficient. (Buchloh, 1989, p. 
118) 
According to Susan Buck-Morss, it was “Duchamp’s famous gesture of placing a urinal 
on the museum wall that performed the dialectical reversal of subject and predicate: 
Because it is in the museum, it is art” (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 66). Art practice, 
seemingly liberated from the criteria of taste and politics is now dependent on 
legitimisation from “the museum, the curatorial decision, and the biennials that 
legitimate the artists, and on which they (un-freely) depend” (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 
67). As Jan Verwoert points out “if an object, or the practice of producing it, no longer 
qualifies as art on the basis of recognisable material properties, then in the end it is 
the museums or the market that determine whether it is art or not” (Verwoert, 2005). 
At the same time, however, the institution of art ostensibly and structurally remains 
faithful to the subjective criteria of the judgement of taste. The gallery space, the 
museum, the exhibition, remain unchallenged in their monopoly on aesthetic practice.  
Following Adorno’s emphasis on the “immanent critique” of art (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
248), Bürger argues that art is defined by its self-criticism (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 22). 
Brian O’Doherty regards Duchamp’s gestures as a singular occasion to examine what 
happens to the work of art in the exhibition context (and how we make sense of art). 
Considering how the gestures “subsumed an entire gallery […] and managed to do so 
while it was full of other art”, O’Doherty observes that: 
By exposing the effect of context on art, of the container on the 
contained, Duchamp recognized an area of art that hadn’t yet been 
invented. This invention of context initiated a series of gestures which 
“develop” the idea of a gallery space as a single unit, suitable for 
manipulation as an esthetic counter. From this moment on there is a 
seepage of energy from art to its surroundings. With time, the ratio 
between the literalization of art and the mythification of the gallery is 
inverse and increasing. (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 40) 
O’Doherty points out that the gallery space assumes not only the role of “context”, but 
also of “history” and “ideology”, in a word, our belief about what art is and what it 
does. Duchamp’s gesture is an “invention”, its formal content lies in its “aptness, 
economy and grace”: 
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It dispatches the bull of history with a single thrust. Yet it needs that 
bull. For it shifts perspective suddenly on a body of assumptions and 
ideas. (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 40) 
O’Doherty points out that when we look at a work of art, the gallery space disappears 
and becomes something that we take for granted, but also that its invisibly provides 
the structure and support for the way that we look at and understand a work of art. 
Adorno makes a similar argument regarding the way we understand the “new” in art; 
we understand it in relation to the “old”. Adorno privileges “the new” as a critique (but 
also a validation) of “older aesthetic norms” and regards it as part of the work of art: 
“through the new, critique—the refusal—becomes an objective element of art itself” 
(Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 22). However, the new is always in danger of becoming 
fetishised: “Fetishization expresses the paradox of all art that is no longer self-evident 
to itself”58 (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 22). Adorno argues that art cannot take its 
conventions for granted and points to the paradox of an art that seeks out the new 
(and different), only to subsume it within the old (and the same): 
The new wants nonidentity, yet intention reduces it to identity; modern 
art constantly works at the Munchhausean trick of carrying out the 
identification of the nonidentical. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 22) 
The conceptual artists Karl Beveridge and Ian Burn launch a similar critique of Judd’s 
“specific object”:  
You are saying that materials which don’t “belong” to art are more 
objective. But you are also saying that, by appropriating these materials 
“for” art purposes, they lose their extra-art associations. They become 
materials “without histories.” (Beveridge and Burn, 1975, p. 130) 
Art defined as its self-consciousness is involved in relentless re-definition through the 
interrogation of anything that may be taken for granted about art. However the 
insights of this self-critique quickly fall back into convention and the self-critique of art 
falls back onto the distinction between art and non-art. The process can be described 
as a progressive expansion and contraction of the field of art with the persistent 
importation and exportation of its contents. This is evident in the practice of artists in 
the twentieth century who have stripped art of all its recognizable characteristics and 
                                            
58 Similarly, any critique of this fetishization must be carried out within the work itself, in other 
words we must not critique the mere fact that it has become a fetish (Adorno, 1970/2002, p. 
22).  
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in the expansion of art into other fields. The relatively recent coupling of art and 
research is one such example.59  
…the only sense in which there is a difference between the appreciation 
of art and the appreciation of nonart is that the appreciations have 
different objects. The institutional structure in which the art object is 
embedded, not different kinds of appreciation, makes the difference 
between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nonart. (Dickie, 
1974, p. 41)  
Theodor Adorno argues that we cannot understand art with the help of a theory of art 
because “the arts will not fit into any gapless concept of art” (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 
2), we can only understand art “by its laws of movement, not according to any set of 
invariants” (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 3). For Adorno art “is defined by its relation to what 
it is not”, he argues that the “specifically artistic in art must be derived concretely from 
its other” (Adorno, 2002, p. 3): 
Art acquires its specificity by separating itself from what it developed 
out of; its law of movement is its law of form. It exists only in relation 
to its other; it is the process that transpires with its other (Adorno, 
2002, p. 3) 
Art is also defined by the distinction between art and non-art.60 The vague and 
inconsistent distinction between contemporary art and popular culture is evident in the 
impossibility of articulating any well-defined description of art that radically excludes 
popular culture. In fact, the definition of art has stumped theorists for centuries. 
Obviously art cannot be defined. We cannot define art either in terms of its individual 
or collective agents because popular culture too is produced by individual or collective 
agents acting independently of agencies or companies. Artists of the twentieth century 
(Marcel Duchamp, Allan Kaprow, Sol LeWitt, Group Material, Gorilla Girls) have 
divested art of authorship and its significance as the public expression of subjectivity61 
                                            
59 The Journal for Artistic Research (JAR) is an international, online, open access peer-reviewed 
journal organised by the Society of Artistic Research for the “identification, publication and 
dissemination of artistic research and its methodologies”, JAR website <http://www.jar-
online.net/>. Although JAR considers the status of art research to be “still hotly debated”, this 
opinion is voiced from within an established organisation for the promotion of art research. The 
cross-over between art and other fields including politics, commerce and research was debated 
at ART &..., a symposium organised by Alun Rowlands and John Russell (November 2007, ICA, 
London). “The contemporary discourses of art cannot be conceived of as an autonomous 
specialism: Art, but as a space of transversality and connectivity”, <http://www.john-
russell.org/Web%20pages/Artworks/Exhibitions/Solo/A_art&.html>. 
60 See also Agamben, 1999, p. 42. 
61 In Marx After Duchamp, or The Artist’s Two Bodies (2010), Groys argues that art is no longer 
an unaliented activity distinct from industrial labour because we no longer identify art as the 
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while, as Boris Groys points out, this polemic only serves to conceal the process of 
institutional authorisation which amounts to the “multiple authorship” of art (Groys, 
2008, pp. 96-97).  
Neither can the definition of art be determined by recourse to its historical origins 
because “artworks became artworks only by negating their origin […] art retroactively 
annihilated that from which it emerged” (Adorno, 2002/1970, pp. 2-3). Adorno 
conceives of a progressive development of art, which is defined by what it replaces and 
what it appropriates through successive iterations. He therefore also conceives the end 
of art:  
Art and artworks are perishable, not simply because by their 
heteronomy they are dependent, but because right into the smallest 
detail of their autonomy, which sanctions the socially determined 
splitting off of spirit by the division of labor, they are not only art but 
something foreign and opposed to it. Admixed with art’s own concept is 
the ferment of its own abolition. (Adorno, 2002, p. 4) 
“Art” for Ranciere is “the dispositif that renders [the different arts] visible” or more 
precisely, art is “the framing of a space of presentation by which the things of art are 
identified as such” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 23). Art serves to identify art. If art performs 
this function, it is immanent and incidental to what art is. Art is not defined, art is 
legitimised. The question is how art is legitimised as art, because this is no longer a 
function of art itself. For Diederichsen, “the type of art that generates speculative 
profits seems to rest on the shoulders of the type that was required to justify itself”, 
whilst  
…the art in need of justification and its justifying discourses supply the 
grist for the art world’s mill, its conversation and its ideas. But beneath 
this lies the plump flesh of the art economy – the very old as new 
(Diederichsen, 2008, p. 30).  
Artworks, art practices, actions or events do not have an essential ontological status; 
they acquire their status only in the context of an encounter. This amounts to the 
“relational” nature of art. But if art cannot be defined, then how do we recognise it? 
Pierre Bourdieu argues that the “specific economy of the literary and artistic field [is] 
based on a particular form of belief”, the work of art only exists because of the 
(collective) belief which recognises and acknowledges it as a work of art. This requires 
                                                                                                                                
unique trace of the artist’s body. Groys observes that the readymade opens up the possibilities 
for works of art not only to be produced in an “alienated, quasi-industrial manner, but also to 
allow these artworks to maintain an appearance of being industrially produced” (Groys, 2010).  
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us to understand the work of art as a fetish which is constituted by—amongst other 
things—discourses which produce the work of art as an “object of belief” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 35). Every discourse contains not only the affirmation of the work, but also an 
affirmation of its own legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36). 
What is camouflaged here is the regulation of production and dissemination of cultural 
production. The mechanism of ‘qualitative’ judgement is the belief system that sustains 
this apparently natural system of the selection and promotion of artists. The 
importance ascribed to professionalism contains this naturalised, unspoken concept of 
quality, which is disseminated throughout the art world. The production of a work of 
art involves material production but also symbolic production: the production of the 
value of the work and production of belief in the value of the work (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 
36). Thus the necessity of taking into account both the social conditions of artistic 
production (social origin, education, qualifications etc.) as well as the social conditions 
of the field of social agents which help to define and produce the value of works of art 
(institutions, museums, galleries): 
…it is a question of understanding works of art as a manifestation of 
the field as a whole, in which all the powers of the field, and all the 
determinisms inherent in its structure and functioning, are 
concentrated. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 37) 
If we cannot take for granted the existence of art, the multitude of forms it assumes 
also come under question. Art institutions however cannot function on this basis of 
uncertainty. Art institutions perform an affirmation of art over and above the 
affirmation of the individual works of art they display. This is the task for specialists; 
their influence is in direct proportion to their institutionally conferred status as curators, 
writers, critics and artists. If anything can be art, then it is important that we can rely 
on an authority to separate art from non-art. Andrea Fraser and Benjamin Buchloh 
argue that art is constituted not as such by the spaces or practices of art but by the 
discourse of art (Fraser, 2005, p. 103, Buchloh, 1990, p. 118). The institution of art 
provides the conditions for the production of art as well as the discourses by which we 
recognize art. It produces discourses on the “meaning” of art as well as discourses on 
the concept of “meaning”.  
In her essay, One Place after Another: Notes on Site Specificity (1997), Miwon Kwon 
argues that site-specific art extends previous attempts to take art out of the museum 
and gallery circuit by subordinating the “site” (both in terms of actual location and 
institutional frame), to “a discursively determined site that is delineated as a field of 
knowledge, intellectual exchange, or cultural debate” (Kwon, 1997, p. 92). Art thus 
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seems to find a space for itself outside of institutional space and in the “ungrounded, 
fluid, virtual” (Kwon, 1997, p. 95) and apparently uninstitutionalised field of discourse. 
Kwon argues that “unlike previous models”, the “site” of discourse: 
…is not defined as a precondition. Rather, it is generated by the work 
(often as “content”), and then verified by its convergence with an 
existing discursive formation. (Kwon, 1997, p. 92) 
This however only proves that art may overflow the institutional context, but it remains 
attached and dependent through discourse. Institutions represent themselves through 
discourse, extending their traditional pedagogical model with panel discussions, 
conferences and talks.62 Nicolas Bourriaud’s intention in writing Relational Aesthetics 
(1998) was to articulate a way of understanding art practice in the 1990s. Bourriaud 
tapped into a form of socially-engaged art practice that emerged in the 1970s63 and 
took root in the 1990s. In due course, and in part thanks to Bourriaud’s legitimising 
discourse, it flourished within museums in the 2000s. With the exception of Rirkrit 
Tiravanija, Felix Gonzalez-Torres and possibly Liam Gillick and Pierre Huyghe, the work 
of the artists that Bourriaud collaborates with cannot be characterised as relational, but 
as object-based and spectacular. This also explains why, although the theory has been 
influential, it has also drawn much criticism in terms of Bourriaud’s theoretical rigour 
and the implications of his arguments.64 Rather than support artists’ aims to 
disentangle the function of art as commodity, Bourriaud takes a step in the opposite 
direction by fetishising the concept of “relationship” itself: 
When a collector purchased a work by Jackson Pollock or Yves Klein, he 
was buying, over and above its aesthetic interest, a milestone in a 
history on the move. He became the purchaser of a historical situation. 
Yesterday, when you bought a Jeff Koons, what was being brought to 
the fore was the hyper-reality of artistic value. What has one bought 
when one owns a work by Tiravanija or Douglas Gordon, other than a 
relationship with the world rendered concrete by an object, which, per 
se, defines the relations one has towards this relationship: the 
relationship to a relationship? (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 48) 
                                            
62 These public discussions often tend to be exercises in public relations rather than sincere 
investigations or sharing of information, the real issues are often glossed over in mutual 
legitimation and anecdote. 
63 Bourriaud refers to Josef Beuys (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 40), but equally this tendency was 
present in the work of the Artists’ Placement Group (1968-1975), Peter Dunn and Loraine 
Leeson (East London Health Project, 1978-1981 and Docklands Community Poster Project, 
1981-1991), Stephen Willats (West London Resource Project Public Monitor, 1973) and others. 
64 See Ranciere, 2009; Bishop, 2004; Martin, 2007/2006 and Kenning, 2006. 
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Bourriaud addresses the collector and—playing the role of cultural entrepreneur—
stresses the unique selling point of relational aesthetics. How does he stand in relation 
to the explicit intention of artists who resist the commodification of their work? While 
Bourriaud promotes the understanding of contemporary art, this is framed within an 
agenda to reinforce and extend the power of the institution. Considering Bourriaud’s 
theory of “relational form” Dean Kenning argues that Bourriaud is inattentive to the 
specific ways in which form is produced relationally, “relational forms become formulaic 
in Bourriaud’s theory”, the result for Kenning is that as artistic forms thus become 
interchangeable and “the works which illustrate best the relational role that art is seen 
as playing in society will be the most insipid”. Kenning regards this as an excuse to 
foreground the gallery as a site of social exchange, “reinforcing the performative 
authority of the art institution” (Kenning, 2006, p. 58). 
The paradox of relational aesthetics is that whilst making claims for a 
more socially relevant type of practice, the art space itself becomes the 
zero degree condition of its functioning. (Kenning, 2006, p. 58) 
The museum is identified with the work; the identity of the work seeps into the 
museum and the identity of the museum seeps into the work, but they are two entirely 
different things. The institution draws our attention first and foremost to the work of 
art as a work of art.  
An institution of legitimisation 
In many ways I think we are using up the symbolic capital of the 
museum. The core audience still comes for what the museum 
represented in the past rather than what it does now, so at some point 
they will give up, I imagine, as will many modernist-trained critics. 
(Esche and Lind, 2011) 
In the early twentieth century, the avant-garde sets its critical sights on the institution 
of art with the conviction that art’s lack of social impact is to be blamed on its 
autonomy (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 22). In Pascalian Meditations (2000), Bourdieu 
reveals that the dialectic between autonomy and heteronomy in art is in effect a 
compromise between the symbolic and the commercial character of the work of art. 
More significantly, Bourdieu argues that political power must justify itself through 
external legitimisation because “force cannot assert itself as such, as brute violence, an 
arbitrariness […] without justification”. Power therefore appeals to social institutions 
for justification, recognition and legitimacy. In order to provide legitimate recognition 
institutions must not be subject to coercion and they must be recognised and 
legitimate themselves (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 104-105). Power thus appeals to artists 
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and intellectuals, granting relative autonomy to institutions that provide its 
legitimation:  
The prince can obtain a truly effective legitimation service from his 
poets, painters or jurists only in so far as he grants them the (relative) 
autonomy which is the condition for independent judgement but which 
may also be the basis for critical questioning. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 105) 
Bourdieu explains that the arts can provide “powerful instruments of legitimation” 
directly or indirectly.65 But equally, and because the “apparent autonomy or 
misrecognized dependence may have the same effects as real independence”, the arts 
can also use their legitimating power to subvert power with “challenges to the self-
evidences of common sense” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 105). The field of art is thus a 
potential site for symbolic revolution. This is why, in due course, the progressive 
expansion and differentiation of the field is accompanied by institutionalisation as a 
means of control (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 106). 
The institution of art is constituted—and henceforth functions—as a buffer zone, and 
this is the point at which art assumes the status of autonomy:  
The historical avant-garde movements made clear the significance art 
as an institution has for the effect of individual works, and thereby 
brought about a shift in the problem. It became apparent that the social 
effect of a work of art cannot simply be gauged by considering the work 
itself but that its effect is decisively determined by the institution within 
which the work ‘functions’. (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 90) 
For Peter Bürger the autonomy of art accomplishes the movement towards art’s 
ineffectuality; if art belongs within a circumscribed field, it ceases to take place in the 
real world. The institutionalisation of art in a circumscribed field of its own conceals the 
instrumentalisation of art within the institution of art. The institution of art is a space of 
apparent freedom, but this freedom is latent. The historical avant-garde performed a 
negation of the institution of art, understood as: 
…the productive and distributive apparatus and also to the ideas about 
art that prevail at a given time and that determine the reception of 
works. The avant-garde turns against both—the distribution apparatus 
on which the work of art depends, and the status of art in bourgeois 
society as defined by the concept of autonomy. (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 
22) 
                                            
65 Jacques-Louis David, Sergei Eisenstein, Alexander Rodchenko, Arno Breker and Shepard 
Fairey have legitimised power directly, but indirect legitimisation through corporate sponsorship 
and community art is just as effective. 
 115 
In capitalist society, the market assumes an ideological function and “dominion-
legitimating world pictures” lose theirs (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 23), this leaves the 
legitimating institutions with a loss of centre. The institution draws our attention first 
and foremost to the work of art as a work of art. The institutional context of art shifts 
our focus from the interpretation of the singular work of art to the problem of 
understanding art as such. If the authority of art institutions guarantees the status of 
art, then we are caught in a double bind. If the work of art is dependent on its context 
and if that context is invariably the gallery, the museum or the collection, then the 
work of art is tautological. Haacke argues that it is not merely a question of the 
physical properties of the museum or gallery that have an effect the work of art. More 
significantly, “the status and the meaning” of the institutional context “infects” the 
work of art (Haacke, 2007). Exhibition contexts are frames that seep into the object 
that they define.  
Peter Bürger argues that the social role of art is not determined by artists’ intentions. 
The social effect of works of art is “decisively determined by the institution within 
which the works function” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 31). Bürger argues that although the 
attitude of neo-avant-garde artists “may perfectly well be avant-gardiste”, their art is 
nevertheless institutionalised as autonomous art. For Bürger, the neo-avant-garde 
institutionalises the avant-garde as art and “thus negates genuinely avant-gardiste 
intentions”. Despite artists’ intentions, their work takes on the identity of “artistic 
manifestations” (Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 58). The art institution thus endures even in 
works of art that ostensibly intend to overcome the divisions between art and non-art.  
According to Daniel Buren, the art institution serves an idealist function by 
perpetuating the universality of art (Buren, 1973, p. 68). The idealism of autonomous 
art renders art apolitical and divests it of critical content by sequestering it to an extra-
social realm. At the same time, paradoxically, this is precisely the process by which art 
is functionalised. Within the art institution, art becomes instrumental in numerous 
ways. Whatever the values each individual work conveys, these become redirected by 
the museum and this is what art ends up being about: the direct association with 
power and prestige, which overrides anything the work might be doing. The museum 
comes across as benefactor providing aesthetic experience, entertainment and 
diversion. Such recuperation is lamentable because the artist’s subjective singularity is 
misrepresented and misapprehended as the voice of a powerful universality.  
The context of art determines (in the sense of “limits, draws a line around”) the 
production of art and the meaning and value of art. It is a circular system which 
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reinforces itself, if it were not for a constant influx of new artists (expendable and 
equivalent) it would stagnate. Art production is directly determined by museums, 
biennials, foundations, collections, art fairs, funding bodies, galleries and journals. 
In the mid 1960s, Daniel Buren began to paint alternating white and coloured vertical 
stripes emulating the traditional fabric of French awnings. In 1967, he stopped painting 
but continued to use stripes on paper and other supports and in 1968, he began to 
affix them in public spaces (auffichages sauvages). For Buren the frame of reference of 
the work includes the surrounding architecture (“when we say architecture, we include 
the social, political and economic context”) as “the inevitable background, support and 
frame of any work” (Buren, 1996/1975, p. 319). In The Function of the Museum 
(1973), Buren argues that the art institution has a “mystical” role, it “instantly 
promotes to “Art” status whatever it exhibits […] thus diverting in advance any attempt 
to question the foundations of art”. Buren refers to the museum as “the frame and 
effective support upon which the work is inscribed/composed”, the art institution 
frames and compromises the (critical intentions of the) work of art (Buren, 1973, p. 
68): 
In fact every work of art inevitably possesses one or several extremely 
precise frames. The work is always limited in time as well as in space. 
By forgetting (purposefully) these essential facts one can pretend that 
there exists an immortal art, an eternal work…. And one can see how 
this concept and the mechanisms used to produce it […] place the work 
of art once and for all above all classes and ideologies. (Buren, 1973, p. 
68) 
One of the ways in which the museum as an institution sustains the “idealistic nature” 
of art is through the deliberate “non-visibility […] of the various supports of any work 
(the work’s stretcher, the work’s location, the work’s frame, the work’s stand, the 
work’s price, the work’s verso or back, etc…)”. For Buren art (and by implication the 
artist) bears the responsibility of revealing the obscure process of the institutional 
framework: “This frame does not seem to worry artists who exhibit continually without 
ever considering the problem of the place in which they exhibit” (Buren, 1973, p. 68). 
Most artists seem to study, produce, exhibit and sell their work quite contentedly 
within the existing structure of the art institution. But, according to Buren: 
…any work presented in that framework, if it does not explicitly 
examine the influence of the framework upon itself, falls into the illusion 
of self-sufficiency—or idealism. This idealism (which could be compared 
to Art for Art’s sake) shelters and prevents any kind of break. (Buren, 
1973, p. 68) 
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For Hal Foster, artists practicing a critique of the institution in the 1970s responded to 
the necessity to “expose this false idealism of art […] for it became clear that its 
supposedly supplemental role of ‘preservation, enclosure and refuge’ actually 
preconditioned art production” (Foster, 1986, p. 101).  
The museum as parergon 
“Artists” as much as their supporters and their enemies, no matter of 
what ideological coloration, are unwitting partners in the art-syndrome 
and relate to each other dialectically. They participate jointly in the 
maintenance and/or development of the ideological make-up of their 
society. They work within that frame, set the frame and are being 
framed. (Haacke, 2006, p. 55) 
The museum is a lacuna, it is a gap, nothing in itself, it acquires its meaning from the 
work that it hosts and exhibits to the public. This is why the space of the museum itself 
becomes invisible. Having shed the gilt frame, the work of art is now framed by the 
museum: “To paint something is to recess it in illusion, and dissolving the frame 
transferred that function to the gallery space” (O’Doherty, 1976, p. 40). In The truth in 
painting (1987), Jacques Derrida uses the frame as a philosophical metaphor; the 
frame is the symbol of the parergon, as that which is external to the artwork but also 
part of it. Whereas the picture frame belongs neither to the painting nor the gallery 
walls, it is part of both:  
parergon: neither work (ergon)nor outside the work [horsd’oeuvre], 
neither inside or outside, neither above nor below, it disconcerts any 
opposition but does not remain indeterminate and it gives rise to the 
work. (Derrida, 1987/1974, p. 9) 
For Derrida, the frame represents the distinctions we effectively institute in order to 
separate and recognise things. The parergon “comes up against, beside, and in 
addition to, the ergon” (Derrida, 1987/1974, p. 54), it supplements the ergon. Whereas 
Kant discounts the frame as mere decoration, Derrida problematises Kant’s failure to 
account for what is “outside” the work. Namely, the discourse around art that in fact 
constitutes its significance (Derrida, 1987/1974, p. 53). For Derrida, the parergon is 
everything that is traditionally dismissed as exterior to a work of art, therefore not 
essential to its meaning: it is the preface, catalogue, press release, review or critique. 
Crucially, there are additional factors involved in the production of art that we cannot 
discount, such as funding, sponsorship, selection, academic and institutional validation. 
These factors, understood as external to the work, encroach on and influence the 
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production of art, the conditions of its display and consequently have a bearing on the 
meaning of the work.66 
According to Derrida, the parergon—the discourse that frames the work—is what 
makes the work mean anything at all. The concept of the parergon thus challenges the 
convention that the work of art is a vessel of meaning and that signification lies within 
the work. Any attempt to suggest an essential, fixed meaning becomes destabilised 
with a shift in context (Derrida, 1987/1974, p. 56). There is no meaning within the 
work itself, it is thus supplemented with “constructed” signification by what is exterior 
to it. Thus none of the plural and subjective interpretations of the work can be 
privileged over any other. 
A frame is essentially constructed and therefore fragile: such would be 
the essence or truth of the frame. If it had any. […] The fragility of the 
frame is its “essential constructedness” or systemic precariousness, 
need for incessant recreation / its “lack of being” (Derrida, 1987/1974, 
p. 73) 
Duncan Reekie points out that in Renaissance theatre, carnival, pantomime and music 
hall the “framing techniques” used to indicate the border between the performance 
and reality were flexible conventions. Carnival and music hall allowed for irony, 
slippage and interplay between the modes of drama, including addressing and 
interacting with the audience: “Integrating elements of improvisation, myth and the 
anarchic subversion of the carnival, popular theatre invokes another order of reality – 
the marvellous”. Naturalist drama of the nineteenth and twentieth century replaced 
conventional frames with “institutional, technological and mimetic strategies”; these 
different registers were suppressed in naturalist theatre (Reekie, 2007, pp. 20-21).  
Pirate copies of feature films on the black market have often been filmed in cinema 
theatres. These are usually poor copies, the image is blurred, the colours are muted, 
the contrast is high, the sound echoes and one is familiarly transported into the cinema 
theatre, the black silhouette of the latecomer blocks the screen momentarily, someone 
is chewing popcorn within earshot, the man in the row in front turns to say something 
to his companion. This has the effect of creating a distance between the viewer and 
the film, foregrounding it as a spectacle and downplaying its immersive effect. The 
                                            
66 At Tate Britain we are welcomed by “BP British Art Displays” banners on every threshold. 
Although British Petroleum sponsorship covers only the museum’s display expenses—which for 
activist collectives such as Liberate Tate <www.liberatetate.org> is adequate cause for 
protest—everything in the museum carries the designation “BP”. See also the BP website 
<http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9026067&contentId=7048078>. 
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viewing of pirated feature films inadvertently reactivates Bertold Brecht’s 
defamiliarisation technique.  
Physical encounters with works of art occur primarily in museums or galleries. These 
are dedicated contexts for works of art and they contain other works of art, Andy 
Warhol exploited this fact with his Brillo Boxes (1964) which play off the other work. 
Boris Groys argues that everything in the private installation space of the artist 
becomes part of it, especially the audience (Groys, 2011). The work of Hans Haacke 
and Dan Graham highlights the containing effect of the art context, which infects 
everything. The capacity of the museum to bestow “art-ness” (Duncan, 1995, p. 110) 
on everything within its space by placing brackets around objects, bodies and events, 
de-contextualising and re-contextualising them. This environment creates endless 
opportunities for artists to exploit, only to be reappropriated as another art-exercise 
within the museum.  
But isn’t this one of the more important functions of museums, to kill 
things, to finish them off, to give them the authority and thus distance 
from people by taking out of their real everyday context? Even over and 
above the will of the actors involved with any given museum, I think 
the structure of museums tend towards this kind of activity: 
historization. It is sort of a cemetery for art… (Obrist, 2008, pp. 120-
121) 
The institution as a productive apparatus 
In his article Institutionalisation for all (2006), Dave Beech argues that artists today are 
thrown immediately into circulation as institutions take a more active role in the 
promotion of “emerging” artists: 
Art’s institutions do not lag behind contemporary practice as they 
typically have since the emergence of modernism and the avant garde. 
Funding, retrospectives, sales, monographs, prizes, major public works, 
honours, professorships and trusteeships are not restricted to old-timers 
these days. Young art is welcomed without delay into art’s established 
institutions at a time when contemporary art is growing as an industry, 
extending its pull on the tourist economy, increasing the popular 
recognition of its leading practitioners (now celebrities) and developing 
global brands. (Beech, 2006, p. 7) 
The industrial scale of the art world accommodates more artists than ever before, 
there are more jobs and opportunities for artists, we have never had it better; however 
artists are more dispensable than ever as well. Before artists can become established 
on the market, they must first seek legitimisation through the tier-system of art 
institutions on which they depend: art schools, galleries, journals etc. The criteria are 
not commercial, art is judged exclusively according to artistic criteria, or so the story 
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goes. Art is absorbed into capitalist circulation through commodification and 
recuperation only once it is safely institutionalised. Corporations invest in artists who 
have a list of credentials.67 Far from lagging behind the times, JJ Charlesworth 
suggests in Not about institutions, but why we are so unsure of them (2008), that 
institutions effectively constitute contemporary art practice because “Emerging art only 
emerges if powerful institutions allow it to” (Charlesworth, 2008). 
The active aspect of institutional choice becomes more visibly unstable, 
however, when it addresses that thing called the ‘emerging artist’. What 
is an ‘emerging artist’? Where do they emerge from and what do they 
emerge into? […] the paradoxical aspect of such formulations of art as 
‘emerging’ is that responsibility for art emerging is assigned to itself, or 
to any other agency other than the institution which in fact enables its 
emergence. We could argue that nowadays the institutions of 
presentation of contemporary art are strangely uncomfortable with 
openly declaring the power that they do in fact wield. […] Emerging art 
only emerges if powerful institutions allow it to. (Charlesworth, 2008) 
According to Peter Bürger, the notion of the autonomy of art played a crucial role in 
the failure of the avant-garde to realise its goals. The avant-garde and the neo-avant-
garde pitted themselves against the art institution, which acquires its status precisely 
from the concept of the autonomy of the aesthetic. It is therefore capable of absorbing 
any criticism in the form of anti-art and re-presenting it as an aesthetic experience, as 
art: 
…it can be affirmed, with reasonable confidence, that as soon as a 
concept is announced, and especially when it is “exhibited as art,” 
under the desire to do away with the object, one merely replaces it in 
fact. The exhibited concept becomes idealobject, which brings us once 
again to art (Buren, 1996, p. 142) 
For Rosalind Krauss the liberation of art from the fetters of medium-specificity leads 
directly to a new form of dependency, its dependency on the market. Krauss claims 
that the art object has been “reduced to a system of pure equivalency by the 
homogenising principle of commodification, the operation of pure exchange value from 
which nothing can escape” (Krauss, 1999, p. 15). Isabelle Graw also points out that, in 
the absence of artistic criteria, the “new power of the art market manifests itself, then, 
in the replacement of artistic criteria by economic imperatives” (Graw, 2006, p. 147). 
                                            
67 “We wanted to invite artists to work here with the architecture and create artworks that 
relate specifically to the building, the Lufthansa identity and the construction process. We 
therefore selected artists who are on the brink of an important stage in their careers. Lufthansa 
will continue to follow their progress.” Frankfurt Lufthansa Aviation Center website 
<http://lac.lufthansa.com/en/html/kunst/konzept/index.php>. 
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Paradoxically, art fairs appear to provide a more “neutral” exhibition space for the work 
of art to assert its own conditions of address. This is possibly because the evident 
commercial context has no pretensions to ostensible thematic and concealed 
ideological framings. Boris Groys argues in The Politics of Installation (2009) that the 
market is a more democratic space within which works of art can assert their own 
value: 
…the art market appears to be more favorable than the museum or 
Kunsthalle to Modern, autonomous art. In the art market, works of art 
circulate singularized, decontextualized, uncurated, which apparently 
offers them the opportunity to demonstrate their sovereign origin 
without mediation. (Groys, 2009) 
Whereas, art institutions must justify the works of art they exhibit and where “every 
discourse legitimizing an artwork […] can be seen as an insult to that artwork”, in the 
art market the work of art can assert its autonomy—irrespective of aesthetic taste and 
theoretical critique—and command its own price:  
The sovereign decision of the artist to make an artwork beyond any 
justification is trumped by the sovereign decision of a private buyer to 
pay for this artwork an amount of money beyond any comprehension. 
(Groys, 2009) 
Presumably Groys has the auction house in mind, however, he does not take into 
account is the intricate gate-keeping system against which a work of art must assert its 
“value”. According to Richard Bolton “the market can be manipulated deliberately. 
Important collectors can change the status of the work of artists merely by shuffling 
their collections” (Bolton, 1998, p. 27). 
The notion of the autonomy of art perseveres today more than ever, veiling 
instrumental decisions in a cloak of ambiguous aesthetic judgements that merely serve 
to legitimise institutional decisions. This is evident in practices ranging from the 
unregulated commerce of the primary art-market, to the autonomy of the relatively 
new form of the independent curator—modelled on the figure of Harald Szeemann—
who designs exhibitions of art based solely on his or her own subjective criteria.68 The 
legitimising authority of the curator is in effect productive. JJ Charlesworth observes 
that recent discussions on the role of the “curator-as-author” acknowledge the “role of 
                                            
68 Marc Spiegler writes in the Art Newspaper that curators fashion their careers by “becoming 
the new stronghold for validation of taste. The curator is also closer to the artist, because 
where the critic is trying to be ‘objective’ the curator is clearly subjective” (Spiegler, 2005).  
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the contemporary art institution in producing an art scene, and not merely 
representing an already existing one” (Charlesworth, 2008).  
Institutions have currently usurped the critical role of the artist via the mediating role 
of the curator. Often an artist him or herself, the curator mediates between artists, 
institutions and public thus representing an indeterminate hybrid figure, part 
institution, part artist. A distinctive brand of institutional critique is taken up by 
museums and art fairs themselves, which adhere rhetorically to the self-critical model 
of modern art. This is evident in contemporary institutional discourse and in the 
current proliferation of institutions inviting artists to practice institutional critique and 
hosting exhibitions, conferences and symposia on the critique of institutions.69 This 
posture disguises these strategies of self-promotion and self-validation.  
Neutralisation and the accretion of value and sense 
…in our museums, with modern painting hung beside that of the past, 
the latter enters into a comparable silence. It does so as soon as it is 
removed from its original context; out of that context its original 
message loses its meaning. So it is that, for us today, the beauty of the 
Old Masters’ art is similar in kind to that of modern painting, since we 
no longer have eyes or ears for the message that was once attached to 
it. We see something else today, we see that magic interplay of light 
that lies above or beneath the literal significance of the forms. What we 
perceive today in these majestic images is not the expression of a well-
defined majesty, bound up with political or mythological constructions, 
but the expression of a majesty quite devoid of political implications. 
(Bataille, 1983/1955, p. 53) 
In The Field of Cultural Production (1993), Pierre Bourdieu produces a theory on the 
structure of the field of cultural production and how it connects with the fields of 
power and class. He demystifies the symbolic struggle for the definition of art and the 
naturalisation of cultural practices. Bourdieu argues that the study of art history fails in 
its stated task because “the essential explanation of each work lies outside of each of 
them, in the objective relations which constitute this field” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 30). 
Instead of studying the art object as a discrete artefact, Bourdieu argues that: 
                                            
69 The talk Institutional critique: can the institution ever criticise? was part of the series of 
events entitled 60 Years of Curating at the ICA in association with the London Consortium and 
London Centre for Arts and Cultural Enterprise, London in October 2008. The blurb for the 
event states: “In 2005 Martha Rosler restaged her piece from 1973, Garage Sale. The exhibition 
offered a piece of institutional critique on object festishism, the act of buying and selling, and 
the notion of an ‘art exhibition’. However, Rosler is now a known entity, an institution in herself. 
Is all critique eventually undone, institutionalised, aestheticised?” (ICA, 2008). 
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The task is that of constructing the space of positions and the space of 
the position-takings in which they are expressed. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 
30) 
Bourdieu observes that every position in the field of art is defined by its relation to all 
the other positions which constitute the field. Even dominant positions depend on the 
overall space of positions. The structure of the relationships which constitute the field 
follows the structure of the distribution of capital which determines success in the field: 
“The literary or artistic field is a field of forces, but it is also a field of struggles tending 
to transform or conserve this field of forces”. The relations between positions defines 
the strategies which the occupants of the different positions use in their struggle to 
maintain and strengthen their positions (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 30). Bourdieu argues that 
because a “position-taking” within the field is relatively constituted, it is subject to 
changes in the field and “receives its distinctive value from its negative relationship 
with the coexistent position-takings to which it is objectively related and which 
determine it by delimiting it” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 31). This means that the work of art 
is subject to definitions and interpretations that are determined by the field as a whole: 
The meaning of a work (artistic, literary, philosophical, etc.) changes 
automatically with each change in the field within which it is situated for 
the spectator or reader. (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 30-31)70  
The institutional context of art breaks down the relationships of the particular elements 
of a work of art, effectively disassociating works of art from their social context and 
political aspect. The apparent disconnection of the work from its context and its 
attachment to art history abstracts the work and presents it as an object free from 
ideology. Adorno argues that the history of art separates the “productive force” of art 
from the “real history” in which it is produced:  
The heteronomy, which reception theory’s normative interpretation of 
phenomena foists on art, is an ideological fetter that exceeds everything 
ideological that may be inherent in art’s fetishization. Art and society 
converge in the artwork’s content [Gehalt], not in anything external to 
it. This applies also to the history of art. Collectivization of the individual 
takes place at the cost of the social force of production. In the history 
of art, real history returns by virtue of the life of the productive force 
that originates in real history and is then separated from it. (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 228) 
                                            
70 Bourdieu considers parody and pastiche as the fate of a cultural artefact taken out of context 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 31).  
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The aesthetic and art-historical categorisation of art does not leave it unscathed. The 
category of the aesthetic object delimits a reified sphere. Once consecrated within this 
sphere, works of art are removed from their existence in the world. The traditional 
time-lag between the production of the work of art, its circulation to an increasingly 
broader audience (beginning in the studio, the art school), and its eventual inclusion in 
the museum, followed the temporal recession of events into historical facts. Although it 
is impossible to reconstitute this history, or the doxa that constitutes the field of art at 
any point in time: 
Ignorance of everything which goes to make up the ‘mood of the age’ 
produces a derealization of works: stripped of everything which 
attached them to the most concrete debates of their time […] they are 
impoverished and transformed in the direction of intellectualism or an 
empty humanism. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 32) 
The contemporary art institution institutionalises and historicises art simultaneously. 
The formative effect of this orgy of production and dissemination on current art 
students is very difficult to predict. Bourdieu points out that a vast amount of 
information circulates and produces effects within any cultural field. In his particular 
example, he refers to the field of philosophy:  
…what circulates between contemporary philosophers, or those of 
different epochs, are not only canonical texts, but a whole philosophical 
doxa carried along by intellectual rumour—labels of schools, truncated 
quotations, functioning as slogans in celebration or polemics—by 
academic routine and perhaps above all by school manuals (an 
unmentionable reference), which perhaps do more than anything else 
to constitute the ‘common sense’ of an intellectual generation. 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 32) 
These influences provide obvious reference points for other producers and they often 
perform their work on the unconscious, burrowing their way into the text of a book or 
between the frames of a film. Sometimes they are surreptitiously placed between the 
frames where the attentive observer will find them. Especially in the art world, 
references to formative influences—even discarded ones—have a role in the production 
of the field. A significant influence in the context of production is the oedipal complex: 
the work is always an aspirational response to another work. 
Finally, the structure of the entire field is also subject to change as the result of change 
in the power relations that constitute the space of positions. And this also has the 
effect of constraining the production of the field. Bourdieu considers the transformation 
of the field of production when a new group with new ideas makes an appearance in 
the field and displaces “the universe of possible options; the previously dominant 
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productions may, for example, be pushed into the status either of outmoded [déclassé] 
or of classic works” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 32). In the current lateral expansion of the 
field there are no discernible movements, influences come from all directions and 
rather than a progressive movement, the production of art follows localised flourishes. 
In this context, personal and subjective agendas are privileged over social and 
collective concerns in art practice. The field is one of professional competition rather 
than common aspiration. Bourdieu argues that given this account of the structure of 
field—and although we cannot entirely discount the possibilities for self-determination 
in the field of art—it is impossible: 
…to make the cultural order [episteme] a sort of autonomous, 
transcendent sphere, capable of developing in accordance with its own 
laws. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 33) 
For Adorno, normative interpretations impose heteronomy on art. We can see this in 
the display texts at the Tate Modern, which provide assertive interpretations of the art 
on display.71 These authoritative statements are not supplemental or equal to other 
interpretations because they come directly from the mouth of the institution. They 
impose themselves on the audience, precluding active engagement. Cultural artefacts 
are effectively captured and ideologically re-directed by normative interpretations over 
democratic ones. Adorno argues that although works of art are “internally 
revolutionary”, all art has nevertheless the “tendency toward social integration”. 
Adorno is essentially referring to institutional integration, which: 
…does not bring the blessings of justice in the form of retrospective 
confirmation. More often, reception wears away what constitutes the 
work’s determinate negation of society. (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 229) 
The institution of art abstracts and aestheticises the work of art, allowing extraneous 
values to be attached to it: “Form works like a magnet that orders elements of the 
empirical world in such a fashion that they are estranged from their extra-aesthetic 
existence” (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 226). It is not only art with purely formal objectives 
that is susceptible to accretion of value and ideology. Any work of art, as soon as it 
                                            
71 Test Sites (2006), Carsten Holler’s Unilever commission was composed of three gigantic 
slides, the audience could use them to shuttle from the top floors to ground level in the Turbine 
Hall. According to Tate Modern, these slides “question human behaviour, perception and logic, 
offering the possibility for self-exploration in the process”. We are also told that they “are 
impressive sculptures in their own right, and you don’t have to hurtle down them to appreciate 
this artwork” (Tate, 2006). 
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becomes the object of aesthetic judgement is a clean slate and can tell us nothing 
apparently about the real world:  
Neutralization is the social price of aesthetic autonomy. However, once 
artworks are entombed in the pantheon of cultural commodities, they 
themselves—their truth content—are also damaged. In the 
administered world neutralization is universal. (Adorno, 2002/1970, pp. 
228-229) 
This problem has been addressed by artists throughout the twentieth century but the 
idealised value of art still persists, notably in the market. In his essay Enlightened Self-
Interest: The Avant-Garde in the 80s (1998), Richard Bolton argues that in an 
information society—characterised by immaterial labour—capital is generated by the 
manipulation of signs in the form of investments, corporate takeovers, media 
spectacles, advertising and communication. At the same time, labour conflicts arising in 
the productive base are suppressed because the “success of the commodity depends 
upon its degree of detachment from reality, from labor […] the corporation replaces 
the individual as the author of the commodity” (Bolton, 1998, p. 42): 
The object, abstracted, infused with aura, becomes a free-floating sign, 
and value becomes flexible, determined by manipulation of market. 
(Bolton, 1998, p. 42) 
Politics and the war of culture 
What is in our time the value of the aesthetic—of reception as well as 
production? Indeed, what is the point (political or otherwise) of culture 
itself in the first place? (Jameson, 1986, p. 44) 
For Fredric Jameson, it is “culture’s radical self-doubt, the profound guilt of culture 
works at their own ‘elitist’ and (appropriately Kantian) un-practicality”, that spawns 
radical traditions eager to denounce art in its entirety (Jameson, 1986, p. 44). Jameson 
argues that although we can perform a critique of the “strategic cultural and 
ideological institutions” of art and literature, individual works will always escape these 
institutional approaches. In particular, we can analyse the historical terms of these 
institutions, scrutinise their institutional subsystems (the gallery, museum, art school, 
journals, etc.), and demystify their various ideologies (defences, theories etc.), 
however individual works of art escape this approach. This is because the ideology of 
the individual work of art is incommensurable with the ideology of the field of art in 
general.  
Jameson reveals how the dialectics of autonomy and heteronomy at play within the 
institution of art enforce a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, which 
excludes the later from artistic discourses and thereby masks the dynamics of the 
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institution altogether. For Jameson, Hans Haacke’s work is a “solution” to this dilemma, 
because he includes within the work of art the excluded heteronomous (and 
parergonal) elements: the patrons, donors and museum trustees. According to 
Jameson, Haacke’s work draws the heteronomous determinants of art into the work of 
art. The work’s “content” can thus only be excluded as heteronomous “at the price of 
repudiating the installation itself and denying it any status as a ‘work of art’”, which is 
in fact what happened at the Guggenheim Museum in 1971 and at the Cologne 
Museum in 1974 (Jameson, 1986, p. 48). The letter written by Thomas M. Messer, 
director of the Guggenheim Museum, to Hans Haacke in 1971 justifies the cancellation 
on the grounds that the “political” intentions of the work exceed the “professional 
competence” of the institution (Messer, 1971, pp. 248-249). 
It is impossible to situate oneself critically within the art world without acknowledging 
the institutional frame and one’s own complicity with what it in fact stands for. On the 
other hand, the problem of the impact of the art institution on art practice is difficult 
for artists to negotiate without becoming self-conscious. Perhaps the only way to 
escape the context of the museum is to address it critically by practicing a type of 
institutional critique or site-specificity. 
Although conceptual artists highlighted the politics of the museum, they also 
inadvertently helped to promote the institution, leading to the current practice whereby 
institutions formally invite artists to practice this critique. They limited the scope of art 
practice in hermetic and self-conscious investigations and introduced what Buchloh 
calls “the aesthetic of administration” (Buchloh, 1990). In this sense, institutional 
critique foregrounds the institution, which takes precedence as the disavowed centre of 
the structure of art as a language game. Finally, institutional critique becomes 
dependent on the museum and sets the precedent for the institutional privileging of art 
that is made inside the institution (site-specificity, performance, happening and event). 
According to John Osborne, speaking at the panel discussion entitled Institutional 
critique: can the institution ever criticise? at the ICA (2008), institutional critique has 
become a “subconscious practice within the institution”. The significance of this 
outcome is that institutional critique is co-opted by museums as a strategy for their 
own self-promotion: 
Institutional critique was the main art-institutional means for the 
political modernisation of its own institutions […] it is the medium of 
political modernisation and in that sense it is essentially a politically 
conservative but modernising function. (Osborne, 2008)  
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Institutional critique has provided the means whereby the institution reinvents itself. 
This reinvention is not the type that artists have in mind; it does not contain the radical 
promise of transformation with unlimited possibilities because it is informed by a neo-
liberal agenda. As Patricia Bickers has pointed out, Haacke’s visitor surveys are 
currently used by museums as a “marketing device” (Haacke, 2007).72 According to 
Osborne this modernisation:  
…marks recognition by the institution and artists alike of the new kind 
of professionalism in art. It is not the professionalisation of artists which 
some people talk about. It is a new kind of professionalisation, and it is 
a new kind of recognition of a kind of managerial or self-managerial 
role as an essential institutional practice (Osborne, 2008) 
Artists like Carey Young extend their critique to neo-liberalism, but can this critique 
overcome the prevalence of neo-liberalism in the very exhibition contexts that we 
encounter her work? Does this predicament amount to the irony of institutional critique 
or its cynical realism? Artists affirm and sanction the museum merely by exhibiting 
within it. This positive affirmation of the institution speaks louder than their negative 
critique, which becomes subverted and comes across as rhetorical posturing, hypocrisy 
or nonsense.  
In his Installation Munster (Caravan), first exhibited in 1977 at Skulptur Projekte 
Münster, Asher presented a caravan parked on the streets of Munster that depended 
entirely on the museum for its artistic designation without even being in the institution. 
As Fraser points out, “nothing indicated that the caravan was art or had any 
connection to the exhibition. To casual passersby, it was nothing but a caravan” 
(Fraser, 2005, p. 281). How then are we to perceive the work as art? Speaking to 
students at the Cooper Union School of Art in 2007, Fraser explains that: 
...it’s only the people who are going to the exhibition and go to the 
museum and pick up, or get the brochure, the catalogue of the 
exhibition, and go out and look for the trailer, who see it as art. To 
everybody else on the street, who might be standing next to those 
people, it’s just a trailer (Fraser, 2007) 
Fraser argues that with Installation Munster, “Asher demonstrated that the 
institutionalization of art as art depends not on its location in the physical frame of an 
                                            
72 Hans Haacke’s first Visitors’ Profile was intended for his 1971 exhibition at the Guggenheim 
Museum, which was cancelled. In 1970, he exhibitied MOMA Poll at the exhibition Information, 
Museum of Modern art, New York, followed by Visitor’s Profile 2 (1973), at the John Weber 
Gallery, New York. 
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institution, but in conceptual or perceptual frames” (Fraser, 2005, p. 281). Fraser’s 
argument is that with Installation Munster Asher demonstrates that: 
…the institution of art is not only “institutionalized” in organizations like 
museums and objectified in art objects. It is also internalized and 
embodied in people. It is internalized in the competencies, conceptual 
models, and modes of perception that allow us to produce, write about, 
and understand art, or simply to recognize art as art (Fraser, 2005, p. 
281) 
Far from demonstrating these things, Asher’s Munster installation only becomes a work 
of art if we read the museum catalogue or brochure. Asher is demonstrating that a 
work of art does not exist until it is institutionally validated. In his installation at the 
Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art in 1979, Michael Asher literally limited the work 
to materials specific to the architectural space of the institutional space itself. Asher 
removed aluminium panels from the museum facade and mounted them inside the 
museum.  
Rigorously denying spatial and temporal transcendence, Asher’s works 
are constituted first of all within their own spatial, institutional context, 
the museum; and they become the performative articulation of their 
actually given historical time, the allocated exhibition period itself. 
(Buchloh, 2000/1987, p. 22) 
Asher’s installations fail both as works of art and as a forms of critique; they are 
obscure, unrewarding, pointless and worst of all, they privilege the institution as the 
primary site of artistic production. John Welchman is visibly frustrated by artists’ 
apparent ignorance regarding how their work comes across and its long-term the 
consequences: 
Could it be that there is something delusional in practices that are so 
attached to deconstructing the apparatuses of the museum—mostly 
from within the institution—yet still believe themselves to be “critical” 
according to some measure or judgment from the outside? Has critique 
been evaporated into absorption; and the era of installation and site-
specificity ushered in during the 1990s digested the assumptions of 
Institutional Critique so thoroughly that the predicates of place have 
now become the first conditions of the artwork? (Welchman, 2006, p. 
13-14) 
In The Museum and the Monument: Daniel Buren’s Les Couleurs/Les Formes (2000), 
Buchloh suggests that Buren’s Les Couleurs: Sculptures (1977), striped flags mounted 
on buildings and visible from the Centre Pompidou, represents an attempt “at solving 
one of the most crucial problems in twentieth century art: the dialectic between 
aesthetic reification and the counter-concept of aesthetic use value” (Buchloh, 2000, p. 
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126). These installations by Buren and Asher articulate a subtle relationship between 
formalism and Dadaist intervention and can be construed either way. 
The institution of art determines what is produced and exhibited through forms of 
direct censorship and indirect methods of positive and negative reinforcement, which 
enforce artists’ self-censorship.73 Herbert Schiller argues in his book Culture, Inc. The 
Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (1989), that the “apparent absence” of control 
in the sphere of culture is achieved by the internalisation of values: 
It is not necessary to construct a theory of intentional cultural control. 
In truth, the strength of the control process rests in its apparent 
absence. The desired systemic result is achieved ordinarily by a loose 
though effective institutional process. It utilizes the education of 
journalists and other media professionals, built-in penalties for doing 
what is not expected, and rewards for doing what is expected, norms 
presented as objective rules, and the occasional but telling direct 
intrusion from above. The main lever is the internalization of values. 
(Schiller, 1989, p. 8) 
The institution selects through exclusion, but on what criteria? Justification in art can 
never be definitive because all aesthetic values are subjective. The institution of art 
dictates but it also suggests, coaxes and propositions artists into making work with 
calls, project rooms, residencies, commissions, etc. The institution also educates 
artists, and so on. 
Culture is both an industry and a battleground. The institution of art has entirely ceded 
to material objectives and political agendas and can no longer claim a critical position 
in relation to capitalism. Whereas the autonomy of art is founded on the promise of 
“aesthetic revolution”, it is currently subject to corporate instrumentalisation and 
control. Throughout modernity, we have examples of artists who established their own 
alliances with power (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 51-60). Since the late twentieth century, 
curators and administrators mediate between artists and power. Exhibition sponsorship 
is arranged by museums on behalf of artists, who have no control of the alliances they 
enter into as a result of exhibiting in institutions. The political partnerships of museums 
or galleries are not considered problematic, apparently they have no bearing on art. Art 
exists in an abstract, reified sphere, it is not real. 
If art continues to claim the avant-garde project—which includes the ambition to reject 
all forms of domination and exploitation—then artists need to resist the colonisation of 
                                            
73 See Bourdieu and Haacke, 2005, pp. 2-10 on the relationship between censorship and self-
censorship. 
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art by the powers that it has repeatedly rejected. Artists need to reassert art as a free 
and potentially revolutionary space within society. Art is not just a harmless and self-
indulgent game for artists and patrons alike, because in every game there is in the end 
a winner. Art is as much a struggle in terms of exclusively aesthetic goals, as it is a 
struggle for control over its own territory. The power that individuals wield in the art 
world is upheld by the entire population that makes up the art world. The intricate 
alliances in the art world are politically charged because they constitute the struggle 
for power. Power within the art world is constituted through its structure, which is 
relational as well as hierarchical. The field’s hierarchical structure is composed at the 
top by powerful collectors, dealers and museum directors and politicians. Next is a 
group of supporting collaborating curators, dealers, collectors, artists, museum 
directors, gallery directors, critics, theorists, writers and politicians. Following them a 
less powerful but crucial group of gallery directors, curators, academics, museum staff, 
journalists, teachers, entrepreneurs, celebrities, students and—most significantly—lots 
of artists. This last group function like proselytisers who consciously or unconsciously 
transmit the discourse of their superiors to their own spheres of influence: artists, 
journalists, the public and crucially, the students. The spaces where this dissemination 
of dominant ideas intensifies includes art schools, universities, conferences, museum 
and gallery panel discussions, journals and the media, exhibitions and web-sites. 
The three fields: society, power and art 
It is clear that curatorial practice today goes well beyond mounting art 
exhibitions and caring for works of art. Curators do a lot more: they 
administer the experience of art by selecting what is made visible, 
contextualize and frame the production of artists, and oversee the 
distribution of production funds, fees, and prizes that artists compete 
for. Curators also court collectors, sponsors, and museum trustees, 
entertain corporate executives, and collaborate with the press, 
politicians, and government bureaucrats; in other words, they act as 
intermediaries between producers of art and the power structure of our 
society… (Vidokle, 2010)  
Karl Marx links the control of material production in society to control over the 
production and distribution of ideas. He argues that insofar as the ruling class 
determines “the extent and compass of an epoch”, it also controls the intellectual 
production of that epoch, its members rule “as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and 
regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are 
the ruling ideas of the epoch” (Marx, 1998, p. 67).  
In The Painting of Modern Life (1985), TJ Clark describes “ideologies” as distinct and 
singular “orders” of knowledge, which are imposed on representations and behaviours, 
 132 
ways of “providing certain perceptions and rendering others unthinkable, aberrant or 
extreme”. Ideologies, for Clark are singular constructs tied to class-specific attitudes 
and experiences and are “therefore at odds, at least to some extent, with the attitudes 
and experience of those who do not belong to it”. Although, Clark holds that class “is 
regularly made out of the many and the various” he also affirms the existence of 
antagonism between ideological frameworks belonging to different classes. The 
function of ideology therefore is “as far as possible to dispose of the very ground for 
such conflicts” (Clark, 1985, p. 8). Herbert Marcuse maintains that art provides ways 
for power to assert itself (Marcuse, 2009/1968, pp. 71, 97), Benjamin Buchloh sees art 
as “a tool of ideological control and cultural legitimation” (Buchloh, 1990, p. 143), 
Adrian Piper uses the term “weaponry”.74 In The Rules of Art (1996), Pierre Bourdieu 
affirms the existence of power struggles “for the monopoly of the definition of the 
mode of legitimate cultural production” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 227). These power 
struggles do not just take place amongst artists; they take place amongst the 
legitimising institutions of art: 
The producer of the value of the work of art is not the artist but the 
field of production as a universe of belief which produces the value of 
the work of art as a fetish by producing the belief in the creative power 
of the artist. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 229) 
In The Field of Production (1993), Bourdieu sketches an image of the relationship of 
art to society with a diagram of three interlocking social spheres and their power 
dynamics: the social totality, the field of power and the field of art. Each sphere has its 
own hierarchy, indicated by a dominant pole on the one end and a dominated pole on 
the other. The field of power is situated within the dominant pole of the social totality. 
The field of art in turn, is governed by a “double hierarchy”, it occupies the dominant 
pole of society and it simultaneously occupies a dominated position within the field of 
power. But how is this balance of power allocated and articulated? Bourdieu argues 
that this double hierarchy is a “struggle” between two opposing principles of assigning 
value or “principles of hierarchization” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40). 
The field of art controls the production of symbolic capital and its “principle of 
hierarchization” is autonomy. Bourdieu defines of “autonomy” in this instance as “fulfils 
its own logic as a field” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39). The field of art thus retains a degree 
                                            
74 Piper argues that “Galleries and museums are political arenas in which strategies of 
confrontation and avoidance are calculated, diplomacy is practiced, and weaponry is tested, all 
in the service of divergent, and often conflicting, interests” (Piper, 1996/1980, p. 43). 
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of autonomy regarding the economic and political forces in society. Pulling in the 
opposite direction is the “heteronomous principle of hierarchization”, which is 
“favourable to those who dominate the field economically and politically” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 40) and is indicated by official success. For Bourdieu success is “measured by 
indices such as book sales, number of theatrical performances, etc. or honours, 
appointments, etc.” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 38). Thus the heteronomous principle would 
dominate the art-field unchallenged if the field lost its autonomy and became subject 
to ordinary laws prevailing in the economic and political field.  
Equally, in the field of art the autonomous principle of hierarchisation “would reign 
unchallenged if the field of production were to achieve total autonomy with respect to 
the laws of the market” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 38). Paradoxically, the more autonomous 
the field of art becomes, the more independent it becomes from the field of power and 
the more autonomous artists become from institutional and ideological constraints. 
Although as Bourdieu argues: “whatever its degree of independence, it continues to be 
affected by the laws of the field which encompasses it, those of economic and political 
profit” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39) and this is why the autonomy of art is always “relative”.  
For Bourdieu the “most perfectly autonomous sector of the field of cultural production” 
is one where production addresses an audience of other producers, epitomised by the 
Symbolist movement. In the most autonomous sectors of cultural production there is 
an inversion of principles of common economies, Bourdieu describes this as a game of 
“loser wins”. For example, in economic terms the autonomous field “excludes the 
pursuit of profit and does not guarantee any sort of correspondence between 
investments and monetary gains”, in terms of power “it condemns honours and 
temporal greatness” and in terms of institutional authority, “the absence of any 
academic training or consecration may be considered a virtue” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39). 
The more autonomous the field becomes, the more favourable the 
symbolic power balance is to the most autonomous producers and the 
more clear-cut is the division between the field of restricted production, 
in which the producers produce for other producers, and the field of 
large-scale production… (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39)  
The paradox is that the contemporary art world—as the most lucrative sector of the 
culture industry—has essentially become a field of “large-scale production”. This is not 
only evident in large-scale exhibitions and sprawling museums but also “factories” for 
the mass production of the work of artists such as Damien Hirst, Jeff Koons and 
Takashi Murakami. In Bourdieu’s scheme, the heteronomous principle of 
hierarchisation functions to screen the field of art from social forces. The field of power 
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asserts the heteronomous principle as a value in the field of art, which is a field of 
institutional authorisation and “multiple authorship” (Groys, 2008, p. 96). So 
interestingly, the buffer zone that in bourgeois society traditionally encircles and 
protects art, now converts it into a field of mass-production, with the associated 
division of labour between art-making, curating, research, education, marketing, 
promotion, fund-raising, etc. in the various museum departments each with its experts 
and trained staff. 
The program of the visual industry implies that visuality and its 
meanings are no longer produced by singular protagonists (artists, 
galleries, curators). Instead responsibility for the production and 
distribution of images and their content lies in the hands of larger 
entities, including international franchises and multi-national 
conglomerates. (Graw, 2006, pp. 146-147) 
Analysing the relations between artists and mediators such as agents, dealers, gallery 
directors or publishers, Bourdieu describes the later as “equivocal figures”: through 
them, the logic of the economic field enters the autonomous field. These figures must 
posses “economic dispositions” but also qualities that are similar to those of the artists 
“whose work they valorize and exploit” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39): 
…this favours the relationship of trust and belief which is the basis of an 
exploitation presupposing a high degree of misrecognition on each side. 
These ‘merchants in the temple’ make their living by tricking the artist 
or writer into taking the consequences of his or her statutory 
professions of disinterestedness. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40)  
Bourdieu argues that “authenticity” in the art field is demonstrated by the absence of 
guarantee of strictly economic or political rewards: the art world is structured in such a 
way, that those who enter it must demonstrate that they “have an interest in 
disinterestedness” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40). There is however an economic logic in the 
field, but it is a reverse logic involving the investment of belief and commitment: 
There are economic conditions for the indifference to economy which 
induces a pursuit of the riskiest positions in the intellectual and artistic 
avant-garde, and also for the capacity to remain there over a long 
period without any economic compensation. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40)  
This group also includes curators and other institutional figures who mediate between 
artist and public and who barter the symbolic capital of the work in exchange for 
economic, political and social rewards within the sphere of art and beyond. Bourdieu 
alludes enigmatically to something that is crucial for our discussion:  
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This explains the inability of all forms of economism, which seek to 
grasp this anti-economy in economic terms, to understand this 
upsidedown economic world. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40)  
Bourdieu is implying that the principle of instant gratification which governs in the field 
of power has limited bearing in the field of art, which is structured according to an 
inverse economic logic. The insistence on applying the “heteronomous principle of 
hierarchization” in the art world—as has been the case in the music industry—creates a 
large-scale cultural industry, a powerful mainstream. Being thus at odds with the 
disinterested values of the field, this mainstream promotes a climate of estrangement 
amongst the producers. In the music industry, this process led to productive 
resistance, which librated the producers from their dependence on legitimisation from 
the mainstream as they printed their own CDs and organised their own gigs. This 
process resulted in the diminishing value of the mainstream and the once bloated 
record companies found themselves struggling to survive. The overall result was the 
disintegration of the entire centralised music industry into self-governing networks. 
The Politics of art  
“An artist is identical with an anarchist,” he cried. “You might transpose 
the words anywhere. An anarchist is an artist. The man who throws a 
bomb is an artist, because he prefers a great moment to everything. He 
sees how much more valuable is one burst of blazing light, one peal of 
perfect thunder, than the mere common bodies of a few shapeless 
policemen. An artist disregards all governments, abolishes all 
conventions. (Chesterton, 2005/1908, p. 8) 
Bourdieu describes the field of art as a struggle between two principles, the 
heteronomous principle and the autonomous principle. The struggle between the 
competing forces of heteronomy and autonomy takes place within the institution of art 
even before it takes place within the work of art.  
For Peter Bürger, art “lives off the tension” between autonomy and its social content 
(Bürger, 2007/1974, p. 25). He does not suggest that they are incompatible, on the 
contrary, “the autonomy status certainly does not preclude the artist’s adoption of a 
political position; what it does limit is the chance of effectiveness” (Bürger, 2007/1974, 
pp. 25-26). Adorno considers the dialectics of autonomy and heteronomy in relation to 
the work of art itself, not in the context of the political and economic relations that 
constitute the field of art, thus obscuring the inherent congruence between artists who 
make art-for-art’s-sake and those who believe in the social role of art. There is no clear 
separation between autonomy and heteronomy, their relationship is dialectical. Given 
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that artists occupy a dominated position in the institution of art, there is always the 
pressure of external economic or political interests.  
Ranciere dispels the distinction between political and non-political art as a fallacy, yet 
he too considers heteronomy and autonomy in terms of the art object, not the 
structure of the field. But as we have seen, the work of art is a fetish, although it 
embodies the collaborative efforts of everyone in the field, it does not reveal the power 
relationships at play in the field, nor the political choices of the individual agents in the 
field.  
Inevitably, the commitment of socially engaged artists like Beveridge and Burns or 
autonomous artists like Judd and Flavin is to art. Bourdieu argues that socially engaged 
art shares with autonomous art “a radical rejection of the dominant principle of 
hierarchy” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40, note 12). In political terms, to consider the 
principles at play within the work of art without considering the principles at play at the 
level of power is speculative at best. Because the power structure of the field 
determines the production and representation of the field. It renders its own role 
invisible by disavowing this power: 
The state of the power relations in this struggle depends on the overall 
degree of autonomy possessed by the field, that is, the extent to which 
it manages to impose its own norms and sanctions on the whole set of 
producers, including those who are closest to the dominant pole of the 
field of power and therefore most responsive to external demands (i.e. 
the most heteronomous); this degree of autonomy varies considerably 
from one period and one national tradition to another, and affects the 
whole structure of the field. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40)  
So we can safely say that currently, the field is characterised by a very low degree of 
autonomy. Which makes Bourdieu’s claim even more urgent: he argues that the power 
configuration in the field of at ultimately rests on the value of art for the dominant field 
in its struggle for power, more specifically: 
…in the struggle to conserve the established order and, perhaps 
especially, in the struggle between the fractions aspiring to domination 
within the field of power (bourgeoisie and aristocracy, old bourgeoisie 
and new bourgeoisie, etc.), and on the other hand in the production 
and reproduction of economic capital (with the aid of experts and 
cadres). (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 41) 
If we follow Bourdieu’s reasoning, then art is one more weapon in the political struggle 
of the dominant classes. This shines some light on the relationship between art and 
politics in the institution of art, and the resulting impact on the role of the artist within 
this configuration. This is not a novel idea, but the definition of the artistic field as “a 
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field of positions and a field of position-takings” avoids reductive interpretations of the 
type that endeavour to gauge the critical impact of the singular work of art, and 
equally, the automatic condemnation of profit-making or commercial activity. It also 
avoids the reductive polarisation between “the charismatic image of artistic activity as 
pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist” and ethical or instrumental agendas 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 34). In other words, we need not resort to conspiracy theories. 
The position that individual agents or institutions occupy within a system certainly 
determines their behaviour within it. Additionally, it follows that these individuals or 
institutions aim to achieve independence and stability, in other words, they will try to 
maintain control over their status by consolidating their power and influence with 
others in the field. The position that individual agents or institutions occupy within the 
field is determined by and determines how much influence they have. Bourdieu argues 
that the field of cultural production is the site of struggles; at stake is the power to 
impose not only the dominant definitions of the artist but also those who are entitled 
to define the artist (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). 
Bourdieu’s positive argument is that there is “no other criterion of membership of a 
field than the objective fact of producing effects within it” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42).75 It 
follows then, that even attempts to restrict the redefinitions of the field by imposing 
conditions of entry can be subverted: “polemics imply a form of recognition; 
adversaries whom one would prefer to destroy by ignoring them cannot be combated 
without consecrating them” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). The institution’s most effective 
weapon against undesirable competition is feigned indifference. 
When Bourdieu refers to the “boundary of the field is a stake of struggles” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 42), he is not merely referring to the boundary of inclusion within the field of 
art. He is referring to the three boundaries between the three social fields: between 
the field of power and the social totality which it dominates, between the cultural field 
and the social totality and between the field of power and the cultural field. The most 
disputed boundary of all, according to Bourdieu, is the one between the field of cultural 
production and the field of power (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 43) 
Bourdieu argues that the homology between oppositions that structure the field of art 
and oppositions that structure the field of class relations may produce “ideological 
effects which are produced automatically whenever oppositions at different levels are 
                                            
75 Blogging is a good example, art journalism and blogs have achieved broader popularity than 
art journals, leading those journals to imitate arts blogs in their own websites. 
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superimposed or merged”. But there are also struggles within the field of power itself, 
which produce “partial alliances”, the struggles within the field of art are therefore 
“always overdetermined and always tend to aim at two birds with one stone” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 44). The complexity that is the result of the superimposition of 
these various conflicts and allegiances goes a long way in explaining the ambiguity of 
the relationship between art and politics as it is regarded within the field of art. It has 
less to do with the intentions of artists concerning the work of art itself, and more to 
do with the parergonal elements of art practice, which have a direct bearing on the 
work of art. For example, the relationship (of trust) between artists and dealers or 
curators who represent the artwork to the public. Or the choices that artists must 
make between participating in an exhibition or not, accepting a commission or not and 
a multitude of singular choices, the consequences of which may serve to reinforce the 
heteronomous principles of the field, with the artists’ endorsement. Bourdieu explains 
that the individual artists or groups within the productive field of art are not immune to 
the attractions of the heteronomous field (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 41); artists constantly 
negotiate the tension between the impulse toward heteronomy and the impulse toward 
autonomy (and their respective rewards). This is what constitutes the dynamic space 
of artists’ dilemmas and choices. Bourdieu argues that by responding to the logic of 
competition within the field, artists adjust to the expectations of the various positions 
in the field of power, without making conscious decisions (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 45). For 
example, the most common scenario is the artist who considers the benefits of gallery 
representation;76 these include the possibility of increased income and visibility 
(heteronomous values), which will enable the artist to produce new work, thus 
satisfying the artists’ autonomous values. However, the artist soon discovers that this 
is not actually how things turn out; quite often it is the artist who brings visibility to the 
gallery and the sale of a work of art may cover the artist’s associated expenses, but a 
very small proportion of artists make enough of a profit from sales to maintain a 
studio. 
Although the solidarity of artists (“who occupy the economically dominated and 
symbolically dominant position within the field of cultural production”) with the 
“economically and culturally dominated positions within the field of class relations” is 
based on “homologies of position”, they are also divided by “profound differences in 
                                            
76 Generally understood as a partnership—if we go by the standard 50/50 share in sales—
however, artists’ relationship with their gallery is rarely a relationship negotiated on equal 
terms.  
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condition” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 44), which is the source of many ironies in the field of 
art. However, Bourdieu points out that artists can use their power to articulate critical 
proposals about the world: 
The fact remains that the cultural producers are able to use the power 
conferred on them, especially in periods of crisis, by their capacity to 
put forward a critical definition of the social world, to mobilize the 
potential strength of the dominated classes and subvert the order 
prevailing in the field of power. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 44) 
What are the politics of art? What informs artists’ ideological choices, what are they 
based on? Are they political ideologies? If we follow Bourdieu, the traditional values 
that artists apply to each other are autonomous values, for example, the condemnation 
of material gains and the approval of earned recognition. Artists are not socialists, 
democrats or liberals when it comes to choices about art, whether these choices are 
intrinsic to the work or parergonal choices, such as whether to participate in a specific 
exhibition or go for gallery representation.  
When we say “autonomy”, we mean “art is its own politics”. But artists do not 
institutionalise their politics. Adorno’s concept of autonomy characterises the 
designation “artist” as a political ontology. The etymology of “autonomy” emphasises 
self-legislation.77 Art is an autonomous sphere because artists create their own rules 
and they defend their right to create their own rules. Their “precarious” condition 
insists on this right; artists are not answerable because artists do not get a paycheck. 
Unlike curators, artists do not ask for permission.  
The work of an artist is considered inauthentic if it is at odds with the artist’s life-style. 
This self-consciousness can be traced back to Théophile Gautier, Oscar Wilde, Pablo 
Picasso, Salvador Dali, Chris Burden, Andy Warhol. After Warhol, artists increasingly 
identify as professionals. Artists are well-educated, with a string of credentials they 
promote their unique brand of autonomy. They self-consciously negotiate their 
autonomy, hand it over as a commodity in exchange for recognition. On the other 
hand, if artists do not compete on the professional level they will not be able to 
produce and exhibit their work. 
Exploding Cinema was initially defined by a set of strategies aimed against limitations 
to artists’ freedom. It is astonishing that after 20 years these strategies are still crucial. 
                                            
77 “Autonomy”: 1. the quality or state of being self-governing; especially the right of self-
government 2. self-directing freedom and especially moral independence. Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary (2011).  
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What does it reveal? It helps to identify some of the major limitations of the art 
institution and it shows that very little has changed since 1991.  
How do we make a connection with a historical text or context? We make a subjective 
connection. This is why we probably do not realise that certain epiphanies have already 
resurfaced numerous times; it is just that our attention was elsewhere. Epiphanies 
resurface when they are necessary, because without the connecting link we fail to 
recognise any similarity with our own experience. Paradigm shifts and revolutions 
follow similar patterns: any set of premises will eventually become redundant but in 
the meantime it has become sedimented and institutionalised, a way of life is built on it 
and interests coagulate around it. This is why any set of premises and the structures 
around it must be forcibly removed and replaced when it no longer serves a purpose. 
The notion of the autonomy of art must be replaced with the concept of the autonomy 
of the artist. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NO STARS NO FUNDING NO TASTE78 
There’s a strange kind of […] obsolescence written into the film club 
thing which is that it takes a lot of energy to do it and you can’t make 
any money out of it. So you can do it for a while, but eventually you are 
going to be thinking you have got to find a way to sell this thing to 
make money out of it. But the thing is the Exploding is always going to 
be around, because we don’t care. We never wanted to make money 
and we never wanted to go into the commercial industry. (Reekie in 
Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
Art is political, not because of the contingencies within which it is embedded and the 
histories it necessarily incorporates. Art is political because we encounter it in the 
imposing museum, the hidden gallery, the exclusive auction house. The privileged and 
circumscribed context of the encounter with art is politically charged. Artists who 
imagine a different way of doing things and do not share the ideologies and discourses 
of established art venues are effectively excluded. Artists have responded to these 
exclusions by creating their own spaces, events and networks, thus practicing a 
negative critique of the predominant and naturalised bourgeois ideology that reigns in 
the art world. These include artist-run spaces, one-off exhibitions and screenings in 
warehouse spaces, organisations and networked practices. The problem, however, 
with many of these distributed practices, is that they often fail to grow to produce an 
enduring alternative culture for the production and distribution of art. There are 
various reasons for this: these spaces are often unsustainable and become co-opted in 
their struggle to survive. They are isolated within the broader sphere of the cultural 
industries and feel the pressure to conform and compete. They often serve as 
springboards to the mainstream and either disappear or become transformed when 
they have served their purpose. In many ways, these failures can be traced to a single 
factor, the artist’s desire for recognition: 
Fame and success are important tools of affirmative culture; by casting 
achievement as an individual accomplishment, the artist is separated 
from the collective—the subculture—from which the work originally 
drew its power. This former power is replaced by the power of value 
and fame. “Genius” fills the void left by the elimination of work’s social 
base. (Bolton, 1998, p. 41) 
Georges Bataille discerns this most “pathetic desire” in Manet: “What he yearned for 
was encouragement, official success” (Bataille, 1983/1955, p. 27). Manet assisted a 
                                            
78 Exploding Cinema slogan. 
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revolution not only in art but also in the status of the artist in society, yet “his aplomb 
concealed a rankling bitterness. Few more charming men than he, yet few have 
suffered more not simply from their failure to gain recognition, but from being a target 
of public ridicule” (Bataille, 1983/1955, p. 23).79 This public was a new public for art, a 
bourgeois public. And the artists of the modern world “were their own masters, their 
own sovereign. The ambiguous name of “artist” covered both a newfound dignity and 
a pretension difficult to justify” (Bataille, 1983/1955, p. 26): 
In the confusion brought on by an almost overnight emancipation 
Manet appears as the symbol of all the conflicting inclinations a free 
man is torn between. (Bataille, 1983/1955, p. 26) 
After 1848, the political climate in Europe began to change in favour of the bourgeoisie 
who were now the ruling class. How did this affect the artists? How did they react?  
From its beginnings, the artistic avant-garde has discovered, renewed, 
or re-invented itself by identifying with marginal, ‘non-artistic’ forms of 
expressivity and display – forms improvised by other social groups out 
of the degraded materials of capitalist manufacture. Manet’s “Olympia” 
offered a bewildered middle-class public the flattened pictorial economy 
of the cheap sign or carnival backdrop, the pose and allegories of 
contemporary pornography superimposed over those of Titian’s “Venus 
of Urbino”. (Crow, 1983, p. 215) 
The Impressionist movement effected a distinct rejection of society in the artists’ 
refusal to represent any value other than fleeting impressions. Impressionism coincided 
with the Second Empire, during this period “the bourgeois acquiescence to political 
authoritarianism was followed by the first spectacular flowering of consumer society” 
(Crow, 1983, p. 228). In his essay Modernism and Mass Culture in the Visual Arts 
(1983), Thomas Crow argues that emerging modes of commodity production 
determined the character of the modernist avant-garde. Crow discerns in the host of 
competing practices within modernism an attempt to construct a critical mediation of 
commodities (Crow, 1983, p. 233). He emphasises the central role in Impressionist 
painting of the “new spaces of commercial pleasure the painters seem rarely to have 
left”. For Crow, early modernist artists consistently identified with the “social practices 
of mass diversion—whether uncritically reproduced, caricatured, or transformed into 
abstract Arcadias”. He comes across the “debris” of mass culture in cubist and dada 
                                            
79 A letter by Berthe Morisot describes him as “embittered to the very end by the blind 
incomprehension of the art public”. He even challenged his friend Louis Edmond Duranty to a 
dual on account of an unfavourable review in Paris-Journal. Their friendship was restored when 
Duranty wrote another, favourable review (Bataille, 1983, p. 23). 
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collage and discovers the “delighted discovery of American traffic, neon, and 
commercialized black music” in Mondrian’s Boogie-Woogie series (Crow, 1983, p. 215). 
This trend reached its climax in Pop Art, and continues to be a fundamental strategy 
for artists. Crow argues that innovation in modern art is due largely to a consistent 
sourcing of “non-artistic” forms, primarily from popular culture: 
From its beginnings, the artistic avant-garde has discovered, renewed, 
or re-invented itself by identifying with marginal, ‘non-artistic’ forms of 
expressivity and display—forms improvised by other social groups out of 
the degraded materials of capitalist manufacture. (Crow, 1983, p. 215) 
As consumption in the post-Fordist capitalist economy became self-justifying and 
began to play a larger role in social relations, there was a need to create expanded 
desires and sensibilities, and artists provided “the skills required for an even more 
intense marketing of sensual gratification” (Crow, 1983, p. 252). Crow argues that the 
artistic avant-garde provided the service of mediating between the differentiated strata 
of commodity culture, which he describes as a “necessary brokerage between high and 
low” (Crow, 1983, p. 253): 
In its selective appropriation from fringe mass culture, the avant-garde 
searches out areas of social practice which retain some vivid life in an 
increasingly administered and rationalised society. These it refines and 
packages, directing them to an elite, self-conscious audience (Crow, 
1983, p. 253) 
High art is thus “an irreplaceable status indicator”, which guarantees its value and 
permanence (Crow, 1983, p. 253). 
Functionally then, the avant-garde serves as a kind of research and 
development arm of the cultural industry: it searches out areas of social 
practice not yet completely available to efficient manipulation and 
makes them discrete and visible. (Crow, 1983, p. 253) 
A close look at the histories of art and the histories of popular culture reveals intimate 
interactions between the two. Far from being discretely outlined, these two fields kept 
separate by respective discourses and markets, can be clearly seen to co-evolve in 
complex processes of appropriation, quotation, imitation and parody. Art and popular 
culture have endlessly recycled common strategies, techniques and ideas against a 
backdrop of social and political shifts. Beyond this cycle of exchange however, Crow 
sees a filtering system at work which moves in one direction: “appropriation of 
oppositional practices upward, the return of evacuated cultural goods downward”. 
Achieved largely by the legitimising function of art institutions, this process entrenches 
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class bias and thus “modernist negation becomes, paradoxically, an instrument of 
cultural domination” (Crow, 1983, p. 255). 
The Exploding Cinema Collective is a resistant subculture, its roots are not in art but in 
the underground. Thomas Crow defines resistant subcultures as “groups which 
articulate for themselves a counter-consensual identity”, they thereby convey “an 
implicit message of rupture and discontinuity” (Crow, 1983, p. 233). Exploding Cinema 
represents a progressive counterpoint to art institutions. Its original constitution was 
motivated by the activities of predecessors and informed by the potential disasters of 
official recognition and support. Exploding Cinema is not motivated by the desire for 
recognition from the established sector; it relies on the audience and the community of 
producers who send in their films to be screened. Exploding Cinema is unique in that 
this vision was never abandoned or compromised. The question rather, is how did it 
manage to survive?  
I have been a member of Exploding Cinema since 2004 and this chapter differs slightly 
in tone from the rest of the thesis. My intention is not to valorise Exploding Cinema but 
to convey it as one more element in a vast sphere of creativity, productivity and 
community that does not aspire to distinctions and recognition within the art world. 
ARTISTS MARCH ON THE MUSEUM 
Record attendances at the Tate Gallery are not a cause for joy. The 
Sermon on the Mount was a CON-TRICK. The performer-audience 
situation whereby, hopefully, some of the magic will rub off onto the 
multitudes is a substitute for DOING. THEM and US is wrong. The 
hierarchy of PROVEN WORTH is wrong; this worth is proved by pieces 
of paper (whether certificates or diplomas), by cash (whether salaries, 
wages, or grants) by END-PRODUCTS (whether coal, tins of beans, 
records, books or art objects); and the cash and the pieces of paper are 
directly dependent on the PRODUCTION of end-products, and if you 
don’t think that stinks then your future is bright, my boy, because I.C.I., 
I.C.A., C.I.A., Unilever, British Petroleum, The Ministry of Employment 
and Productivity (otherwise known as The Arts Council) and countless 
others are looking for people just like YOU. “You want unlimited money 
for research; then what’s the return? Nothing? Yes, well, show him out 
Miss White.” […] It is time to move the emphasis from end-products to 
PROCESS; to ACTIVITY with NO GUARANTEED RETURNS; this implies 
TRUST; the insistence on guaranteed returns implies MISTRUST. NO 
MORE LABELS. NO INSTRUCTIONS. NO PACKAGE DEAL. (Breakwell, 
1969, p. 12) 
This is not a contemporary manifesto, it is a hand-scrawled text by Ian Breakwell 
published in 1969, its polemical tone still echoes the reverberations of 1968. The fact 
that artists have denounced these powers ever since, seems to have made no 
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difference whatsoever. Breakwell argues astutely that artists and their products are 
instrumentalised as the tools of the art industry, a blatant contradiction of the 
autonomy claim of art.  
But there is another assumption in Breakwell’s text which is more significant. The 
assumption that the state should fund artistic production and the associated 
assumption that funding should be provided with no strings attached. These 
assumptions may be embedded in the liberal tradition, but they defy the laws of 
economics and politics, they are simply naïve. Breakwell’s text was published in the 
July-August 1969 issue of Circuit, which was a report on the Friends of Arts Council 
Operative (FACOP) Artists’ Conference held at St. Katherine’s Docks, London, 8th June 
1969. FACOP was an artists’ group, formed to assess the Arts Council’s activities 
(Thomas, 2006, p. 463). The conference brought together 350 artists and activists to 
discuss the role of the artist in society and the problems of patronage, amongst other 
concerns. The conference was critical of the Arts Council’s priorities and argued for 
reforms: 
FACOP’s central demand in 1969 was for the Arts Council to be replaced 
by an ‘Artists’ Council’, which would be democratically elected at 
meetings – such as those organized by FACOP. (Thomas, 2006, p. 463) 
During the 1970s, Breakwell worked with the Artist Placement Group (APG), which was 
founded in 1966 and placed artists into government departments and industry (1968-
75) with the expectation that they could bring a different perspective to these 
institutions and affect a positive shift in decision-making processes. Breakwell’s 
placements included the Department of Health and Social Security and British Rail 
(Steveni, 1983). For the founders John Latham and Barbara Steveni, the APG was one 
project amongst many within a concerted effort “to give art a purpose ‘outside’ its 
immediate and overly obvious remit in the art institutions of gallery and museum” 
(Slater, 2000).  
Throughout Europe and the US in the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of 
feminist, civil-rights and anti-war movements and the critiques of artistic autonomy 
that were emerging in conceptual art, artists’ groups coordinated their efforts against 
the ossified traditions of art institutions and art schools, and tried to bridge the gap 
between art and life. From the early 1960s, Fluxus challenged the reigning art world 
hierarchy, the separation of art from life and the status of the artist. Fluxus artists 
endeavoured to fuse art and life by taking art outside the established circuits to an 
expanded audience. They experimented with materials and practices, musical 
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performances and happenings and challenged the professional and elite status of the 
artist (DeRoo, 2006, p. 45). Deploying Dadaist rhetorics, George Maciunas declared: 
Purge the world of bourgeois sickness, “intellectual”, professional & 
commercialized culture […] Promote living art, anti-art, promote NON 
ART REALITY to be grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes 
and professionals (Maciunas in Smith, 1998, p. 3)80 
The Art Workers’ Coalition (AWC) was a New York based movement conceived in 
January 1969 to address the responsibility of museums towards artists.81 The coalition 
of artists and critics delivered 13 Demands to Bates Lowry, Director of the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York. What were these demands, and how might they be evaluated 
today? The demands draw particular attention to the rights of artists when dealing with 
institutions. The first demand required that the museum hold a public hearing on “The 
Museum’s Relationship to Artists and to Society” (Art Workers’ Coalition, 1969). This 
was not granted but the Open Hearing did in fact occur at the School of Visual Arts 
later that year and was a well-attended event, leading to further actions of the AWC 
(Lippard, 1970, p. 171).  
The second and third demands protested the exclusive selection and exhibition practice 
of the Museum, especially with regard to minority artists and communities. The fourth 
demanded an artists’ committee with a curatorial role in the Museum. The fifth 
demanded free entry into the Museum and extended opening hours. Subsequent 
demands included a rental fee for the exhibition of artists’ work, the acknowledgment 
of artists’ rights to refuse the exhibition of their work, a clarification of copyright 
legislation and artists’ legal rights (targeting copyright royalties), an open system for 
the documentation of artists’ work in the museum archive, the exhibition of 
experimental work “requiring unique environmental conditions at locations outside the 
Museum”, a section devoted to the exhibition of the work of artists without gallery 
representation, specialist technical staff for the installation of work, a museum 
appointed “responsible person to handle any grievances arising from its dealings with 
artists” (Art Workers’ Coalition, 1969). Almost all the demands were related to 
professional grievances, and they were all refused, with the exception of the fifth 
                                            
80 George Maciunas’ Fluxus manifesto was delivered to the audience as part of Ben Patterson’s 
Paper Piece, at the Festum Fluxorum Fluxus, Düsseldorf Art Academy in September 1962 
(Smith, 1998, p. 3). 
81 The AWC was originally formed by Hans Haacke, Tom Lloyd, Willoughby Sharp, Takis, Tsai, 
John Perrault, and Gregory Battcock (Volpato, 2010). 
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demand with which the coalition had some measure of success: one free admission 
day per week was subsequently instituted by museums in the US (Kirwin, 2010, p. 50). 
Why did all these efforts fail to meet their objectives? What are the conditions that 
have relegated the activism of the 1960s and 1970s to obscurity? What are the factors 
that have contributed—since the expansion and experimentation in the art of the 
1960s—to the current state of affairs, where art is ubiquitous but institutionalised, 
exclusive, safe and expensive? 
A number of factors came into play, amongst them were the lack of solidarity amongst 
artists and their incapacity to self-organise;82 the recuperation of anti-art as an 
aesthetic object by the art institution; and a naivety concerning the artists’ ambitions 
and their articulation.83 In the case of institutional critique, critique was transformed 
into stylised activism within the museum, a kind of institutional self-vaccination. 
Although Hans Haacke’s work fulfils a critical role within the museum, it also has the 
aura of a work of art. Haacke’s work is first of all a work of art. The reason for the 
failure of artists’ ambitions throughout the twentieth century is due to the confusion 
amongst artists about what is actually at stake in the affirmation of artistic autonomy.  
THE EXPLODING CINEMA 
…Exploding Cinema is an anarchic long-running screening night where 
they show everything people want to show. […] I’ve shown there, and 
it’s fun if totally intimidating. The audience are supportive, but they’re 
also a little intense […] Exploding Cinema showed super8, expanded 
cinema and experimental things in hilarious locations before it became 
ten-a-penny to have ‘edgy’ screening places. I loved it then and I love it 
now. Possibly because as I spend a lot of time trying to help people 
with their financing and their deals, it’s quite lovely to get immersed in 
filmmakers who don’t care about any of that and get on with it in a 
beautifully wild way (Phillips, 2011) 
In the autumn of 2004, after a long trek from Deptford in a storm that left us 
drenched, we walked through the side door of the Hatcham Social Club in New Cross 
                                            
82 See Lippard, 1970 and Forkert, 2006. 
83 Howard Slater argues that the industrial placement of the APG redefined the artist’s role in 
the context of social research. Although, in contrast to the object-based aestheticism of the art 
institution, the placement comes across as a radical practice, it also reveals a naivety 
concerning the role of the artist in the professional sphere: Latham redefined the artist as an 
“incidental person”, who was subsequently legitimised and redefined as a responsible 
employee, a professional (Slater, 2000). The APG model was later adopted by the Arts Council 
in the form of the “artist in residence” which was “far less radical, because it reverted to a more 
passive model of the artist (sometimes engaged to beautify the surface environment of an 
organisation, rather than to question its mode of operation)” (Mason and Davidson, 2007). 
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Gate, across the courtyard and into the function hall. On the counter was a gutted 
television set with glowing letters that spelled EXPLODING CINEMA. We were greeted 
by the cheerful banter of founding member Jennett Thomas, she stamped our wrists 
and handed us our booklets and raffle tickets. The first impression of Exploding Cinema 
is that of a room animated by countless projected images on the walls, the ceiling and 
the audience. The cigarette smoke catches the flickering beams of light from Super 8 
and 16mm projectors, video projectors, slide projectors, overhead projectors and 
solars. Just above the whirl of the Super 8 projectors and the babble and movement of 
the audience, your attention falls on the main screen. If you want to screen your film 
at Exploding Cinema, your work must compete with this activity to grab the audience. 
At Exploding Cinema, there is no polite reverence; attention is not granted in advance, 
it must be wrested from the audience.  
You don’t go to Exploding Cinema to bow down in front of the screen. 
Film is there as part of other things. It’s part of drinking, it’s part of 
meeting people, part of music and atmosphere. It’s more something 
that comes in through the skin. (Audience member in Exploding 
Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
Unlike the self-consciously mute and ceremonial screenings of contemporary art 
venues, whether one-off screenings in galleries or video loops in little dark rooms in 
museums and biennials where viewing is a private experience, Exploding Cinema is 
irreverent and democratic, a fusion of life and art. 
The films screened at Exploding Cinema are an unpredictable motley collection of 
experimental, documentary, animation, home videos, found footage as well as horror, 
comedy and video art. Exploding Cinema is an ideal context: a plural and inclusive 
space to view films, performances, installations, live music and comedy. It is a space of 
social interaction without divisions, a space of proximity between artists and audience, 
a community that is engaged and egalitarian. Exploding Cinema instantly made sense 
to me.  
Exploding Cinema, “a hybrid fusion of projection, performance and social space” 
emerged in 1991 from the London underground scene (Szczelkun, 2002). Although it 
has generated critical literature,84 Exploding Cinema itself is not well-documented. In 
his PhD titled Exploding Cinema 1992-1999, culture and democracy (2002), former 
                                            
84 At least three current and former members of Exploding Cinema, including Peter Thomas, 
Duncan Reekie and Stefan Szczelkun, have written PhDs, books and articles on Exploding 
Cinema and the British underground and independent film and video sector. 
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member Stefan Szczelkun, who was involved in several other collective projects and 
inclusive groups, describes the collective as “complex and multi-layered, with multiple 
and dynamic authorship”, its discourse “largely informal, oral and unrecorded” 
(Szczelkun, 2002).  
In fact, Exploding Cinema has passively resisted archival documentation of its events 
and the films screened at them. Although one could theoretically compile a definitive 
list of the estimated 2000 films shown at Exploding Cinema screenings in the last 20 
years (Exploding Cinema, 2009/1998), this would require a complete collection of the 
Exploding Cinema programme booklets/fanzines handed to the audience at the door, 
and even then, films sometimes do not make it into the booklet. When Jennet Thomas 
and Paul Tarrago left the collective in 2005, we arranged alternative storage for the 
collective’s equipment but the archive of VHS tapes which they had amassed from 
previous shows filled 3 large bin bags and did not fit into the van. For Szczelkun, there 
are “strong grounds to argue for the need to collect, archive and analyse this body of 
work” (Szczelkun, 2002) and he made efforts to introduce archiving systems into 
Exploding.85 When Paul Tarrago and Stefan Szczelkun submitted Exploding Cinema 
materials (a curated exhibition of flyers, booklets, posters) to the British Artists’ Film 
and Video Study Collection (2000), this set a dreaded precedent for the 
institutionalisation of Exploding Cinema. 
Archival documentation delegates events to history. As a practice, it is associated with 
the anxiety of collecting the legitimising credentials of a professional practice. The 
plurality of Exploding Cinema is not reducible to any summation, theorisation or 
archival practice.  
The resistance that is built into Exploding Cinema against all forms of 
institutionalisation can be found in the collective’s constitution. When unprecedented 
conditions arise, these are evaluated through collective consideration and debate.86 
The Exploding Cinema Collective Agreement (Exploding Cinema, 2005/1991) lays out a 
limited number of restrictions: (a) the collective is committed to open access non-
curated screenings for a diverse popular audience with the ambition “to break down 
the limiting divisions between maker and audience, theory and practise, amateur and 
                                            
85 Szczelkun has compiled a catalogue of films shown at Exploding Cinema 1991-1998, see 
Szczelkun, 2002. 
86 These occasions have included debates on whether or not to accept invitations from Tate 
Modern and the V&A to participate in their programmed events on underground cinema and art 
collectives, in both cases the decision was no. 
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professional”. (b) The collective has an open membership, anyone can join the 
collective by coming to a meeting. Membership is voluntary. (c) The collective is non-
profit-making and does not accept funding under any circumstances. (d) Decisions are 
made collectively, the roles and duties within the collective are allocated on a rotational 
basis to promote skill-sharing and exclude specialisation and hierarchy (Exploding 
Cinema, 2005/1991). 
The collective constitution of Exploding Cinema is by no means ideal. Unlike a team of 
film-makers—where every member has an allocated job-description—a collective is 
often subject to internal strife and antagonism. The informal hierarchies usually 
established in collectives are more difficult to address and challenge than formal ones. 
A tightly-knit group of collaborators often becomes a clique that is impenetrable to 
outsiders. Exploding Cinema has been through many transitions and incarnations. In 
1994, Exploding narrowly escaped dissolution in a schism that warned the members 
about the likelihood of internal threats to its survival.  
Exploding Cinema has two inbuilt mechanisms which prevent the collective form 
settling into a sedimented hierarchy. The first is the open membership principle; the 
influx of new members periodically changes the dynamic of the collective and unsettles 
the balance of power. The second mechanism is its job-rotation and skill-sharing ethos; 
the various jobs (programming, publicity, door-duty, AV desk, transport of equipment 
etc.) are shared and rotated. No job is privileged, there are no leadership roles and 
decisions are made by collective consensus following debates on specific issues. These 
two principles allow participation on the basis for freedom and at the same time they 
prevent individual members from claiming ownership. Individual members of Exploding 
Cinema are therefore also disinterested; they are tolerant of the different opinions, 
aspirations and practices of members within the collective and they do not have 
exclusive professional or material stakes in the activities of the collective. This amounts 
to a recognition that the collective is a plurality that cannot be owned, controlled or 
contained, which also means that we do not need to agree on everything. Exploding 
Cinema does not require absolute loyalty, the members assert their identity in other 
fields and spaces because Exploding Cinema is only one aspect of their identity. 
Returning to Bourdieu’s concept of illusio, the collective belief and investment in the 
values of Exploding Cinema does not flow in one direction. Belief in Exploding Cinema 
is not a matter of “loyalty to the institution” (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 158-159) because the 
members ascribe meaning and value to the stakes of the collective as they effectively 
contribute to their redefinition. At Exploding Cinema there is no hierarchy, apart from 
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the constitutional rules there are no defining structures, yet the collective is held 
together as an institution. It does not limit the freedom of the members, it compounds 
their freedom. Members of the collective pursue their individual agendas collectively, 
these become the agenda of Exploding Cinema. The decision to organise a show or 
participate in a festival is made collectively but it is usually initiated by a single 
member. Exploding does not define or limit the activities of members or the film-
makers. The flexible and open structure of Exploding responds and changes to 
accommodate different venues, new members, shifting priorities and audience 
feedback. Although Exploding Cinema remains committed to the core constitutional 
rules that were established at its inception, the collective agreement is open to 
additions or amendments.  
Can the model of Exploding Cinema be transferred to art institutions? This is not the 
question, artists’ collectives spring about all the time. The problem is rather in their 
ambitions, which also provide the reasons why these collectives and artist-run space 
start up and why they subsequently become absorbed into the mainstream or 
disappear.  
THE LONDON FILM-MAKERS’ CO-OPERATIVE  
Exploding Cinema emerged in the early 1990s when the cultural scene was set for a 
number of artists’ collectives and independent activities. In 1991 a collective called 
Pullit were squatting the CoolTan building on Effra Road in Brixton, where they 
organised large inclusive exhibitions: “it soon became an Underground cultural centre 
housing a gallery, theatre, performance space, rave venue, café and office for the 
Brixton Green Party” and Ken McDonald held his Reel Love Super 8 screenings. Within 
this activity, a group of artists and film-makers came up with the idea to form a 
collective and organise open-access screenings (Reekie, 2007, p. 194): 
From the very beginning we decided to be totally open and democratic: 
anyone could show their work, anyone could join the group, all you had 
to do was come to a meeting and get involved. We drew up a loose 
constitution: the group was to be non-profit-making, all work would be 
voluntary, no wages would be paid, all the money we made would be 
used to run our screenings and to buy equipment to be collectively 
owned. (Reekie, 2007, p. 195) 
Within a year, Exploding Cinema was showing more than twenty films per show to an 
average audience of two hundred. Contacted by a “hidden Underground subculture”, 
the collective expanded. Some filmmakers began to make films specifically for 
Exploding and some began to experiment with film for the first time (Reekie, 2007, p. 
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196). Exploding Cinema members drew from a number of precedents and brought 
diverse influences to the collective. In his book Subversion: the Definitive History of 
Underground Cinema (2007), Duncan Reekie, a founding member of Exploding 
Cinema, traces the history of the underground film and video scene of the 1960s and 
1970s. Amongst these were the London Film-Makers’ Co-op and the New York Cinema 
of Transgression. Stefan Szczelkun and Duncan Reekie cite David Leister’s Kino Club as 
the most significant contemporary influence, amongst “a cluster of sporadic and 
fragmented Underground activities around South London”, including the filmmakers at 
Ken McDonald’s Reel Love screenings, the Strand Super 8 Workshop in Brixton and 
Lepke B’s old-school visuals (Reekie, 2007, p. 194). 
Though there were precedents and lessons to be learned from them, Exploding Cinema 
came together and continues to evolve through extemporization and collective 
interaction: “from material necessity, process, experiment and audience interaction” 
(Reekie, 2007, p. 195). Reekie describes the early days of Exploding Cinema as a 
series of improvisations as elements such as slide shows, performance and live music 
were included as part of the screenings.  
Bored by the sedate and puritan format of established independent film 
and video screenings we began to develop techniques of combination 
and mutation, and to create a hybrid fusion of projection, performance 
and convivial interaction. (Reekie, 2007, p. 195) 
Significantly, most of the work screened at the time was by the members of the 
collective. This had an effect on their production process, they had to speed it up and 
an element of this survives today. The work screened at Exploding is not always 
polished and the screening becomes part of the working process. The work itself is not 
a precious self-contained object but a means as well as an end that changes as it 
interacts with the audience.  
Exploding Cinema creates unpredictable spatial, visual and conceptual contrasts and 
juxtapositions of all kinds. It radically transforms venues and unconventional venues 
offer themselves readily to appropriation and subversion, as did the office space of the 
squatted Reuters Data Centre in Shoreditch (May 2007, Temporary Autonomous Art), 
the Peckham Car Park (August, 2006), the Area 10 warehouse in Peckham (2004, 
2006, 2008), the Blockbuster store in Catford (April 2012, Tapescape). With an 
audience of 2000 people, the legendary Dive-In Show at Brockwell Park Lido in August 
1993 established Exploding Cinema as an underground institution (Szczelkun, 2002). 
There are the visual combinations and juxtapositions of 1980s sci-fi projected onto VHS 
Disney animation superimposed with black and white Super 8 loops and roving solar 
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projections. Then there is the programme of films. Exploding Cinema receives films 
from all over the world, they are either posted, uploaded to a server or handed to the 
collective. We screen all the films that we receive, but we do programme the shows. It 
is well-known that the effect and meaning of any film depends on its position in the 
programme and how it follows from and builds up a narrative together with the other 
films. Everyone brings something to the show, so the outcome is always unpredictable. 
Undoubtedly the singular most influential precedent for Exploding Cinema was the 
London Film-Makers’ Co-operative (LFMC). The early days of the LFMC served as an 
inspiration and set the precedent for Exploding Cinema’s open access constitution, its 
emphasis on distribution, its activism and democratic organisation. The subsequent 
dissolution of the LFMC served as an example of how an independent organisation can 
be captured and destroyed by its growing dependence on financial support. This 
knowledge informed the constitution of Exploding Cinema.  
The LFMC was formed in 1966 with an emphasis on film distribution. The first shows 
were organised in conjunction with the underground newspaper The International 
Times (1966). Within the year, the LFMC organised several open-access screenings 
and a festival, and provided visuals for the UFO Club “alongside lightshows, bands, 
jugglers, performance artists, food stalls and so forth” (Thomas, 2006, pp. 461-462). 
The LFMC was initially a screening and distribution organisation for underground 
cinema, not an artists’ organisation (Reekie, 2005). Between 1969 and 1975, it evolved 
into a voluntary, non-profit, open-access democratic collective committed to the 
alternative production, distribution and exhibition of experimental film (Reekie, 2007, 
p. 5). Indicatively, when the BFI offered to take over the distribution arm of the LFMC, 
they declined on the grounds that it would threaten the LFMC’s independence 
(Mazière, 2003): 
Most of the Institute’s suggestions threaten or impair the independence 
of the Co-op as an organisation run by film makers for film makers, and 
for this reason alone, they must be declined. (LFMC letter to the BFI, 
1970 in Mazière, 2003) 
In the same letter, the LFMC however emphasised that they continued to demand 
funding and recognition for experimental film. Between 1969-1970 the LFMC—with its 
emphasis on distribution—merged with the UK Arts Lab (1967), which was 
spearheaded by David Curtis who ran the cinema and Malcolm Le Grice who focused 
on production and equipment (Mazière, 2003). The merger brought about a transition 
as the film-makers “not only made films, but also built and maintained equipment, and 
organized and promoted shows” (Thomas, 2006, p. 462). In their book Reaching 
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Audiences: Distribution and Promotion of Alternative Moving Image (2011), Julia 
Knight and Peter Thomas describe this as a shift, which “finally brought together 
production, distribution and exhibition in the same organization”: 
…a new activist philosophy was propounded whereby, in an attempt to 
break down the alienating effects of the film industry’s division of 
labour, the filmmaker would operate in and be responsible for all areas 
of film work (Knight and Thomas, 2011, p. 42) 
By the early 1970s, “independent film” defined a broad range of movements and 
interest groups of film-makers and media workshops producing an equally broad range 
of films from documentary to animation and avant-garde film (Reekie, 2007, p. 2). In 
1975, the LFMC received its first major BFI Grant (Mazière, 2003), and from then 
onwards it became increasingly dependent on direct and indirect state patronage 
(Reekie, 2007, p. 5). In his article The Struggle for Funding: Sponsorship, Competition 
and Pacification (2006), Peter Thomas argues that shortly after the LFMC received its 
first subsidies from the BFI and the Arts Council “the urge to omnivorous volunteerism 
which had created and sustained the LFMC visibly subsided”, and eventually this meant 
“the evisceration of that milieu and ethos which had been the source of the films, the 
ideas, and the energy” (Thomas, 2006, p. 466). 
Peter Thomas locates the source of the problem in the conflict between the LFMC and 
the funding agencies concerning “who would control cultural production and provision, 
and what means would best deliver it” (Thomas, 2006, p. 465). Duncan Reekie locates 
the problem in a schism between two different attitudes towards experimental film-
making within the LFMC. The underground film-makers were interested in exhibition 
and distribution. The artists, associated with the Arts Lab, were interested in the 
provision of workshops to make films so they wanted the LFMC to go into production. 
The two factions were also therefore interested in radically different audiences. These 
disagreements, according to Reekie, culminated in the triumph of the artist faction, 
which marked a shift away from counter-cultural activism towards the art institution in 
search for recognition with its ensuing normalisation, academisation, 
professionalisation and bureaucratisation (Reekie, 2005).  
Reekie’s analysis of the conflicting attitudes within the LFMC indicates that for the 
activists, the problem was not a question of production; the open-access ethos 
affirmed that anyone could make films. Production was significant for the artists 
because they approached film-making as a profession which had to be sustainable. 
While for the activists, everything was staked on the imminent revolution (Reekie, 
2005), the artist’s stake was a personal and professional risk. For the artist, art is an 
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investment because there is an expectation of return, regardless of how long it will 
take to arrive (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 66-69, Graw, 2006, p. 139). 
If a state agency funded your work then they would distribute it to 
state funded art centres, cinemas, festivals, art schools and Universities. 
Or maybe your work would be co-funded by T.V. and screened at 2 
a.m., on a Wednesday in a lack lustre short film compilation. Once your 
funded work had been distributed you could use it to apply for more 
funding or to get yourself a teaching post in an Art school or university 
where you could screen other funded work to your students who 
inspired by the work could apply for funding to make their own work. If 
you were really successful you could be appointed to a funding panel in 
one of the agencies or even become a career administrator in the 
funded sector. And the absence in this autonomous circuit was a 
popular audience. (Exploding Cinema, 2009/1998) 
In the industrial, technological and administrative transformations of the 1980s, the 
broad independent film movement lost its sense of identity (Reekie, 2007, p. 2). With 
the guarantee of state funding and distribution through the production arm of the BFI 
and Channel 4—and increasingly private production companies, which were 
commissioned to produce content for the BBC, cable and satellite television—“the 
concept of independence from a commercial mainstream became ever more difficult to 
rationalise” (Reekie, 2007, p. 3): 
To be an independent film/video maker was no longer an act of 
conscious political autonomy or radical opposition; it was to be a free-
lancer in the deregulated media industry. (Reekie, 2007, p. 3) 
In 1991 “the L.F.M.C. was locked into an endless series of feuds, schisms and 
scandals, mostly concerning money, power and the possibility of a move to new 
premises (The Lux); its screenings were sparse and often deserted” (Exploding 
Cinema, 2009/1998). The gradual shift of the LFMC from “underground” to “avant-
garde” culminated in the 1990s when the term “artists’ film and video” was adopted by 
state agencies (Reekie, 2007, p. 3). In his research paper Institutional Support for 
Artists’ Film and Video in England 1966–2003 (2003), Michael Mazière maintains that 
by the mid 1990s the Arts Council and the BFI did not only fund a broad range of 
organisations such as LFMC, London Electronic Arts (LEA, established as London Video 
Arts in 1976) and Umbrella, but they played a leading role in production, distribution 
and exhibition within the mixed-market economy (Mazière, 2003).  
The LUX Centre on Hoxton Square was purpose built in 1997 to house the LFMC and 
the LEA (Reekie, 2007, p. 4). As a condition of the move to the new building, the LFMC 
had to abolish its open access constitution in 1995 and adopt a standard bureaucratic 
structure. It however continued to accept new members as well as membership fees 
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(Reekie, 2007, p. 6). In 1999, the LFMC was forced into a merger with the LEA to form 
the LUX Centre for Film, Video and Digital Arts, (Reekie, 2007, p. 6, note 7). The LUX 
suddenly closed down in 2002, the LUX distribution collection survives and continues to 
be funded by the Arts Council. 
What remained of the avant-garde and the independent film and video 
sector had become a closed circuit of state agencies, desperately 
underfunded workshops and an elite circle of established artists and 
production companies locked into mutual self legitimisation. (Reekie, 
2007, p. 194) 
The fall of the LUX proved damaging for British experimental film and video and the 
LFMC. According to Reekie, it signals the failure of “the most ambitious project in the 
history of British experimental film and video” (Reekie, 2007, p. 7). From a truly 
independent field of experimental film and video in the 1960s and 1970s, the LFMC 
became the “audio/visual element of a broader state project engaged in the integrated 
production distribution and exhibition of a legitimate film/video culture” (Reekie, 2007, 
p. 3): 
What remained of the avant-garde and the independent film and video 
sector had become a closed circuit of state agencies, desperately 
underfunded workshops and an elite circle of established artists and 
production companies locked into mutual self legitimisation. (Reekie, 
2007, p. 194) 
The significance of this in relation to the field of contemporary art is that it reveals how 
in a short time the forces that play a supporting role, eventually control the productive 
field. This process is now so naturalised within the field of art that it is indisputable and 
unchallenged. For Reekie, the question is “how did a radical voluntary collective 
organisation get fatally involved in a commercially incompetent public/private 
partnership” (Reekie, 2007, p. 7) and why, despite the proliferation of academic theory 
and analysis, debates and peer reviewed journals “British radical filmmaking and the 
independent film and video sector had become politically, culturally and industrially 
wretched” (Reekie, 2007, p. 4). Reekie locates the problem in the fact that the LFMC 
did not make any money. On the one hand, this was because they relied on funding.87 
                                            
87 Adorno picks up on the problem of funding: “Currently official culture grants special funds to 
what it mistrustfully, half hoping for failure, calls artistic experimentation, thus neutralizing it. 
Actually, art is now scarcely possible unless it does experiment. The disproportion between 
established culture and the level of productive forces has become blatant: What is internally 
consistent appears to society at large as a bogus promissory note on the future, and art, 
socially dispossessed, is in no way sure that it has any binding force of its own” (Adorno, 
2002/1970, p. 37). 
 157 
On the other, it was because their films were not appropriate for mass consumption; 
the main audiences for the films were art schools and regional film theatres. The Arts 
Council proceeded with the logic of a bureaucratic cultural organisation informed by 
state policy, whereas the system of cultural distribution is capitalist (Reekie, 2005).  
In due course, a similar fate befell the ICA as it became increasingly dependent on 
private funding and even abolished its entrance fees.88 Anthony Davies argues that in 
the 1990s corporations began to interact with the public through their association with 
cultural institutions. The alliance between art and business was sold to artists as an 
alternative to the elitist gallery system (Davies, 2001). This has now become 
conventional with the proliferation of agencies and consultancies that mediate and 
distribute the work of artists and film-makers. 
Inasmuch as any work of art becomes increasingly superfluous under 
the conditions of total reification because it has lost its function of a 
critical reflection of social reality, it approaches a state of either mere 
objecthood or mere aesthetic voluntarism, i.e. decoration (Buchloh, 
2000/1981, p. 132) 
The instrumentalisation of art by museums, corporations and government institutions 
is a well-documented problem within the art world and beyond; art is recast in public 
relations and marketing jargon and government policy. The question rather is why do 
artists continue to participate in and supply these promotional mechanisms? The 
simple answer is that artists will use any opportunity to produce new work, and they 
are not always aware of what they hand over in return. In Free Transit (2005), Pierre 
Bourdieu claims that cultural production exists by virtue of the public funds that are 
channelled via cultural institutions and argues in favour of state funding:  
We cannot leave cultural production to the risks of the marketplace or 
the whims of the wealthy patron. (Bourdieu and Haacke, 2005, p. 69)  
Public funding however comes with no fewer strings attached than private sponsorship 
or the market. Funding bodies have agendas too. Publicly funded art often amounts to 
the functionalisation of art in the name of institutional policies, whatever the particular 
terms of the agenda. If artists accept financial support, they are in effect legitimising 
both the values affirmed in the terms of funding bodies and the functionalisation of 
their work. According to video activist Sue Hall (TVX, Fantasy Factory) arts funding in 
                                            
88 On the funding crisis in the ICA see Charlesworth, 2010.  
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the 1960s was ubiquitous and independent artists accepted public and private funding 
as a matter of fact. In an interview with Peter Thomas, she relates  
…the situation really changed from independent or independents to 
dependent or dependents. The more the arts funders talked about the 
independent sector, the less independent it was […] we allowed 
ourselves to be sucked in by the lure of the money and we didn’t realise 
that our freedom was disappearing, until it was too late. You could say 
that it was naïve, and yes it was naïve, but our attention was 
elsewhere. (Thomas, 2010) 
Reekie argues that by the mid-1990s the movement was already being historicised, 
while the relevance of the concept of independence was under question:  
Nevertheless, although the movement has lost its ideological integrity 
there remains a complex national network of independent film/video 
agencies and institutions which is now so dependent on state funding 
that it can be identified as a sector of the state. It is the ‘independent 
sector’ but it is not independent. (Reekie, 2007, p. 3) 
The logic behind the founding of Exploding Cinema was along the lines “what can we 
do to make sure this does not happen again”. The LFMC were forced to change their 
constitution twice, why did they accept these conditions? It is much easier to judge 
from a distance, but when you are involved in a day-to-day process, the decisions you 
make lead to consequences that are impossible to evaluate. In the case of the LFMC, 
this process was documented. Artists complain about their grievances in private but 
not in public. This fosters the mystification and normalisation of the art world, 
prolonging its function to individualise artists and re-direct their efforts to externally 
determined purposes.  
PARTICIPATION (PROXIMITY/COMMUNITY/CONTEXT) 
The art audience is the worst audience in the world. It’s overly 
educated, it’s conservative, it’s out to criticize, not to understand—and, 
it never has any fun. […] So I refuse to deal with that audience, and I’ll 
play with the street audience. That audience is much more human, and 
their opinion is from the heart. They don’t have any reason to play 
games; there’s nothing gained or lost. (Hammons, 1991, p. 28) 
Guy Debord’s situationist critique of the Society of the Spectacle (1967) is a precursor 
and backdrop for the staging of current debates on participation. The spectacle 
according to Debord mediates the extreme separation that characterises social 
relationships, which are no longer directly experienced but mediated in spectacular 
representation. The spectacle is “pacifying and divisive” (Bishop, 2006, p. 12), it 
reunites the separated “only in their separateness” (Debord, 1967, p. 16). Film-makers 
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from Eisenstein to Debord were concerned about the passivity of the audience. If the 
spectacle delegates social subjects to subjugation and prevents their self-
determination, then the injunction to activity through the construction of situations 
would eventually dissolve the audience function (Bishop, 2006, pp. 12-13). This notion 
of ‘constructed situations’ is adopted by contemporary artists89 in the effort “to produce 
new social relationships and thus new social realities” (Bishop, 2006, p. 13). 
Participatory art usually involves audience participation as a component of the work. 
The artist is the director or manager and the audience is used a vehicle or test subject 
for the artist’s ideas. This type of art is usually exhibited in the form of installation, 
inviting the viewer to enter and participate, thus becoming part of the work. This 
notion of participation is crucial to the work of Rirkrit Tiravanija (Bourriaud, 2002) and 
Thomas Hirshhorn (Bishop, 2004). Frequently, the participatory work of art takes place 
in a remote location and it is the documentation of the event that is exhibited (House 
Project, The Land (1998) by Rirkrit Tiravanija; Supergas (1996) by Superflex). These 
projects are usually hosted within or supported by institutions that additionally promote 
the notion of participation in the form of workshops, family days and school visits. 
Alternatively such projects are commissioned in the form of community art by local 
authorities and government sponsored initiatives to compensate for the lack of social 
cohesion in urban centres.  
Amongst the concerns and motivations that have informed participatory art since the 
1960s, Claire Bishop discerns three categories: activation, collectivity and community. 
The first is the desire to activate the audience, to empower individual subjects with 
experiences of “physical or symbolic participation” that will hopefully enable them to 
exert more control over their own lives. The assumption is that there is a causal 
relationship between engagement with a work of art and individual or collective agency 
(Bishop, 2006, p. 12): 
Sometimes politics are ascribed to such art on the basis of a shaky 
analogy between an open work and an inclusive society, as if a 
desultory form might evoke a democratic community, or a non-
hierarchical installation predict an egalitarian world. (Foster, 2006/2004, 
p. 193) 
The second value prioritised in participatory art is collaboration because it emerges 
from and produces non-hierarchical social models. Bishop suggests that the 
                                            
89 It is also consequently recuperated by institutions, see Bourriaud, 2002, p. 19. 
 160 
relinquishment of authorial control in collaborative production is considered more 
democratic than individual authorship and has the additional “aesthetic benefits of 
greater risk and unpredictability”. But she also points out that these qualities are 
neither particular to participatory art nor are the values associated with them 
particularly justified, concluding that: “As an artistic medium, then, participation is 
arguably no more intrinsically political or oppositional than any other” (Bishop, 2006, p. 
12). 
The third argument follows the Marxist critique of capitalism, it perceives a “crisis in 
community and collective responsibility” and takes issue with the alienating effects of 
capitalism. For Bourriaud the motivation for participatory art is to “fill in the cracks in 
the social bond” (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 36). Bishop articulates this motivation as “a 
restoration of the social bond through a collective elaboration of meaning” (Bishop, 
2006, p. 12). Originating from a position of privilege however, these projects often 
assume a patronising attitude, with the intention to educate and transform. Artists 
“working with live events and people as privileged materials” (Bishop, 2006, p. 13) 
entertain the conceit that they can manipulate “sociopolitical relationships” in the way 
that traditional artists manipulated materials. Wochenklausur aim to bring about 
“recognizable and sensible change” in social relations “just as the Baroque master 
made an effort to realize his plan for a ceiling fresco in a cathedral, regardless of 
whether he personally put his hand to the task or not” (Wochenklausur, 2008). 
Bourriaud expresses a similar view in his ambiguous concept of “relational form” as the 
articulation of political ambitions in relational art (Bourriaud, 2002, pp. 13-14)  
Bishop discerns two different approaches in participatory work, both of which address 
the issue of political commitment in art. On one end of the spectrum is the category of 
“disruptive and interventionist” events prefigured by provocative Dada actions in the 
street. On the other, is the category of “constructive and ameliorative” projects, which 
according to Bishop, harks back to the propagandist Soviet mass spectacles of 
collectivity (Bishop, 2006, p. 11). Francois Matarasso’s 1997 study, Use or Ornament? 
The Social Impact of Participation in the Arts, contributed significantly to the current 
consensus among policy-makers in Britain regarding the value of publicly funded 
participatory arts programmes (Merli, 2004, p. 17). Matarasso claims that the true 
purpose of the arts is “to contribute to a stable, confident and creative society” 
(Matarasso, 1997, p. v), his study advocates the funding of participatory arts 
programmes on the basis that they can produce positive social effects at a low cost: 
In economic terms the case for supporting participatory arts projects 
arises principally from their contribution to social policy objectives. […] 
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participatory arts projects are different, effective and cost very little in 
the context of spending on social goals. They represent an insignificant 
financial risk to public services, but can produce impacts (social and 
economic) out of proportion to their cost. (Matarasso, 1997, p. 76/81) 
Matarasso evaluated the social impact of participation in the arts according to a 
research model that measured the potential changes to individuals and communities 
(Matarasso, 1997, p. vii). In a critical review, Paola Merli sheds doubt on Matarasso’s 
research methodology and the ideology that frames his assumptions. She questions 
Matarasso’s main claim, which advocates the use of participatory arts as a “form of 
governance to promote social cohesion” (Merli, 2004, p. 17). Merli argues that the 
reasoning behind this evaluation is flawed and the research data fails to support the 
conclusions of the study because Matarasso’s method of assessing the social impact of 
the arts has little bearing on “social development and cohesion” (Merli, 2004, p. 18; 
Matarasso, 1997, p. vii). She points out that the questions in the survey do not reflect 
criteria that have the potential to change people’s lives, but “only ‘help’ people to 
accept them” (Merli, 2004, p. 18): 
However, making deprivation more acceptable is a tool to endlessly 
reproduce it. Social deprivation and exclusion arguably can be removed 
only by fighting the structural conditions which cause them. (Merli, 
2004, p. 18) 
Merli argues that amongst the fallacies in Matarasso’s study are the perception that 
promoting inclusion is the way to combat exclusion and that the researchers’ own 
culture and values are suitable standards by which to judge the personal development 
of individuals in the studied communities:   
Such a commitment to changing people's ideas and behaviour does not 
solve problems because it leaves the structural conditions of deprivation 
untouched. (Merli, 2004, p. 19) 
Merli concludes that Matarasso's study is informed by a desire to restore social stability 
and control by means of enculturation. His revival of 1960s socially-engaged art as a 
cheap and innovative social policy objective is therefore “simply a new way of 
achieving the old “civilising” objective of cultural policy” (Merli, 2004, pp. 19-20). 
Unable to allow participation on terms other than its own, the spectacle 
propagates the image of participation and invites everyone to ‘join in’ 
with the happy whole whilst at the same time ensuring that this totality 
is illusory and unattainable: a strong, appealing, but empty image. In 
principle, one can have anything, do anything, be anything, and go 
anywhere, but one cannot choose or define the whole in which these 
abundant choices are made. (Plant, 1992, p. 25) 
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In his 2004 essay The Emancipated Spectator, Ranciere challenges the viewpoint that 
spectatorship is inherently passive, and questions the conventional binary equivalences 
and oppositions on which it is premised (Ranciere, 2007, p. 279, 274). Oppositions 
between “looking/knowing, looking/acting, appearance/reality, activity/ passivity” are 
effectively “a partition of the sensible”, which divides individuals into those with 
capacity and those with incapacity and thus promotes inequality. These “allegories of 
inequality” persist in the relationship between master and student, or performer and 
spectator by delegating the learning process to an “endless verification of inequality”. 
For Ranciere, “Emancipation starts from the opposite principle, the principle of 
equality” (Ranciere, 2007, pp. 275, 277). In other words, equality is based on the 
assumption that we can all respond to a work of art and generate our own 
interpretations and meanings. Ranciere argues that there is no need to suppress the 
work of art in order to suppress the distance between the artist and the audience in 
the misguided search for communitarian immediacy because distance “is the normal 
condition of communication”. He refers to the chorus of Greek tragedy, where the 
chorus represents the incorporation of the community/audience into the play or ritual. 
The chorus is not physically active, but neither is it a passive audience, it can discuss, 
critique and foretell the consequences of the action onstage. The chorus also has 
privileged information that the players onstage do not have (Ranciere, 2007, pp. 276, 
274). Ranciere argues that the spectator is equally able to “contemplate ideas, foresee 
the future, or take a global view of our world”. He argues that the gap that separates 
the audience and the performers is what in fact connects them via the work of art and 
makes communication possible. However, it also “prevents any kind of ‘equal’ or 
‘undistorted’ transmission”. In other words, the work of art is open to interpretation 
and hence “crucial in the process of intellectual emancipation” (Ranciere, 2007, pp. 
277-278).  
OPEN ACCESS 
…the challenge of exploding cinema is “you think its rubbish, show us 
yours” (Matt Lloyd in Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
For Stefan Szczelkun, the key aspects of Exploding Cinema are its open-access 
principle, its independence and financial basis and its group identity (Szczelkun, 2002). 
Like the context of the art institution, the context of Exploding Cinema—the screening 
process, the presentation, the association with other films on the programme or 
projected onto the walls, the audience interaction—sets the work up and frames it. The 
open access programme of films and performances, their juxtaposition and variation, 
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the MC and the Q&A between the audience and the film-makers, the punters chatting 
at the bar or heckling in front of the stage. Exploding cinema is a space of creative 
exchange, where casual encounters take place and collaborations are struck up. 
Szczelkun and Reekie emphasise the importance of the conviviality at Exploding 
Cinema as an extension of the original intentions of the collective to be open and 
inclusive and to challenge the gravitas of the institutional screening. 
Factors that have contributed to Exploding Cinema’s continued existence over the last 
twenty years is the open-access principle and the tolerance of its open membership 
structure. If absolutely anyone can join the collective, then it does not matter what 
views they hold, this is what amounts to Exploding Cinema’s resilience and pluralism. 
Exploding Cinema encourages the audience to make films by eliminating the selection 
process. Through its open membership, it encourages new members to join the 
collective and share the equipment and skills: 
If the audience found the work ‘boring’ or ‘bad’ we encouraged them to 
make better work themselves; if our equipment broke down we asked 
the audience to help us fix it and we discovered that if you created a 
space where anything could happen, and if you included the audience 
into the action, then it didn’t really matter what went wrong. (Reekie, 
2007, pp. 195-196) 
Participation as an unspoken priority is a crucial principle governing the structure of 
Exploding Cinema. Experimentation and participation inform the purpose of the entire 
venture, without preconceived ideas about the outcome. Exploding Cinema is an 
unhierarchical and inclusive context where artists, film-makers and performers can 
contact an audience directly. Film-makers are invited onto the stage after their film is 
screened for questions from the audience. This opens up discussion and debate as 
audience members provide their feedback and film-makers have a chance to talk about 
their work. According to the artist and film-maker Philip Sanderson, Exploding Cinema 
continues to be relevant for a number of reasons, but mainly because it provides film-
makers with access to an audience. He explains that in the 1980s and early 1990s 
there were limited opportunities for film-makers to screen their films. Although in 
theory the LFMC was open access, in practice the screenings were thematic and in 
effect curated. This also limited the film-makers’ chances of access to funding which 
further limited their potential to make new work. Sanderson points out that several 
museums and galleries in London currently organise regular screenings, which are 
inaccessible to most film-makers: “programming in these galleries is tightly controlled 
by a small group of curators answerable to nobody but themselves” (Sanderson, 
2010). 
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So perhaps it was more this frustration at the seeming impossibility of 
getting one’s work shown/seen rather than a lack of audience that was 
the impetus behind the Exploding Cinema. That such a pert up demand 
was there was evident at the early Exploding screenings when both 
unknown film and video makers rubbed shoulders with more 
experienced hands who though able to get their work on at the more 
established venues picked up on the immediacy, atmosphere and the 
excitement of the Exploding Cinema. (Sanderson, 2010) 
Rose-Marie Kivijarvi, who joined the collective in 2010, described Exploding Cinema as 
a “free film school, without the exams and without the tutors. It is sort of a peer-led 
film school” (Kivijarvi in Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011). Film-maker Asif 
Kapadia shares this view: 
For many people who submit their work to be screened at Exploding, 
including me back in the day the shows work almost like filmmaking 
workshops. People screen their work there to learn from the audiences’ 
reaction and from other filmmakers, who at Exploding are of course, 
more often than not, one and the same. (Kapadia in Exploding Cinema, 
BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
The open-access principle of Exploding Cinema is an unconditional refusal of selection. 
Exploding Cinema screens all the films that are submitted, there is no censorship. If 
the audience objects to a violent or sexually explicit film, Exploding Cinema appeals to 
free speech and equally the right of the audience to make up their own minds. In 
January 2010, Exploding Cinema was the subject of a BBC Radio 4 programme, the 
presenter, film director Asif Kapadia posed the question: 
The value to filmmakers in showing their work at Exploding Cinema is 
clear, but what about the assertion the group makes that anyone can 
make a film and should have the opportunity to screen it? As noble as 
Exploding Cinema’s no selection policy sounds, what does it mean for 
an audience? Do they really want to sit through a random sample of 
film with no quality control whatsoever? (Kapadia in Exploding Cinema, 
BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
Ben Slotover, Exploding Cinema member and low-budget film-maker who ran his own 
screening events, the Blunt Club (2002, with Paul Elliot) and Shaolin (1996), replied: 
Well it’s funny because sometimes we show a film and I don’t like it […] 
and I’m complaining of course to someone about it and then they’ll say 
“My god that was the best film of the evening”. So what do I know? We 
let the audience decide. At Exploding it’s a bit like a stock-ticker for 
what’s coming off the end of the production line. These are all new 
films and people are trying things out and saying “look, what if I attach 
a camera to a dog” or something. And they make something and maybe 
it’s rubbish but the main thing is it has been made and it is like a snap-
shot of films that people are making right now and right here and 
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everyone is watching all of them, unless they walk out during one of 
the rubbish ones. (Slotover in Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
The concept of “quality control” or curatorial selection is at best a subjective judgment 
and at worst it is censorship, cultural exclusion and political enculturation. Essentially it 
stands for and carries out the function of institutional legitimation. Curatorial selection 
prioritises the expert’s taste over the audience’s reception of the work, patronising and 
disempowering both the audience and the artist. In the most obvious sense, art is 
“served up” to the audience as fait accompli. Selection is carried out as a service by 
institutions on the presumption that a small proportion of cultural products need to be 
differentiated from the mediocre totality of what is produced at any time. But most 
low-budget amateur films screened at Exploding Cinema are better than funded 
productions and this is something the audience responds to. Selection is both 
subjective and largely unsubstantiated, based as it is on subjective criteria and 
expressed in institutional terminology. In fact, we see that the same artists are shuffled 
and re-shuffled in exhibitions worldwide. No sooner does an artist appear on the scene 
in New York before we encounter the same artist in London, Berlin, Hong Kong and so 
forth. This outcome betrays much about the laziness and the lack of imagination that 
characterises the function of curating. Legitimisation provides artists with exhibition 
venues, funding and crucially, an audience, which encourages artists to produce more 
work. It also opens up more opportunities, either officially through internal routes, or 
unofficially via curators and other institutional figures who haunt the exhibition circuit. 
Within this circular process, artists continuously improve and expand their practice. 
Without the initial legitimisation, artists are likely to spend their entire lifetime in 
obscurity. The audience is left out of the process altogether, they don’t presume to 
understand or have the capacity to evaluate art because they have already been told 
that this is the province of experts.  
Exploding Cinema provides a platform for the circulation of films, performances, 
installations etc without distinctions between media and genres, professionals and 
amateurs or political versus aesthetic intentions. This empowers the artists who are 
provided with access to an audience unconditionally, it also empowers the audience 
members who bring their own subjective judgement to bear and provide feedback 
directly to the artist. Exploding Cinema hosts regular shows in pubs (the Hatcham 
Social Club in New Cross 2000-06, the Half Moon in Herne Hill 2006-09, the Cross 
Kings in Kings Cross 2009-10) where many people in the audience are local punters 
out for a drink on Friday night. The diverse and egalitarian environment of Exploding 
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Cinema is probably very close to what the avant-garde artists had in mind when they 
conceived of the ambition to fuse art and life.  
Anyone who has been to art school or film school was involved in a collaborative 
creative learning environment. In art school, we learn to look at art and to talk about 
art when it is half-formed, participating in its emergence. The work of art is constantly 
emerging through its reception, revision and re-contextualisation. Bourdieu does not 
hide his frustration when he speaks of the enduring myth of the individual creator or 
genius. This myth serves to conceal the levels of collaboration functioning to create the 
work of art. Art is the product of a collective effort between artists, actors, technicians, 
educators, agents, critics, theorists and audience (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 34-35). Works 
of art emerge through a process which includes the exchange of feedback; a 
collaborative aspect of art practice that is never acknowledged. At Exploding Cinema, 
this process is public and part of the reception of the work, it includes and empowers 
the audience. The contemporary art world elevates the work of a fraction of practicing 
artist to universal importance. Of course, most of this work merits our attention. 
However, it also disempowers us and removes us from first-hand experience of the 
work and its context. Art institutions, curators and galleries mediate jealously between 
the artist and the audience by selecting, framing and contextualising the work. These 
decisions are essentially made beforehand by legitimizing and instituting the work at its 
inception, in project rooms and commissions, residencies and fellowships.  
In his essay Conversation Pieces: The Role of Dialogue in Socially-Engaged Art (2005), 
Grant Kester articulates a concept of art as a dialogical encounter that promotes 
conversation. Considering the practice of artists and art collectives such as Suzanne 
Lacy, Wochenklausur and Temporary Services, Kester regards artist and audience as 
equals. The collaborative activity between artists extends to the audience’s encounter 
with the work. Addressing the problem of evaluation in such work, Kester points out 
that enlightenment philosophy “rejected the idea of an aesthetic consensus achieved 
through actual dialogue with other subjects because it would fail to provide a 
sufficiently ‘objective’ standard of judgment or communicability” (Kester, 2005, p. 81). 
It follows that if we cannot judge art according to objective and universal criteria, then 
we need experts to make decisions on what counts as “good” art and is therefore 
appropriate for public display. But the claim for the universality of aesthetic criteria 
collapses if we consider that the apprehension of a work of art is dependent on the 
audience and their perceptions or beliefs. Kester argues that a dialogical aesthetic is 
consensual, local, provisional and collective, more specifically it is: 
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…based on the generation of a local consensual knowledge that is only 
provisionally binding and that is grounded precisely at the level of 
collective interaction (Kester, 2005, p. 82)90  
The idea of consensus is potentially volatile because it transfers power to the 
individual. Consensus plays a crucial role and in the public reception of art, without this 
consensual judgement, art becomes subject to the criteria of authority and the 
monopoly of the definition of art. We establish aesthetic sensibilities and values 
collectively in socially and historically determined contexts, our perceptions and values 
are contingent and therefore relative.  
YOUTUBE AND THE CULTURE INDUSTRY 
Now that it is possible for anyone to show pretty much any film online 
via video sharing websites like YouTube and Vimeo what does that 
mean for a group like Exploding Cinema, does it still have a place? 
(Kapadia in Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
New digital technologies have made the means of production more accessible, 
breaking down the distinctions between professionals and amateurs. The internet 
provides a publishing platform for everyone. It has been suggested that the advent of 
YouTube has eclipsed the need for collectives like the Exploding Cinema. Audience 
figures at Exploding Cinema were at a low when I joined in 2005. The following two to 
three years saw them drop even further and the three shows we had at Hoxton Hall, 
east London in 2006 drew a very small and timid audience. Things picked up when we 
returned to South London in 2007 for a series of regular and one-off shows. Since 
2009, when we moved to regular venues in King’s Cross and east London the audience 
numbers have increased remarkably.  
We did at one point think that the whole YouTube phenomenon was 
going to render redundant the likes of Exploding Cinema but it 
absolutely hasn’t. In some ways it has made it all the more necessary 
because people are getting all of their culture sitting in front of their 
screens in their bedrooms and people really do want something else. 
(Jennett Thomas in Exploding Cinema, BBC Radio 4, 2011) 
The availability of film-making technologies to a wider public has increased the need 
for spaces like Exploding Cinema, with its inherently popular structure. This is also 
evident in the proliferation of profit-oriented enterprises such as Secret Cinema and 
                                            
90 This also implies the apparently radical concept—which is never affirmed—that every work of 
art can and does establish the criteria for its judgment or communicability on it own terms. In 
other words, because of their singularity, works of art cannot be judged by universal criteria.  
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consulting agencies such as Artprojx, which organise film screenings. YouTube is not 
an alternative for Exploding Cinema, it is an immense random database with the 
potential to replace traditional promotional media, but not traditional screening venues, 
which are social spaces. Rather than a space of exchange, YouTube is a space where 
videos can be showcased, notably as a springboard to the media industry.91 The 
popularity of “user-generated” content available on sites like YouTube and Facebook 
attracts advertising.92 These companies generate revenue without having to produce 
any content. Corporations take advantage of “consumer-generated content” and create 
links to their products and services, taking advantage of the viral transmission of data 
on the internet.93  
The media and cultural industries control of the terms of cultural production, taking 
advantage of the social and aesthetic value of cultural products. Works of art, films, 
theatrical performances and graphic novels provide entertainment, they have a 
pedagogical function, they help us to create meaning for ourselves, they enable 
understanding and communication, they teach us about other people’s experience, 
they present us with different ways of seeing and thinking and their representations 
inscribe themselves in our sense of identity. 
INDEPENDENCE OR AUTONOMY  
With the money we began to make on the door we were able to buy 
our own projection and sound equipment and become self-sufficient 
without state intervention or funding of any kind. (Reekie, 2007, p. 196) 
Artists are engaged in a relentless struggle for recognition; they compete with each 
other for this recognition, indicated by exhibitions, reviews, awards, grants, 
                                            
91 Examples include Ataque de Pánico! (2009) by Uruguayan filmmaker Fede Alvarez: “I 
uploaded [Ataque de Pánico!] on a Thursday and on Monday my inbox was totally full of e-
mails from Hollywood studios” (Anonymous, 2011). Video of Ataque de Pánico! available at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKQUZPqDZb0>.  
Nick Haley’s television commercial for the iPod Touch (2007), demonstrates that the “idea that 
you do not have to be a professional to create a good commercial is becoming widespread, in a 
trend known as consumer-generated content” (Elliott, Stuart (2007). Student’s Ad Gets a 
Remake, and Makes the Big Time. New York Times, Oct 26, 2007. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/business/media/26appleweb.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adx
nnlx=1296241383-CD0nFR/Rg8NCBZAdyNhXWQ>). The advert is available at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dadPWhEhVk>. 
92 On the potential traffic generated by viral video clips and its optimisation see the 
MarketingExperiments website <http://www.marketingexperiments.com/improving-website-
conversion/viral-video-clips-targeted-traffic.html>. 
93 On the re-direction of YouTube’s focus from amateur videos to corporate broadcasts, see 
Hudson, 2011.  
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commissions and other forms of institutional legitimisation. A common anxiety amongst 
artists is the difficulty of showing work, many artists profess that they collaborate or 
curate exhibitions just for the chance to exhibit their work. It is precisely this difficulty 
that constitutes the structure of the art world: an artist must have some form of 
consecration in order to exhibit and to produce new work. In fact, the production of 
new work has become almost entirely dependent on an artist’s consistent exposure 
and recognition within the art world: 
Unfunded experimental filmmakers were effectively excluded from all 
the established routes to distribution and exhibition, and those who did 
not desist were forced to spend their time and energy competing 
against each other for funding from agencies who had become so 
disengaged from economic and public accountability that they were 
both the critics and the audience of their own product. By creating a 
vertical state monopoly the independent sector had at last become truly 
autonomous. What got funded was good, what was good got funded 
and what did not get funded remained invisible. (Reekie, 2007, p. 194) 
Artists are resigned to this state of affairs as though it were a form of natural selection. 
If artists refused to enter into unequal and compromising relationships, the art world 
would become transformed. Lucy Lippard’s article The Art Workers’ Coalition: not a 
history (1970) is an impassioned account of the early days of the AWC. Lippard 
describes a moment of turmoil in the art world, when artists were called to stand up to 
museums and their trustees, and museums were called to answer to the artists’ 
grievances. A battlefront emerged in the New York art scene; Lippard confronted the 
artists and critics who remained silent, those who wavered and proffered excuses and 
those who condemned the AWC. The recurring theme in Lippard’s text is the artist’s 
status: “if he measures his success against his compromises, he is asking for a 
downer” (Lippard, 1970, p. 174). Significantly, the AWC was accused of the 
“politicisation” of art, although it was essentially a political organisation—a union—and 
offered no opinions on aesthetic matters (Lippard, 1970, p. 174). However, the barriers 
that the artists failed to break down were aesthetic:  
…if aesthetic differences are a barrier even to a successful artist’s 
understanding or working with equally successful colleagues, as artists 
for artists’ rights, maybe there’s no ballgame. Maybe artists will have 
the unique distinction of being the only vocation in the world that can’t 
get together long enough to assure their colleagues of not suffering 
from their mistakes. (Lippard, 1970, p. 174) 
The airing of complaints from the assembled artists, film-makers, architects and critics 
at the AWC Open Hearing (1969) at the School of Visual Arts was a “picture of 
frustrated violence”. This surprised no one but the parties it was aimed at because “art 
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world complaints are made loudly but in the relative privacy of studios and barely in 
public” (Lippard, 1970, p. 171). Amongst the many speakers at the Open Hearing, Carl 
Andre, Robert Barry, Gregory Battock and Seth Siegelaub expressed radical positions. 
Carl Andre expressed the most comprehensive polemic of all.94  
The solution to the artist’s problems is not getting rid of the turnstiles at 
the Museum of Modern Art, but in getting rid of the art world. This the 
artists can do by trusting one-another and forming a true community of 
artists. (Andre, 1969, p. 30) 
He argued that artists must reject the institution of art entirely and withdraw from 
public exhibitions, cooperation with museums95 and commercial representation to 
create an alternative and democratic sphere where artists would have more control 
over their work (Andre, 1969, p. 30).  
No more “scene.” No Vogue, Time, Life, Newsweek, interviews. Artists 
who permit themselves to be used this way are not in the true 
community of artists, who are universally hostile to such public 
humiliation. (Andre, 1969, p. 30) 
Robert Barry urged the artists to abandon the museum. He questioned the movement’s 
protest against the Museum of Modern Art. Acknowledging the museum’s influence, he 
argued that the museum does not reflect the values of art although it appears under 
arts’ guise. 
Why bother with the Museum of Modern Art? Why not work outside it 
and leave it to those who want it. If it doesn't serve us, why not let it 
be. […] The spirit of the museum and the spirit of art are two totally 
different conceptions. The Museum is a huge artistically impotent 
superstructure of something other than art, but with great influence. 
Under the guise of art, and without art's spirit it is even opposed to the 
true art spirit. And most of all it is unfortunately mistaken for the actual 
reality of art. (Barry, 1969, p. 69) 
Carl Andre and Robert Barry urged the movement to completely abandon the 
institution in favour of a community of artists that would establish direct contact with 
the public. Although, as Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen points out, “the identity of the artist as 
artist was never really in question”, the artists were not in favour of abandoning the art 
                                            
94 According to Philip Leider, editor of Artforum at that time, it was in fact he who wrote Andre’s 
speech to the Open Hearing (Newman, 2000, pp. 267-268).  
95 “They make ‘shows’, get everything wrong. ‘Will you lend a painting?’ ‘No.’ So they will 
borrow a painting from a person to whom an artist has sold a painting. Fine. At least the proper 
relations between artist and museum have been established, the proper distance between what 
museums do and what artists do is maintained” (Andre, 1969, p. 30). 
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institution and the “relative autonomy of art” (Bolt Rasmussen, 2009, pp. 37, 45). The 
institution however is not the custodian of the autonomy of art; the autonomy of art is 
up to each individual artist. The institution accumulates artists’ commitment to 
autonomy as a form of capital. If artists abandoned the institution they would not be 
compromising their autonomy, on the contrary, they would be asserting it. It was not 
the autonomy of art that they did not want abandon, it was the prestige of the 
institution: 
…the majority of the art world is afraid to take its bullshit out of the 
bars and into the streets, afraid of losing the toehold it got last year on 
the next ring of the ladder, but at the same time afraid that the ladder 
will have been burned, toppled, or blown sky high just as they get near 
the top (and there’s no fury like that of a man who hates himself for 
compromising… (Lippard, 1970, p. 174) 
What prevents artists from working collaboratively and in their own interests? There is 
a set of restrictions associated with the special aura of the artist, and these increase 
with the artist’s success. The more an artist becomes dependent on the institution, the 
dealer, the collector, the more the artist has stakes in those relationships. The ideas 
promoted by Andre and Barry threatened to break down the invisible network of 
power-relationships that keeps the machinery of the art world in motion. Artists are 
trapped within their guarded autonomy and their dependence on the institution. 
Individualist and mistrustful of other artists they invest all their trust in the institution 
and back themselves into situations where they have no leverage and essentially no 
freedom or independence. The failure of the AWC to achieve its objectives proved that 
if artists do have any power in the art field they are afraid to show it. 
Anton Vidokle’s E-flux projects remind us of John Searle’s argument that the purpose 
of institutions is to create new forms of power relationships. E-flux is establishing itself 
as a powerful institution in the art world. Responding to the need for a distribution 
system for information in the “international art scene” (Lind, 2009, p. 22), e-flux 
disseminates information in the form of press releases from museums, galleries and 
organisations all over the world. Maria Lind regards e-flux as “one of the simplest, yet 
most influential contributions to the art infrastructure in recent decades”, although she 
acknowledges that e-flux “news digest” announcements are not inclusive of the activity 
in the field because they are essentially paid advertisements (Lind, 2009, p. 23). E-flux 
has a popular base of 50,000 subscribers, which it contacts daily via its 
announcements, it also publishes a journal and it organises artists’ projects such as E-
flux Video Rental (2004), Martha Rosler Library (2005), United Nations plaza (2006-
07), Time/Bank (2009), and recently applied to manage the .art domain (E-flux, 2012).  
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In his article, Art without Artists? (2010), Anton Vidokle promotes the idea that artists 
need to aspire to sovereignty in their practice. For Vidokle, this implies that in addition 
to producing art, an artist must produce the conditions that enable this production, i.e. 
“its channels of circulation”. Vidokle argues that these conditions are sometimes so 
critical to the work that they become the work (Vidokle, 2010). In fact, Vidokle does 
not think of e-flux as an artist-run space, but as “a long-term artists’ project” (Obrist, 
Vidokle and Aranda, 2007, p. 18).  
Vidokle’s New York Conversations (2010)96 was filmed in black and white on 16mm in a 
Chinatown storefront, documenting three days of conversations between artists, critics, 
curators and the public while Rirkrit Tiravanija cooked and served food. The film is a 
record of these conversations, displayed as text over black and white high contrast film 
with a soundtrack. The conversations drift through a range of topics albeit with a focus 
on working conditions in the art world and so-called “precarious” labour, with a 
meditation on the difference between material and immaterial labour. They compare 
themselves to immigrant workers who become displaced in order to find work, but 
neglect to mention the important differences between cultural and economic 
immigrants.97 They discuss the possibilities for non-alienated life, the feasibility of 
artistic freedom, and whether the particular event itself was in fact an artwork.  
An advocate of autonomy, Vidokle prefers Boris Groys’ term “sovereignty” and believes 
that artists can negotiate their dependence on the institution on a case-by-case basis 
(Vidokle, 2010). This is as much as artists can normally do. Although our dependence 
and complicity is precisely in every decision we make, we still need a set of criteria by 
which to judge each case, because concession and compromise lies in the 
unanticipated consequences of every decision.  
Maria Lind describes E-flux as “institution building” which she thinks of as a “less 
direct” phase of institutional critique (Lind, 2009, p. 28). In particular, it is the “self-
appointed responsibility for setting up an organisation that involves a considerable 
number of people and [that] give it some sense of stability and continuity”. Lind adds 
                                            
96 New York Conversations (2010). 16mm film transfer to DV, 66min, e-flux films. 
Commissioned by the Brussels-based art journal A Prior, this film documents a three-day event 
organised by Rirkrit Tiravanija, Nico Dockx, and Anton Vidokle, with the participation of Liam 
Gillick, Jorg Heiser, Miwon Kwon, Monika Szewczyk, Jan Verwoert, Lawrence Weiner and others.  
97 Nomadic artists and curators make conscious choices and calculated risks when they re-
locate in order to take up a temporary post. The plight of immigrant workers involves 
uncertainty and exploitation; many immigrants are indentured labourers, while illegal 
immigrants are entirely at the mercy of slave-traders and corrupt officials.  
 173 
that institution building involves some sort of relation to “a local context and a specific 
community, be it geographical, social, cultural, or other” (Lind, 2009, p. 25). But how 
is the international art scene a “local community”? And who does E-flux as an 
institution serve? As Monika Szewczyk observes, E-flux is essentially a network that 
provides a distribution service for other institutions (“to publish their plans and 
propaganda”) (Szewczyk, 2009. p. 58). This tends “to make the existing institutions 
matter more, since e-flux’s increasingly broad channels allow them to reach a broad 
audience, one that is encouraged to correspond and converse” (Szewczyk, 2009. pp. 
57-58). All the better because E-flux also publishes a critical journal. Rather than being 
a controversial “institution of its own legitimation” (Szewczyk, 2009. p. 61), E-flux is an 
institution for the legitimation of other institutions, and it receives legitimation in 
exchange, in the same currency. 
Maria Lind and Monika Szewczyk point out that the many activities of e-flux have been 
possible because E-flux is a business, they also observe that “critical” sectors of the art 
world have discounted E-flux as “too complicit with capitalism” (Lind, 2009, p. 24) and 
that “to call it art, e-flux cannot be profitable, cannot be the institution of its own 
legitimation, cannot produce value in the given culture” (Szewczyk, 2009. p. 61). But 
the financial independence of E-flux is the secret of its success and the source of its 
autonomy from these other institutions, it is not where its complicity lies. Theodor 
Adorno argues that works of art have been commodities all along: 
Pure works of art, which negated the commodity character of society by 
simply following their own inherent laws, were at the same time always 
commodities. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002/1947, p. 127) 
What is the persistent (if hypocritical) disavowal of commercial gains for artists based 
on? Artists need to make a living too. Why is this commonplace fact—together with the 
fact that artists make a lot of money when they make any at all—disavowed and 
obscured? The stubborn pursuit to detach art from its commercial aspect can be traced 
back to conceptual artists’ misguided attempt to resist the fetishization of the art 
object, but it has only succeeded in making the process of ascribing value to art more 
mysterious. The more obscure the value of an object is, the more priceless it becomes. 
Every innovative reflex of resistance to capitalist reification has the potential to become 
its opposite and generate fantastic amounts of capital.  
Adorno argues that autonomous art was a commodity from the moment of its 
inception (Adorno, 2002/1970, p. 239). Even as a negation of the social utility of the 
market, the freedom of art remains essentially bound up with the premise of a 
commodity economy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002/1947, p. 127). Commodification is 
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not resisted by removing the possibility of selling or buying art. The culture of 
commodity logic is fuelled by other types of capital, not just financial capital. Museums 
trade in cultural and symbolic capital. Everyone needs some form of capital in order to 
participate. They can trade prestige, connections, ideas, skills, techniques, knowledge, 
networks, time etc. They can exchange these for other forms of value in the exchange 
network of capitalism. Stewart Martin argues that the commodity form does not limit 
the critical potential of art. On the contrary, “Art functions ideologically here precisely 
by presenting itself as a space that is free from capitalist exchange”. Capitalist 
exchange value is not constituted at the level of objects because it is a measure of 
abstract labour: “It is the commodification of labour that constitutes the value of 
‘objective’ commodities”, not the other way around. For Karl Marx, the commodity form 
reflects capitalist exchange, it does not constitute it. To locate the source of value in 
the commodity would be to make “precisely the error that Marx calls fetishism” 
(Martin, 2007/2006, p. 378): 
If we avoid this fetishism, we are stripped of any delusions that the 
simple affirmation of the social within capitalist societies is critical of 
capitalist exchange; it simply draws attention to the social constitution 
of capitalist exchange, exposing it directly. There is no freedom from 
capitalist exchange here, merely the confrontation with it, face to face. 
(Martin, 2007/2006, pp. 378-379) 
The commodity character of the work of art does not limit its critical potential, and the 
eradication of the materiality of the commodity does not eradicate capitalist exchange, 
as conceptual artists discovered and Siegelaub knew all along. Which brings up the 
question, if commodification does not divest art of its critical potential, then why is it a 
problem? After all, artistic autonomy is so-called because it marked the liberation of 
artists from the oppression and control of patronage. The commodification of art is one 
consequence of this liberation. Why are artists, who otherwise consider the sale of 
their work as a mark of prestige, reluctant to admit that art is a commodity? 
Commodification is the prerequisite for autonomy, just as heteronomy is the 
consequence of patronage. Bourdieu’s analysis of the power struggle between 
autonomy and heteronomy in the field of art leaves no doubt that the art field is 
currently characterised by a very low degree of autonomy. Art institutions are being 
redefined as cultural businesses, their economic structure overhauled to generate 
profits, while sources of funding come increasingly from private corporations. Thus in 
Bourdieu’s terms, the heteronomous principle currently reigns unchallenged and losing 
all autonomy, the artistic field disappears, becoming “subject to the ordinary laws 
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prevailing in the field of power, and more generally in the economic field” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 38). 
In her 2009 essay, The Institution of Critique, Hito Steyerl makes timely reappraisal of 
the function of institutions and the “institutions of critique” within them (Steyerl, 2009, 
p. 14). Steyerl points out that cultural institutions were originally established with the 
specific task of legitimising and representing the identities of newly formed nation 
states. Their function was political and they reflected the democratic constitution of the 
nation states founded on the political mandate of the citizens. Museums were therefore 
instituted on similar principles of political participation and representation; they were 
required to represent the idealised public sphere of the state, which was “implicitly a 
national one”. It follows that these institutions were also funded by state taxes: 
“museums had taken on a complex governmental function” (Steyerl, 2009, pp. 15, 14). 
In the nineties, artists practicing institutional critique tried to reassert the public 
identity of the museum, but their protests according to Steyerl fell on deaf ears, 
because in the mean time: 
The bourgoisie had sort of decided that in their view a cultural 
institution was primarily an economic one and as such had to be 
subjected to the laws of the market. The belief that cultural institutions 
ought to provide a representative public sphere broke down with 
Fordism… (Steyerl, 2009, p. 16) 
Steyerl points out that artists’ claims to the public status of the museum (and to public 
funds) are no longer legitimate because it is now sufficient for the state and its 
institutions to represent the public symbolically rather than materially98 (Steyerl, 2009, 
p. 17). The reproduction of national identity and cultural heritage is no longer crucial 
for social cohesion, but it does serve to provide “international selling points in an 
increasingly globalised cultural economy” (Steyerl, 2009, p. 16). 
Thus, in a sense, a process was initiated which is still going on today. 
That is the process of the cultural or symbolic integration of critique into 
the institution or rather on the surface of the institution without any 
material consequences within the institution itself or its organisation. 
(Steyerl, 2009, pp. 16-17) 
Steyerl describes the predicament of cultural institutions within the current political and 
economic circumstances as a challenge to perform “both within a national cultural 
                                            
98 Steyerl cites for example the symbolic integration of minorities in a sphere of social and 
political inequality (Steyerl, 2009, p. 17). 
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sphere and an increasingly globalising market” (Steyerl, 2009, p. 18). She maintains a 
faith that “critical institutions” are crucial and a sense that they are under threat: 
…while critical institutions are being dismantled by neoliberal 
institutional criticism, this produces an ambivalent subject which 
develops multiple strategies for dealing with its dislocation. It is on the 
one side being adapted to the needs of ever more precarious living 
conditions. On the other, there seems to have hardly ever been more 
need for institutions which could cater to the new needs and desires 
that this constituency will create. (Steyerl, 2009, p. 19) 
Exploding Cinema, which celebrated its 20th Birthday in 2011, seems uniquely 
equipped to deal with these circumstances. Self-funded, flexible, nomadic it seeks out 
and adapts to different contexts, as long as we consistently break even there will 
always be another show. Exploding Cinema does not rely on funding or institutional 
validation, it relies on an audience of producers.  
THE USE-VALUE OF ART  
…nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing 
is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as 
labour, and therefore creates no value. (Marx, 1976, p. 131) 
In the first chapter, I argued that Theodor Adorno’s faith in the critical value of 
autonomy is based on its potential to shield art from functional imperatives in a society 
where everything is subjected to functional demands. However, the political, 
ideological and financial instrumentalisation of art by institutions, corporations and 
governing bodies has evacuated this argument because art plays a functional role in 
society.  
Karl Marx argues that in the process of exchange, products of human labour acquire a 
“socially uniform objectivity” or exchange-value, which is distinct from their use-value, 
their “sensuously varied objectivity as articles of utility”, or the particular ways that 
different things are used (Marx, 1976, p. 166). The use-value of a commodity thus 
accounts for its material qualities as distinct from its economic (or social) value. The 
circulation of commodities is a means of carrying out the “appropriation of use-values, 
the satisfaction of wants” (Marx, 1976, p. 253):  
A thing can be useful, and the product of human labour, without being 
a commodity. Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of 
his own labour, creates, indeed, use-values, but not commodities (Marx, 
1976, p. 131) 
Art’s so-called functionlessness is a normative demand, a prescription not a descriptive 
statement because art is useful. Art is valuable because of its use value, not its 
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exchange value. If we cannot use art in our lives then it is superfluous. Adorno states 
that in the subjugation of human desire to capitalist circulation and industrial 
production, freedom is expressed in the satisfaction of needs through use-value 
(Adorno, 1997/1965, p. 16). He argues that the social (purposeful) character and the 
aesthetic (purposeless) value of the work of art are in a dialectical relationship 
(Adorno, 1997/1965, p. 8) because art represents “a contact with things beyond the 
antithesis between use and uselessness” (Adorno, 1997/1965, p. 17). By subjecting 
everything to the law of profit, bourgeois society has debased the concept of 
usefulness, thus for Adorno, autonomous art fulfils a social role by demonstrating that 
only useless objects can conjure the existence of useful ones. Use-value thus contains 
the promise of liberation from the alienation of capitalist production. Even in the midst 
of that alienation, art can potentially assert itself as a negation of exchange-value. 
In Art Incorporated (2004), Julian Stallabrass argues that the autonomy of art was a 
particular reaction against the orthodoxies of its time and avant-garde artists did not 
count on recognition in their lifetime. Autonomy came at a price and this is ultimately 
why Adorno stores so much faith in its critical and emancipatory potential. The 
autonomy of aesthetic judgment inheres in its freedom—its non-prescriptive character. 
Stallabrass argues that artists no longer enjoy this freedom while “sufficient autonomy 
is maintained to identify art as art” (Stallabrass, 2004, p. 200). Although art can 
conjure a utopian and “less instrumental world”, it also serves as an ally to oppression: 
In these circumstances, it is works of evident use that press on the 
contradictions inherent in the system of art, that seek to liberate 
themselves from capital’s servitude. To break with the supplemental 
autonomy of free art is to remove one of the masks of free trade. 
(Stallabrass, 2004, p. 201) 
To privilege the use-value of art is to affirm that art is what we use it for, the use-
value of art is its meaning. Although this leaves the door open to the political and 
commercial instrumentalisation of art, the claim of autonomy has not prevented these 
possibilities either. At the very least, as Stallabrass argues, it would “unmask” the 
conditions of this instrumentalisation. While art with overtly political objectives is 
subject to the criticism of externally determined purposes, the posture of neutrality 
that institutions maintain raises them above any such suspicion. It also raises them 
above any social responsibility. Peter Bürger has already indicated that the condition of 
autonomy can no longer describe the conditions for art. He maintains that the avant-
garde confronts artists with the question of ambition: 
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…with the question of what it is that one does when one produces 
works of art. The necessity of always seeking anew an answer to this 
question […] and of pursuing this search not alongside artistic 
production, but as an integral part of the latter, deeply alters the 
problem of autonomy. (Bürger, 1998, p. 178) 
What are the ambitions for artists today? Can artists only aspire to professional 
ambitions—awards and participation in biennials—as the art establishment would have 
us believe? Walter Benjamin’s essay The Author as Producer was addressed to the 
Paris Institute for the Study of Fascism in 1934. Benjamin states that artists are 
autonomous (whether they realise this or not) only as far as they are free to choose 
which class of interests to serve (Benjamin, 1969, p. 220). He argues that debates 
premised on a generalised concept of art are pointless: if social relations are 
determined by relations of production, art must be considered within its “living social 
context” (Benjamin, 1969, p. 222). To gauge the critical vigour of a work of art it is not 
enough to ask: “What is the attitude of a work to the relations of production of its 
time?” but rather “What is its position in them” (Benjamin, 1969, p. 222). Benjamin 
promotes the politically radical idea that artists must not supply the existing productive 
apparatus without attempting to change it: 
What matters […] is the exemplary character of production, which is 
able first to induce other producers to produce, and second to put an 
improved apparatus at their disposal. And this apparatus is better the 
more consumers it is able to turn into producers—that is, readers or 
spectators into collaborators. (Benjamin, 1969, p. 233) 
Benjamin essentially proposes two related ambitions for artists: he argues that the 
work of art should incite the consumer to become a producer, while at the same time 
making accessible the means and techniques.99 The avant-garde ambition to transform 
society is more urgent than ever, but not by using the same means. We need to 
overcome the identification of ends with means and develop strategies that are 
appropriate in the current context. By flicking through a lifestyle magazine, John 
Berger demonstrates in Ways of Seeing (1972), that collage does not perform anything 
on images that the media do not perform themselves. The clash between sophisticated 
advertising imagery and documentary photographs of war and conflict that Martha 
Rosler documents in her series of photomontages Bringing the War Home/House 
Beautiful (1967-72), already circulates in millions of magazines. For Victor Burgin, 
                                            
99 See for example the zero budget and DIY instructional video DIY Dolly Zooms (Blunt 
Productions, 2009) from the series Zero Budget Filmmaking Tips (2009) by Paul Elliott and 
Exploding Cinema member Ben Slotover.  
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political art is the new orthodoxy but artists do not depart in “content or analysis” from 
what is already familiar to us from the media, he argues that in fact that, what is 
“documented” in these works are the media themselves: “Artists making 
‘documentaries’ usually encounter their subject matter not at first hand but from the 
media”. According to Burgin the media play a crucial role in the “production of 
subjects”, the task for art therefore is to provide a critical alternative (Burgin and 
Gelder, 2010):  
…what is now fundamentally critical to the western societies in which I 
live and work is the progressive colonization of the terrain of languages, 
beliefs and values by mainstream media contents and forms – imposing 
an industrial uniformity upon what may be imagined and said, and 
engendering compliant synchronized subjects of a “democratic” political 
process in which the vote changes nothing. (Burgin and Gelder, 2010) 
In Empire (2001), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that the place for resistance 
is within the structure of capitalism and emancipation can occur only through the 
reconfiguration of that structure “with no possibility of any even utopian outside” 
(Hardt and Negri, 2001, p. 65). This is because the dominance of language, 
communication and immaterial labour blurs the traditional distinctions between 
productive forces and relations of production, thus: 
Social subjects are at the same time producers and products of this 
unitary machine. In this new historical formation it is thus no longer 
possible to identify a sign, a subject, a value, or a practice that is 
‘outside’. (Hardt and Negri, 2001, p. 385) 
The consumers are also the producers, and artists are also caught within this cycle. 
Artists can play a crucial political role by disseminating encounters of alterity through 
their work, but also by materialising that alterity and showing that a different way of 
life is possible, even within the oppressive systems of capitalism. They can do this by 
sustaining a practice that is not cynically complacent and unproblematically complicit. 
Because the instrumentalisation of art would not be possible without the complicity of 
artists.  
A DIVERSE NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS 
What is compelling in Adorno’s conception of the illusory autonomy of art in the 
concealment of its social character and terms of production, is that it does not presume 
a space outside of society. Adorno’s autonomous art thesis constructs the possibility of 
creating within society the space of the “outside”. Adorno claims that whether the work 
of art is political and socially engaged or not this has no impact on the autonomy of 
the work of art because the concept of autonomy is always relative and does not 
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preclude heteronomy. Today however, the notion of autonomy has been usurped by 
the institutions which define the field of “international contemporary art”, and 
predetermine its activity. Equally then, the concept of autonomy is the product of a 
culture which defines within itself a territory where its rules do not count.100  
Although art may be a positive model against the dehumanisation of labour and the 
instrumentalisation of everything in society, it also masks the instrumentalisation of 
this resistance. Critical art plays a strategic role in the legitimisation of the critical 
profile of the art institution. If art is the critical alternative to society as Bürger, 
Marcuse, Adorno and Ranciere believe, then it cannot function within its own internal 
politics like the rest of society. Adorno and Habermas argue that art is part of society 
and cannot be immune to its failings and the means by which it functions. This may 
sound like an ethical problem, but it is a political problem. It is the confrontation of one 
type of politics with another, a politics of collectivism, collaboration, inclusion and 
equality against a politics of competition, adversity, territorialism and distinction.  
The emergence of the aesthetic as a theoretical category is closely bound to the rise of 
the bourgeoisie and capitalist production, and at the same time, to the material 
process through which cultural production became separated from the political sphere 
and the social functions that it traditionally served (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9). Eagleton 
suggests that, from a radical political viewpoint, the notion of autonomy within 
aesthetic discourse is disabling. Art is thereby “conveniently sequestered from all other 
social practices, to become an isolated enclave within which the dominant social order 
can find an idealized refuge from its own actual values of competitiveness, exploitation 
and material possessiveness”. He adds, that the “entirely self-regulating and self-
determining” notion of autonomy “provides the middle class with just the ideological 
model of subjectivity it requires for its material operations” (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9). 
However, Eagleton points out that the  
…concept of autonomy is radically double-edged: if on the one hand it 
provides a central constituent of bourgeois ideology, it also marks an 
emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers and 
capacities which becomes, in the work of Karl Marx and others, the 
anthropological foundation of a revolutionary opposition to bourgeois 
utility. (Eagleton, 1990, p. 9) 
                                            
100 The idea of “context as content” (O’Doherty, 1976) challenges the notion of the autonomy of 
art, because if one must account for the context of the work, this puts a condition on the work 
that subtracts from its conception as an ideal unity. The demand that artists contextualize their 
practice also negates their autonomy.  
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Liam Gillick shares Eagleton’s view; together with a belief in modernism’s incomplete 
legacy of autonomy: “an almost Adorno-like belief that you should continue to produce 
a form of heightened art, a kind of melancholic art of refusal and abstraction” (Slyce, 
2009, p. 6). In a recent interview with John Slyce, Gillick expressed an affiliation with 
the notion of autonomy as the precondition of the “potential of art as an exception 
within the culture” (Slyce, 2009, p. 4). The notion of autonomy in art might offer a 
measure of freedom, empowering artists to create subjective and insular systems of 
signification, nevertheless, this is where “affirmative culture” is at its most successful, it 
objectifies and commodifies the artist’s subjectivity, so the intended critique fails.  
For Castoriadis a “politics of autonomy” would have the task of enabling “the 
collectivity to create the institutions that, when internalized by the individuals, will not 
limit but rather enlarge their capacity for becoming autonomous” (Castoriadis, 1996, p. 
134). The object of autonomy is thus an autonomous society:  
I call autonomous a society that not only knows explicitly that it has 
created its own laws but has instituted itself so as to free its radical 
imaginary and enable itself to alter its institutions through collective, 
self-reflective, and deliberate activity. (Castoriadis, 1996, p. 132) 
It is not institutions we need, just like we do not need ideologies, slogans or leaders. 
We need self-sufficient communities, actual as well as virtual. As long as artists and 
their institutions continue to aspire to the recognition of the museum by subscribing to 
its values they will always be caught within heteronomously defined or alienated 
conditions. Rather than pursue inclusion with the art historical canon, artists can write 
and disseminate their own histories and compile their own archives. Referring to the 
example of the circulation of pirated Xerox editions of Horkheimer, Benjamin and 
Feuerbach which were out of print in the 1960s and early 1970s, Susan Buck-Morss 
argues that “spontaneous cultural dissemination is proof that there can be readers of 
theory and receptions of art without marketing departments”. Buck-Morss sees within 
the current potential for circulation via the media “nothing less than a grass-roots, 
globally extended, multiply articulated, radically cosmopolitan and critical counter-
culture” (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 72): 
In it, artists would relinquish their impotent power as residents of the 
gated community of the artworld in return for social relevance, relating 
to publics not as their spokespersons, not as ethnographers or 
advocates who represent to a global artworld the underprivileged and 
excluded, but as part of a critically creative global context, where 
aesthetic experience manages to escape not only the artworld, but all 
“worlds” as disciplinary regimes. (Buck-Morss, 2003, pp. 72-73)  
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But to do this artists must detach themselves from reliance on the legitimising 
structure of the art world. This means that they must also readdress the discourse of 
art and the values that it implicitly promotes and reclaim the complex and 
contradictory histories of art and of artists from their recuperation. It means that they 
have to devise means of independent production, to contact their own audiences and 
to collaborate with other artists in these goals. Bourdieu called for an “Internationale of 
intellectuals” to defend the autonomy of the means of cultural production: 
…it is especially urgent today that intellectuals mobilize and create a 
veritable Internationale of intellectuals committed to defending the 
autonomy of the universes of cultural production or, to parody a 
language now out of fashion, the ownership by cultural producers of 
their instruments of production and circulation (and hence of evaluation 
and consecration). (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 344)  
Bourdieu says that we shouldn’t be surprised to hear that “this autonomy is very 
severely threatened or, more precisely, that a threat of a totally new sort today hangs 
over its functioning” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 344). The various facets of this threat have 
been analysed in this thesis, but it is far from inclusive. Bourdieu, Siegelaub, Osborne, 
Steyerl and others identify this threat in the transition of art institutions from the 
control of the public sphere to corporate and neoliberal agendas: 
The threats to autonomy result from the increasingly greater 
interpenetration between the world of art and the world of money. I am 
thinking of new forms of sponsorship, of new alliances being 
established between certain economic enterprises (often the most 
modernizing, as in Germany, with Daimler-Benz and the banks) and 
cultural producers; I am thinking, too, of the more and more frequent 
recourse of university research to sponsorship… (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 
344) 
However, the function of art institutions as public bodies is no less instrumental and 
ideological. Autonomy is contingent on financial independence and self-determination. 
Artists cannot assume positions of political neutrality beyond any form of power 
struggle. Exploding Cinema is a space for consensus and disagreement, it is both a 
critique and a way of life. It is a model of the kind of society we want. Society is a web 
of relationships, networks of power and conflicting interests that do not change from 
one moment to the next without great upheaval and instability. Sedimented structures, 
conventional practices and power relationships change over time. We can contribute to 
the type of society we want by making changes on the local level in which we operate. 
By building models of the type of society we want, in artist-run spaces, collective 
projects and local communities we can make improvements in the present and these 
will function more effectively to undermine the status quo than any negative critique. 
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There is necessarily a plurality of arts, and however we may imagine 
the ways in which the arts might intersect there is no imaginable way of 
totalizing this plurality. (Badiou, 2003) 
It is possible at any time to have plural, multiple definitions of art and to regard them 
as simultaneously valid. One form of art does not invalidate another and the pluralism 
of art does not presuppose a distinct audience for each form of art.  
Dave Beech proposes that to contest the cultural field, independent or artist-run 
spaces need a “stronger brand of independence” (Beech, 2006, p. 10). This can be 
accomplished by pursuing pragmatic short-term goals with self-sufficient means. For 
artists this means establishing sustainable practices and independent networks. This 
should not be confused with a desire to supplant the mainstream, but to bypass it 
entirely with a terrain of diverse approaches, small organisations and institutions.  
Exploding Cinema inspired the spontaneous emergence of an underground film scene 
in the mid-1990s, in London and throughout the UK and Europe. Although they were 
not all collectives or open-access, they all screened short low-budget films and 
incorporated live music, cabaret installation or performance into their shows. London-
based clubs included The Halloween Society, Films That Make You Go Hmmmmm, 
Kinokulture, Omsk, My Eyes My Eyes, Cinergy, KingKey Movies (Vito Roco), Shaolin, 
Renegade Arts, Peeping Toms, Kinodisobey, Uncut, Scooter and many others. 
Beginning in 1996, they collaborated to organise the Volcano Film Festival (1997-1999) 
which turned out to be a major event with groups from Europe and New York 
(Szczelkun, 1998; Szczelkun, 2002; Ilson, 2005).  
Since the late 2000s, a number of film clubs host regular screenings in pubs 
throughout London. However, it is lamentable that with the exception of groups like 
Kino London and Another Roadside Attraction, most of these clubs screen feature 
films: Cinema Colorama, Deptford Film Club, The Duke Mitchell Film Club, Midnight 
Movies, Full Unemployment Cinema, Aorta Burst Film Club and others. 
As discussed in the first chapter, Sadie Plant raises a pertinent question about the 
difference and the connection between forms of critique and ways of life (Plant, 1992, 
p. 89-90). A way of life can also be a form of critique. We can perform critique by 
practicing alternatives. But any alternative is an alternative relationship and difficult to 
establish. Artists establish these relationships across different fields. Artists can create 
an independent network of organisations to ensure their mutual freedom and survival; 
they can diversify the field and its discourses and create new possibilities by practicing 
different models. The monopoly of mainstream art destroys this freedom, as do 
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The economic crisis of 2008 initiated a shift in the political climate on a global scale: 
government policies have drifted towards the right and we have grown accustomed to 
a permanent state of war and the tightening of surveillance and bureaucracy. 
Professional and social competitiveness, materialism and “connectedness” are the 
appropriate manners, while a massive accumulation of wealth accompanies an increase 
in corporate power and a corresponding weakening of democratic processes. Together, 
these conditions result in an exponential rise of individualisation and the breakdown of 
social cohesion. Since 2009, an oppositional tide of grassroots resistance movements—
coordinated via social media—express global dissatisfaction with conditions that 
amount to erosions of the control that individuals can assert over their own lives. Has 
the growing economic austerity and the blatant privileging of material values over 
social ones politicised a whole generation of young people? Or are these 
demonstrations largely performative re-enactments of cultural stereotypes, 
inadvertently functioning to legitimise neo-liberal values, as long as their opposition 
appears to be illegitimate and coming from a demonised minority?  
The neo-liberal promise of freedom through the free market is deceptive because it 
relies on firm-lipped complicity. We experience unprecedented levels of personal 
freedom at the expense of unprecedented levels of social constraint. This constraint is 
invisible, it comes from the disembodied voice of authority in public announcements, 
from myriad CCTV cameras, from spaces of exclusion and spaces of conformity where 
every available surface screams slogans and brands at us, from the multiple choice 
between unsatisfactory answers, from the incapacity to speak to power and to receive 
any answers.  
In summary, in CHAPTER ONE: “INSTITUTIONALISED CRITIQUE” I describe the 
emergence of institutional critique in the aftermath of May 1968 when social and 
political upheavals reactivated the modernist controversy between political engagement 
and artistic autonomy. In the intervening period, art practices that attempted to 
critique and subvert the art institution from within failed and were absorbed, effectively 
reinforcing and expanding the institution’s scope. The “institution of art” refers to the 
art world as a social configuration of institutions but we also speak of the art institution 
in terms of the legitimating discourses that enable us to recognise and discuss art. 
Within this broader definition of the art institution as an ideological system, works of 
art are regarded not as singular entities but as elements of an institutional 
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determination. It is nevertheless problematic to equate art practice with institutional 
practice. A more precise definition of the institution is necessary in order to analyse the 
conditions of art practice, mediation and reception. The institution functions to 
legitimise art by conferring credit in the form of “recognition”. The art institution can 
thus be defined narrowly to include only those institutions or individuals that have the 
authority to legitimise art as such. The institution of art is socially determined, it is thus 
also internalised and entwined with our ambitions, identities, values and investments. 
Discourse determines the production of art, where practice is translated into discourse 
and discourse leads to more practice. The problem is that this serves to preserve the 
status quo. If institutional critique is a critique of the internalisation of ideology, then 
instead of problematising institutional sites while subscribing to their value-systems, it 
would be more appropriate to problematise institutions that are formative in our 
shared discourses on art and to redefine these discourses affirmatively. Institutional 
critique raises critical questions about the concept of the institution of art and the role 
of the artist within it. For Andrea Fraser, unlike movements of the historical and neo 
avant-garde which challenged art institutions and the autonomy of art, institutional 
critique on the contrary is a defence of art and art institutions against exploitation. 
Although artists practicing institutional critique seek to challenge the legitimating 
structures of the institution, they also seek recognition and rewards from the 
institution. These practices raise a pertinent question regarding the ultimate aspirations 
of institutional critique and the ambitions of critical art in general. Artists are 
profoundly invested in the values and meaning of art. Avant-garde artists did not take 
issue with museums or particular practices of interpretation, circulation, selection or 
exclusion within the art world; they took issue with the entire concept of art and its 
role in bourgeois society. Their aim to sublate art was a contradictory endeavour. 
Critical or political art is not a functionalisation of art, but it reveals and resists the 
institutionalisation of art as an exclusive field, which severs art’s connections to the 
world and conceals the instrumentalisation of art in the service of political and 
economic interests. The argument that artists can infiltrate the institution and subvert 
it from within is naïve and misleading. Institutionalisation does not happen from one 
moment to the next, it is a process of internalisation. Institutional critique takes place 
within the value system it claims to challenge, working with and upholding the very 
same values and means that it means to abolish.  
This chapter draws from the work of writers and theorists associated with institutional 
critique, including Benjamin Buchloh, Daniel Buren, Andrea Fraser, Rosalind Krauss, 
Isabelle Graw, Philipp Kaiser, Gerald Raunig and Simon Sheikh. I refer to Peter 
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Bürger’s analysis of the art institution and to Pierre Bourdieu, Thierry De Duve and 
Jacques Derrida regarding the legitimating discourses of the art institution. 
In CHAPTER TWO: I discuss the VICISSITUDES OF AUTONOMY. This chapter traces 
the concept of autonomy to Immanuel Kant with reference to Peter Bürger and Casey 
Haskins. It reviews Theodor Adorno’s thesis on autonomy with reference to Stewart 
Martin, Andy Hamilton, Jacques Ranciere, Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton. It 
discusses the role of the concept of autonomy within the art institution with reference 
to Arthur Danto and to Walter Grasskamp, Travis English, Stefan Germer on the work 
of Hans Haacke. 
In the modern era, art by definition questions its existence. Since the early twentieth 
century, artists have articulated a self-conscious ambivalence regarding the autonomy 
of art. Aesthetic autonomy is an empowering concept but it is also constitutive of the 
false idealism of art and serves to conceal the connection between culture and 
hegemony. The moment of self-consciousness of art also marks the inception of the art 
institution. It is thus possible to differentiate between the work of art and its 
institutional function and designation. A distinction emerges between the singular 
practices of artists and art as a social institution with a legitimising cultural discourse 
that enables us to recognise and talk about works of art. For Adorno the social function 
of autonomous art in the era of modernism is social critique. Art resists heteronomy by 
insisting obstinately on its own values or rules. Through its functionlessness, art resists 
the logic of capitalism as the apparent negation and critique of functionalism. The 
defence of the autonomy of art however, obscures the social and political dimensions 
of the production of art and the relationship of art to social institutions. 
Commodification in and of itself does not necessarily compromise the critical function 
of the work of art. Autonomy is a fetish and a position of complicity but the pay off is 
substantial: works of art are critical because they protest against the 
instrumentalisation of everything in capitalist society. By the end of the twentieth 
century, institutional critique revealed the pervasiveness of the art institution and the 
illusory character of autonomy. Autonomy remains a crucial though problematic 
concept because it confronts artists who set out to produce a “political” critique of 
capitalist ideology from a position of plausible neutrality, one that is circumscribed by 
the institution of art. The art institution clings to the status of autonomy, because it 
guarantees art’s symbolic value. But the institution also trades this symbolic value for 
economic and political forms of value. The posture of neutrality that institutions 
maintain raises them above the suspicion of externally determined purposes. Adorno’s 
faith in the critical value of autonomy lies in its potential to shield art from functional 
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imperatives. The institutionalisation of art conceals the ideological and financial 
instrumentalisation of art. Institutionalised art is instrumentalised and functionalised in 
one way or another and therefore heteronomously defined, not autonomous. Art 
appears to be apolitical in a way that allows it to be political in its own terms. The 
institutions of art—which legitimise art—have taken over this autonomous function, 
both by promoting autonomy as a legitimating concept and by undertaking the role of 
legislator in place of the artist. A truly critical approach would have the task of 
investigating whether art is in fact subordinate to practical ends. 
In CHAPTER THREE: GREAT EXPECTATIONS I address the political status of the artist. 
What are the politics of art? What informs artists’ ideological choices and ambitions? In 
order to address these questions I consider the work of Dave Beech, JJ Charlesworth, 
Anton Vidokle, Jakob Jakobsen and Henriette Heise on self-institutionalisation. This 
chapter considers John Searle’s analysis of institutions and refers to Pierre Bourdieu, 
Peter Bürger, Benjamin Buchloh, Boris Groys, Daniel Buren and Gerald Raunig on the 
institution of art in particular. I also consider the work of Edward Said and Jacques 
Derrida on the relationship between meaning and context.  
Art institutions present two major problems for artists, in the first case, although art 
institutions are “supporting structures”, the opportunities they provide for the 
production of art are defining contexts. Secondly, art institutions recuperate works of 
art by re-defining them in art-historical contexts. In the process of institutionalisation, 
art is separated from its particular context and subsequently re-contextualised as art 
and neutralised. Artists thematise and resist this defining context in their work, only to 
be subsumed once again within the institution. Once inside the institution, artists 
internalise its values and cannot sustain an independent critical position without 
endangering their own precarious position within the institution. The solution must 
necessarily lie in creating new contexts and to conceive of new ways to think of art in 
social space. For artists this means establishing sustainable practices and independent 
networks. John Searle demonstrates that the purpose of institutions is to create power 
relationships. Searle defines institutions in terms of their specific properties, 
distinguishing art-making practices from institutional practices. Art is not an institution 
because it is not defined by a set of constitutive rules. If the long-term aspiration 
behind artists’ self-institutionalisation is to claim a stake in the contested territory of 
the art world then this will always be vulnerable to cooptation. The politics of 
autonomy and the politics of art are thus two entirely different things. Inevitably, every 
artwork is infinitely interpretable, and it can even be argued that it will always be 
misunderstood. The work of art is always open to contingent and supplemental 
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interpretations, its meaning is dependent on a particular encounter. Meaning is 
relational and is deduced within a binding context. The work of art fulfils an objective 
role within society; this is the significance of the work, not its manifest content. The 
vague and inconsistent distinction between contemporary art and popular culture is 
evident in the impossibility of articulating any well-defined description of art that 
radically excludes popular culture. Art is not defined, art is legitimised. The question is 
how art is legitimised as art, because this is no longer a function of art itself. Artworks, 
art practices, actions or events do not have an essential ontological status; they 
acquire their status only in the context of an encounter. But if art cannot be defined, 
then how do we recognise it? The work of art is a fetish which is constituted by—
amongst other things—discourses which contain not only the affirmation of the work, 
but also an affirmation of their own legitimacy. What is camouflaged here is the 
regulation of production and dissemination of cultural production. The mechanism of 
‘qualitative’ judgement sustains this apparently natural system of the selection and 
promotion of artists. The production of a work of art involves material and symbolic 
production: the production of the value of the work and production of belief in the 
value of the work. This is the task for experts with institutionally conferred legitimacy. 
If anything can be art, then it is important that we can rely on an authority to separate 
art from non-art. The institution of art provides the conditions for the production of art 
as well as the discourses by which we recognize art. It produces discourses on the 
“meaning” of art as well as discourses on the concept of “meaning”.  Power appeals to 
artists and intellectuals for legitimation, in exchange granting relative autonomy to 
institutions that provide this service. But equally, the arts can also use their 
legitimating power to subvert power. The field of art is thus a potential site for 
symbolic revolution. This is why the progressive expansion and differentiation of the 
field is accompanied by institutionalisation as a means of control. The institution of art 
is constituted and functions as a buffer zone between art, power and society. The 
institutionalisation of art in a circumscribed field of its own conceals the 
instrumentalisation of art within the institution of art. If the work of art is dependent 
on its context and if that context is invariably the gallery, the museum or the 
collection, then the work of art is tautological. The idealism of autonomous art renders 
art apolitical and divests it of critical content by sequestering it to an extra-social 
realm. At the same time, this is precisely the process by which art is functionalised. 
The context of art determines the production of art and the meaning and value of art, 
a circular system which reinforces itself. The museum is a lacuna, it is a gap, nothing 
in itself, it acquires its meaning from the work that it hosts and exhibits. Having shed 
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the gilt frame, the work of art is now framed by the museum. Funding, sponsorship, 
selection, academic and institutional validation are understood as external factors to 
the work of art, however they encroach on and influence the production and display of 
art, they consequently have a bearing on the meaning of the work. The concept of the 
parergon thus challenges the convention that the work of art is a vessel of meaning. 
There is no meaning within the work itself, meaning is supplemented by what is 
exterior to it. There are thus no privileged interpretations of the work of art. 
Institutions effectively constitute contemporary art practice. The art institution acquires 
its status from the concept of the autonomy of the aesthetic. It is therefore capable of 
absorbing any criticism in the form of anti-art and re-presenting it as art. The notion of 
the autonomy of art perseveres, veiling instrumental decisions in a cloak of ambiguous 
aesthetic judgements that serve to legitimise institutional decisions. The institutional 
context of art breaks down the relationships of the particular elements of a work of art, 
effectively disassociating it from its social and political context. The apparent 
disconnection of the work from its context and its attachment to art history abstracts 
the work and presents it as an object free from ideology. In the lateral expansion of 
the art field there are no discernible movements, influences come from all directions 
and the production of art follows localised flourishes. Personal and subjective agendas 
are privileged over social and collective concerns. The field is one of professional 
competition rather than common aspiration. The institution of art aestheticises the 
work of art, allowing extraneous values to be attached to it. Although conceptual 
artists highlighted the politics of the museum, they also limited the scope of art 
practice in hermetic and self-conscious investigations. Institutional critique became 
dependent on the museum and foregrounded the institution as the disavowed centre 
of art. Institutional critique provided the means whereby the institution reinvents itself, 
but this reinvention is informed by a neo-liberal agenda. Artists affirm and sanction the 
museum merely by exhibiting within it. Their positive affirmation of the institution 
speaks louder than their negative critique. The institution of art determines what is 
produced and exhibited through forms of direct censorship and indirect methods of 
positive and negative reinforcement, which enforce artists’ self-censorship. The 
institution of art dictates but it also suggests, coaxes and propositions artists. Culture is 
both an industry and a battleground. The institution of art has entirely ceded to 
material objectives and political agendas and can no longer claim a critical position in 
relation to capitalism. The autonomy of art is founded on the promise of “aesthetic 
revolution”, but it is currently subject to corporate instrumentalisation and control. 
Artists need to reassert art as a free and potentially revolutionary space within society. 
 191 
Bourdieu describes the field of art as a struggle between two principles, the 
heteronomous principle and the autonomous principle. This power struggle takes place 
within the institution of art even before it takes place within the work of art. The field 
of power asserts the heteronomous principle as a value in the field of art. The buffer 
zone that in bourgeois society traditionally encircles and protects art, now converts it 
into a field of mass-production. The insistence on applying the heteronomous principle 
of value in the art world creates a large-scale cultural industry, a powerful mainstream. 
Being thus at odds with the disinterested values of the field, this institution promotes a 
climate of estrangement amongst the producers. The relationship between autonomy 
and heteronomy is dialectical. Given that artists occupy a dominated position in the 
institution of art, there is always the pressure of external economic or political 
interests. To consider the principles at play within the work of art we must also 
consider the principles at play at the level of power, because the power structure of 
the field determines the production and representation of the field, rendering its own 
role invisible. Currently, the field of art is characterised by a very low degree of 
autonomy. Art is one more weapon in political struggles. The field of cultural 
production is the site of struggles: at stake is the power to impose the definitions of 
the artist as well as the definition of those who are entitled to define the artist. Artists 
are not socialists, democrats or liberals. When we say “autonomy”, we mean “art is its 
own politics”. But artists do not institutionalise their politics. Art is an autonomous 
sphere because artists create their own rules and they defend their right to create their 
own rules. Artists self-consciously negotiate their autonomy, hand it over as a 
commodity in exchange for recognition.  
In CHAPTER FOUR: NO STARS NO FUNDING NO TASTE I discuss The Exploding 
Cinema Collective as a productive counterpoint to art institutions. Its constitution was 
motivated by its predecessors and informed by the potential disasters of official 
recognition and support. Exploding Cinema is unique in that this vision was never 
abandoned or compromised, the question is how did it manage to survive? This 
chapter addresses this question with reference to the research of Duncan Reekie, Peter 
Thomas, Stefan Szczelkun and Michael Mazière on the underground film scene in 
London.  
Artists have responded to exclusion by creating their own spaces, events and 
networks, thus practicing a negative critique of the predominant and naturalised 
bourgeois ideology of the art world. These distributed practices often fail to grow to 
produce an enduring alternative culture for the production and distribution of art. 
These failures can be traced to the artist’s desire for recognition. Art and popular 
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culture recycle common strategies, techniques and ideas against a backdrop of social 
and political shifts. The Exploding Cinema Collective is a resistant subculture, its roots 
are not in art but in the underground. Exploding Cinema does not aspire to distinctions 
and recognition within the art world. The assumption that the state should fund artistic 
production and the associated assumption that funding should be provided with no 
strings attached may be embedded in the liberal tradition, but it is naïve. Throughout 
Europe and the US in the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of feminist, civil-
rights and anti-war movements, artists’ groups coordinated their efforts against the 
ossified traditions of art institutions and art schools, and tried to bridge the gap 
between art and life. Why did these efforts fail to meet their objectives? What are the 
factors that have contributed to the current state of affairs, where art is ubiquitous but 
institutionalised, exclusive, safe and expensive? A number of factors came into play, 
amongst them were the lack of solidarity amongst artists and their incapacity to self-
organise; the recuperation of anti-art as an aesthetic object by the art institution; and 
a naivety concerning the artists’ ambitions and their articulation. Critique was 
transformed into stylised activism within the museum,  and functioned as an 
institutional self-vaccination. The reason for the failure of artists’ ambitions throughout 
the twentieth century is the confusion amongst artists about what is actually at stake 
in the affirmation of artistic autonomy. Exploding Cinema is an ideal context: a plural 
and inclusive space of social interaction without divisions, a space of proximity 
between artists and audience, a community that is engaged and egalitarian. The 
resistance that is built into Exploding Cinema against all forms of institutionalisation 
can be found in the collective’s constitution which emphasises: open access screenings 
for a diverse popular audience; open, inclusive and voluntary membership; non-profit-
making and non-funded financial base; collective governance, rotation of roles and 
duties and skill-sharing rather than specialisation and hierarchy. The most influential 
precedent for Exploding Cinema was the London Film-Makers’ Co-operative (1966-
1995-2002). The early days of the LFMC served as an inspiration and set the precedent 
for Exploding Cinema’s emphasis on distribution, activism and democratic governance. 
The subsequent dependence of the LFMC on funding, its capture by the funding 
agencies and its dissolution functioned as a warning that was incorporated into the 
Exploding Cinema collective agreement. From its beginnings as an independent field of 
experimental film and video, the LFMC became the productive subsidiary of public 
cultural institutions. This process revealed how the supporting role of cultural 
institutions eventually exercise ideological and bureaucratic control over the productive 
field. This process is so naturalised within the institution of art that it is indisputable 
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and unchallenged. The instrumentalisation of art by museums, corporations and 
government institutions is a well-documented fact within the art world; art is recast in 
public relations and marketing jargon and government policy. The question is why do 
artists continue to participate in and supply these promotional mechanisms? Artists will 
use any opportunity to produce new work, and they are not always aware of what they 
hand over in return. Public funding comes with no fewer strings attached than private 
sponsorship or the market. Publicly funded art often amounts to the functionalisation 
of art in the name of institutional policies, whatever the particular terms of the agenda. 
If artists accept financial support, they are in effect legitimising the values affirmed in 
the terms of funding bodies and the functionalisation of their work. The logic behind 
the founding of Exploding Cinema was along the lines “what can we do to make sure 
this does not happen again”. Artists complain about their grievances in private but not 
in public. This fosters the mystification and normalisation of the art world, prolonging 
its function to individualise artists and re-direct their efforts to externally determined 
purposes. Participatory art projects strive to collapse distinctions between performer 
and audience, professional and amateur, production and reception. They emphasise 
collaboration and collectivity. However, participation is not intrinsically political or 
oppositional and the public is not inherently passive. Factors that have contributed to 
Exploding Cinema’s continued existence over the last twenty years is the open-access 
principle and the tolerance of its open membership structure. Participation as an 
unspoken priority is a crucial principle governing the structure of Exploding Cinema. It 
provides film-makers with access to audience without censorship and a space for 
exchange. Curatorial selection is at best a subjective judgment and at worst it is 
censorship, cultural exclusion and political enculturation. It stands for and carries out 
the function of institutional legitimation, patronising and disempowering both the 
audience and the artist. Art is the product of a collective effort. Works of art emerge 
through a process which includes the exchange of feedback; a collaborative aspect of 
art practice that is never acknowledged. At Exploding Cinema, this process is public 
and part of the reception of the work, it includes and empowers the audience. 
Consensus plays a crucial role and in the public reception of art, without this 
consensual judgement, art becomes subject to the criteria of authority and the 
monopoly of the definition of art. The availability of film-making technologies to a 
wider public has increased the need for spaces like Exploding Cinema, with its 
inherently popular structure. Artists are engaged in a relentless struggle for 
recognition. Artists are resigned to this state of affairs as though it were a form of 
natural selection. If artists refused to enter into unequal relationships that they felt 
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compromising, the art world would become transformed. Artists are trapped within 
their guarded autonomy and their dependence on the institution. The commodity form 
does not limit the critical potential of art. The stubborn pursuit to detach art from its 
commercial aspect has only succeeded in making the process of ascribing value to art 
more mysterious. The commodity character of the work of art does not limit its critical 
potential, and the eradication of the materiality of the commodity does not eradicate 
capitalist exchange because symbolic capital is also a form of currency. 
Commodification is the prerequisite for autonomy, just as heteronomy is the 
consequence of patronage. Art is valuable because of its use value, not its exchange 
value. To privilege the use-value of art is to affirm that art is what we use it for, the 
use-value of art is its meaning. Consensus plays a crucial role in the public reception of 
art because without consensual judgement, art becomes subject to the criteria of 
authority. The concept of autonomy is the product of a culture which defines within 
itself a territory where its rules do not count. Critical art plays a strategic role in the 
legitimisation of the critical profile of the art institution. If art is the critical alternative 
to society then it cannot function within its own internal politics like the rest of society. 
The notion of autonomy in art might offer a measure of freedom, empowering artists 
to create subjective and insular systems of signification, nevertheless, this is where 
“affirmative culture” is at its most successful, it objectifies and commodifies the artist’s 
subjectivity, so the intended critique fails. As long as artists and their institutions 
continue to aspire to the recognition of the museum by subscribing to its values they 
will always be caught within heteronomously defined or alienated conditions. Artists 
must detach themselves from reliance on the legitimising structure of the art world. 
They must also readdress the discourse of art and the values that it implicitly promotes 
and reclaim the complex and contradictory histories of art and of artists from their 
recuperation, they must devise means of independent production, to contact their own 
audiences and to collaborate with other artists in these goals. Exploding Cinema is a 
space for consensus and disagreement, it is both a critique and a way of life. It is a 
model of the kind of society we want. By building models of the type of society we 
want, in artist-run spaces, collective projects and local communities we can make 
improvements in the present and these will function more effectively to undermine the 
status quo than any negative critique. It is possible at any time to have plural, multiple 
definitions of art and to regard them as simultaneously valid. One form of art does not 
invalidate another and the pluralism of art does not presuppose a distinct audience for 
each form of art. Real autonomy can be accomplished by pursuing pragmatic short-
term goals with self-sufficient means. For artists this means establishing sustainable 
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practices and independent networks. This should not be confused with a desire to 
supplant the mainstream, but to bypass it entirely with a terrain of diverse approaches, 
small organisations and institutions. 
This thesis addresses artistic ambition in the context of contemporary art. The ambition 
for institutionally-bestowed recognition is the single factor behind the failure and 
recuperation of collectives and artist-run spaces. We participate in and simultaneously 
produce and reproduce the ideologies of the institution, it is thus important to 
demystify the function of the art institution. The significance of the failure if LFMC in 
relation to the field of contemporary art is that it reveals how in a short time the forces 
that play a supporting role, eventually control the productive field. This process is now 
so naturalised within the field of art that it is indisputable and unchallenged. The 
reason for the failure of artists’ ambitions throughout the twentieth century is the 
confusion amongst artists about what is actually at stake in the affirmation of artistic 
autonomy. The autonomy of art is not aesthetic, it is political because it defines a 
sphere for the critique of power and it defines artists as free agents.  
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